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FOR MY MOTHER AND FATHER

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INTRODUCTION

One of the continuing ironies of Karl Marx' works is that, though he comes out of an extremely complex and rich intellectual tradition, he offers us little direct insight into the philosophical foundations of his own methodology in his critique of political economy. The heart of this book will be devoted to the investigation of the epistemological and methodological foundations of Marx' political economy with special emphasis on his later economic writings in the *Grundrisse* and *Capital*. *Capital* in particular, will be examined as his response to certain epistemological and meta-theoretical dilemmas raised and developed in the philosophical tradition of German Idealism, which he then incorporates into his own critique of liberal capitalism.

This book will trace the evolution of the critical method used by Marx from 18th-century metaphysics and epistemology to 19th-century German political economy. These philosophical traditions and the evolution of the "method as critique" were partly a response to the epistemological questions raised by David Hume in his critique of science. His central focus was around the crisis of the philosophical justification of science and of the 'dilemma of objective validity'; the latter is defined as the difficulty of relating and validating the relationship between thought and reality. Of further concern is the analysis of how Kant, Hegel, Schelling, Feuerbach, and Marx deal with this crisis of epistemology and scientific validation. The result is a critique of the traditional views of positivism in both its empiricist and rationalist forms and the necessity to rethink the methodological foundations of Marx' political economy. After these considerations the fascinating developments in Marx' approach to political economy in his later writings take on a completely new configuration and meaning. His critique of bourgeois science and positivism radically transforms his own method of analysis of capitalist society in very unexpected, exciting, and radical ways. These sometime obscure meta-theoretical issues are really not the remnants of some fanciful metaphysical system inherited from the Hegelian imagination, which he proceeds to incorporate *en masse* into his critique of capitalism. They are the heart of any serious attempt to examine the methodology of social science. The goal of this work is not to reconstruct or revive the Geist of Hegel, but the vision of Marx.

These epistemological issues are the unraised questions that ground Marx' whole approach. What must be done is a clarification of these issues and comparison of them with his analysis of the logic of capital and his use of the critical method. If epistemology and methodology fall into place, are logically consistent, and help explain each other, then we will have made a small contribution to an understanding of 19th-century

political economy. With this in mind the reader will be taken through three meta-theoretical levels of Marx' method of analysis of the structures of capitalism: (1) the clarification of 'critique' and method from Kant's epistemology, Hegel's phenomenology, to Marx' political economy (Chapter One); (2) the analysis of 'critique' and time, that is, the temporal dimensions of the critical method as they evolve from Hegel's *Logic* to Marx' *Capital* and the difference between the use of the future in explanatory, positivist science and 'critique' (Chapter Two); (3) and finally, 'critique' and materialism, a study of the complexity of the category of materialism, the ambivalence and ambiguity of its use in Marx' critical method, and the ontological and logical dilemmas created by the Schelling-Feuerbach turn toward materialism in their critique of Hegel (Chapter Three). The critique of political economy is, therefore, examined at the levels of methodology, temporality, and ontology.

To what do the categories of political economy really refer when the positivist interpretations of Marx have been shattered and 'critique' becomes the method of choice? What kind of knowledge do we have if it is no longer "scientific" in the traditional sense of both epistemology and methodology? And what kind of applicability will it have when its format is such as not to produce predictive, technical knowledge, but practical knowledge in the Greek sense of the word (praxis)? What becomes of the criterion of truth when epistemology itself, like science, is undermined by philosophical reasoning? Finally, what is the criterion for the evaluation and validation of knowledge produced by social praxis? These then are only some of the issues and questions to be dealt with in this first part. To get at these very perplexing and hotly debated questions we must first uncover the German tradition and its use of the term 'critique' in its epistemological, phenomenological, and political economic forms and its three dimensions as method, time, and materialism.

The book continues with the examination of the actual application of Marx' epistemology to his method of social critique and critique of British and French political economy. As the work moves from epistemology to methodology the reader will see how German philosophy becomes incorporated into a new 'science' of critical political economy (Chapter Four). Epistemology becomes an actual force in method. Also in this section the transition from method and theory to social practice is examined along with the methodological problems and implications for Marx' notion of 'theory and practice' (Chapter Five). The utilitarian, pragmatic, functionalist, or positivist readings of Marx' social practice have been the generally accepted interpretations for both Marxists and non-Marxists alike. Reading Marx in the context of the critiques of epistemology and science of the German tradition and the

revised reading of his critical method, radically transforms our understanding of his use of praxis as an epistemological category. The philosophical justifications for both science and epistemology have collapsed and Marx must search elsewhere for a basis for the validation of his critical method. It now lies nowhere in theory, since meta-theory has been undermined along with science itself. What is startling are some of the similarities these issues and problems have with contemporary post-empiricist philosophy of science. The third part centers around the legacy of Marx, a critique of some of the contemporary interpretations of Marx as a positivist by Wellmer, Habermas, and Baudrillard, the moral philosophy and democratic consensus theory underlying social praxis, and the further implications of his ideas and method for modern social theory (Chapter Six).

The two major purposes of this work are, on the one hand, to expose the hidden methodological foundations and assumptions of political economy as they develop from the 18th- and 19th-century philosophical debates and, on the other, to examine Marx' response to them along with his own critique of science and positivism in his later works. I recognize that this is going against the grain of some of the most known and accepted interpretations of Marx, but I have always been uncomfortable with the general interpretations of his supposedly scientific method in his economic writings. This results from their lack of analysis of the epistemology which structures his social critique and their general reliance on specific passages, many times pulled from context, to carry the weight of their positivistic readings of *Capital*. For this latter work to be an example of explanatory science with its predictive and positivistic categories, its whole meta-theoretical framework would have to be archaeologically discovered and clearly defined.

Positivism is a theological perspective, whose central tenets lie in the belief in scientism and objectivism. That is, its central component is based on the belief in the exclusionary centrality of science as the only form of legitimate knowledge and in the metaphysical belief in the existence of an objective physical and social reality. This philosophy of science has its own epistemological, methodological, and ontological assumptions and foundations. Its methodology assumes the independence of an *objective reality* (metaphysics of science), which can be examined with a value-free method (*objectivity*), producing independently verifiable *objective facts*, which mirror the *objects of nature or society*. Marx' *Capital* has generally been interpreted using either the empiricist or rationalist variants of positivism. However, this book will show that *Capital*, rather than being a 19th-century product of positivist thinking, represents one of the most articulate criticisms of this approach.
Marx' critique of positivism will be examined through his theory of consciousness, objectivity, false universalism, and his critique of

fetishism and epistemology. He undermines its epistemological, methodological, temporal, and ontological assumptions, its theory of science and verification, its instrumental rationality, and its technical purposes of application. With this critique the meaning of *Capital* and, in turn, Marx' whole critique of political economy takes on a new character; this major work must be rethought and its place in the development of Marx' thinking must be re-examined. This will involve a major reassessment of his intentions, theories, and methodologies. Marx' goal was not to develop a positivist theory of political economy, but a critique of positivism itself, which would involve a new set of assumptions regarding knowledge, method, and verification.

In *Capital* Marx analyzes the logic and structure of capital, not the history of capitalism. While the historical institutions and relationships are joined to social theory, they are united only at the level of logic and do not immediately reflect social reality as it exists. The philosophical foundations of Marx' methodology in *Capital* have a very complex meta-theory due to the unusual nature of his borrowings from European philosophy. His critique of capitalism is a structural, historical, and technical critique of its institutions and values whose ultimate purpose is the critique of all forms of false consciousness, *i.e.*, false claims to scientific knowledge by the positivism of classical political economy and political theory.

Though there have been excellent works on Marx' method, theorists have not dug deep enough to find the depth-structures which underlie and support that method. For a good interpretation of Marx' science and positivism there must be a correspondingly good interpretation of his epistemology and meta-theory which would justify such a position. But this has not really been done. I think, mainly because it simply does not exist implicitly or explicitly in Marx. Marx is too closely tied to German Idealism and its constitution theory of truth for this to happen. The interpretations of Marx' positivism need an epistemological justification, which, I will argue, is not there. What is there both explicitly and implicitly is the German intellectual tradition and its very rich and complex reaction to traditional positivism, its scientific method and epistemology.

Marx pushes his analysis of science beyond traditional categories to include knowledge as an expression of praxis, creativity, and objectification (sociology of knowledge), as an expression of power and class relations (critique of ideology), and finally, as an expression of the whole array of the historically specific institutions of society (political economy). Marx was moving in the direction of social praxis within the institutional limits of political economy. If consciousness, the objects of consciousness, the categories of knowledge, and the criterion of truth are formed within particular social formations and modes of

production, then there is a direct relationship between knowledge and self-consciousness, on the one hand, and the types of social institutions found in liberalism on the other. A corollary theme involves the analysis of the integration of epistemology with political economy. Social institutions and the resulting interpersonal relationships are part of epistemology for they have the ability to distort and undermine the quest for self-consciousness and moral autonomy. The clarification of the meaning of social practice and its grounding of truth- and validity-claims will be studied in relation to the manner in which the social system fosters or restrains the search for truth; false consciousness and ideology are products of a society which attempts to hide the power structures and social forms of domination and exploitation. Thus the early and later political economy are viewed as forms of social epistemology.

Somehow when considering the epistemology and methodology of Marx' later economic works these issues have been forgotten, as he is generally viewed within the positivist tradition and its defense of objective science. Therefore, this work will establish the epistemological continuity between his earlier and later works and his rejection of the modern science of the British economists; it will show the continuity between his theory of objectivity and false universalism as it develops from his early anthropological critique in 'On the Jewish Question' and 'Private Property and Communism' to the methodological analysis of his later political economy in the *Grundrisse* and *Capital*. The real change is not one from philosophy to science, but from an application of his critical epistemology, *i.e.*, his theory of objectivity and praxis in his philosophy of man to the methodological foundations of his later social critique. This will mean that the categories of science, 'critique', materialism, and 'theory and practice' will have to be rethought along with a new interpretation of the nature of political economy. This, in turn, will radically alter the way Marx' economic categories and theory have been understood. The generally accepted division between Marx' critical and early writings and his later scientific ones yields to an understanding of the continuity of a critical science with roots deeply placed in both materialism and idealism.

If positivism is abandoned as the appropriate form of science, then the issues of the normative foundations and justifications of knowledge, the evaluation and critique of the social institutions of liberalism and their effect on the creation of knowledge and human consciousness become very important. Thus we cannot lose sight of the fact that Marx' methodology can be examined from four simultaneous perspectives: its internal logic, its epistemological foundations, its place in the broader analysis of social knowledge which includes social psychology and the critique of knowledge and ideology, and the relationship between

method and social practice. To summarize, this work is about the meta-theoretical foundations (epistemology and methodology) of Marx' political economy and analysis of modernity in terms of their relation to the developments in the classical epistemology of German Idealism. It will also examine how Marx' method is still relevant for a critical insight into the structures and values of modern capitalism. A short overview of the range of issues and their logical development to be dealt with in the analysis of Marx' methodology in *Capital* entails the following:

Epistemology in Classical German Idealism

1. a critique of the traditional justifications of science - induction and deduction in Hume's *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.*
2. the crisis of science and the undermining of the ability to justify philosophically science at all resulting from Hume's scepticism.
3. a critique of epistemological theories and an undermining of both rationalism and empiricism in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason.*
4. an analysis of the 'dilemma of objective validity' and the philosophical problems of justification of concepts and their relation to reality, that is, the justification of the relation between ideas and reality, subjectivity and objectivity (Hume, Kant, and Hegel).
5. Hegel's critique of epistemology in general and a new theory of consciousness which is social and historical in his *Phenomenology of Spirit.*
6. Hegel's definition of science as the dialectical self-movement of the Concept (*Begriff*).
7. the Hegel critiques of Feuerbach and Schelling which establish the later philosophical foundations of historical materialism. Feuerbach's turn to sensuous reality (materialist moment) and Schelling's separation of concepts and reality and his critique of Hegel's identity theory (idealist moment), thereby reinforcing the original problem of the 'dilemma of objective validity', thought solved by Kant and Hegel.
8. the development of the dialectical method and the notion of temporality implicit in this logical form from Hegel's *Logic*, where the future unfolding of the Concept represents the actualization of the past and where the end is already contained in the present (totality). A different understanding of time and history and the role of reflective consciousness than occurs in the positivist tradition.

Marx' Meta-Theory and Modern Political Economy

9. the transition from epistemology to methodology and the development of the real concrete implications of the above epistemological issues for Marx' logico-historical method.
10. Marx' theory of objectivity (methodological, perceptual, and metaphysical objectivity) and false universality in the *Early Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* and their later methodological implications.
11. his critique in the 'Theses on Feuerbach' and *The German Ideology* of the traditional theories of epistemology, and positivism in particular, in light of his theory of objectivity and his sociological constitution theory of truth (historical materialism as epistemology).
12. the epistemological and methodological importance of his notion of the fetishism of the categories as the methodological application of the idea of alienation to his later writings on the critique of political economy.
13. the formation of a science of political economy based on three crucial elements - the method of 'critique' (from Kant's transcendental, Hegel's phenomenological, to Marx' political-economic critique), the dialectical method of the development of the Concept (*Begriff*) of capital, and the temporal dimensions of the method in which the future represents the development of the original past internal logical contradictions of commodity production (Hegel's *Logic*).
14. the sociology of knowledge and critique of ideology as further critiques of positivism; the objects of immediate experience are pre-structured and pre-formed within the social formation of a class society based on private accumulation and property.
15. the distinction in Marx between political economy as method of presentation (*Darstellungsmethode*) and research method (*Forschungsmethode*). Marx' method of immanent critique - not a mirroring of historical reality as is the case with an explanatory science of positivism, but a critique of the attempts at an ethical justification of the liberal values of liberty, freedom, and social justice in a society characterized by the theory of value, labor abstraction, unpaid surplus labor, class antagonisms, rising organic composition of capital, tendency of the profit rate to fall, and chronic economic crises, on the one hand, and by alienation, reification, economic misery, and distorted human development on the other. Marx' economic crisis theory is an expression of both the logic of capital (essential conceptual contradictions) and its ethical critique.

Beyond Meta-Critique

16. Marx' critique of epistemology, positivism, and foundationalism and the turn toward social praxis as the basis and criterion of truth in his 'theory and practice'. Praxis is viewed from the methodological, epistemological, and ethical perspectives and is intended to solve the crisis of knowledge raised by Hume.
17. epistemology is transformed into a political economy, a sociology of knowledge, critique of ideology, and moral philosophy, that is, into a social theory. Political economy is, in turn, the social framework within which consciousness and the objects of consciousness are created (social epistemology) and the framework within which the very possibility of moral action and moral autonomy takes place (social ethics).
18. Finally, the criterion of the truth of social practice is found in the institutionalization of democratic consensus seen in the *Paris Manuscripts*, *The Civil War in France*, and the 'Critique of the Gotha Program' and in the philosophical tradition from Aristotle, Rousseau, to J. S. Mill. The notion of praxis used by Marx includes both the model of work from Hegel and the model of political participation from Aristotle.

The difficulty with laying out the argument so succinctly is that it appears as a simple linear progression of ideas from Hume's epistemology to Marx' political economy. The reader should note that each idea will continue to affect every other one, turning Marx' methodology into a very complex philosophical problem which will look more like the double helix of DNA. The dialectic becomes a real part of the presentation of Marx' own ideas as the book moves from the philosophical foundations of Marx' epistemology in classical German philosophy, his meta-theory and its application, to political economy, and to the legacy of Marx beyond epistemology and meta-critique.

Outline of the Work

Part I: The traditional theories of consciousness, objectivity, and science will be examined as we develop the implications of the German critiques of epistemology and science for the new social 'science'. This will not be a simple analysis of the development of Marx' method from idealism to materialism, rationalism to empiricism, or from philosophical abstractions to concrete historical analysis. Those distinctions are more caricatures than workable perspectives. Marx' use of the dialectical method is in part a direct response to the 18th-century questioning of the nature of knowledge that led beyond science to a

critique of epistemology itself. The first part of the work, as we have seen, involves the analysis of the development of the philosophical foundations of Marx' later writings on political economy. The meta-theoretical foundations of Marx' critique of British capitalism lies in his ideas on epistemology. How does Marx form his political economic categories; what role do they have in social critique; what are the normative foundations of his analysis; what relationship is there between his concepts and the social reality they analyze; and how is this relationship justified in his 'theory and practice'? Over the past few years these issues have been seen as relatively unproblematic, since the philosophical context of his political economy (positivism) has gone mostly unquestioned. Some authors had recognized the continuity between his early and later writings and the humanistic enterprise that underlay both parts of his intellectual life. But even given that his later writings were still seen to be scientific in the positivist tradition and thus not open to serious philosophical questioning. This work will show the epistemological continuity between his early and later works. Though his particular method of analysis changes from the early emphasis on Feuerbach's transformative method and philosophical anthropology in the *Paris Manuscripts*, to some positivistic experiments of his middle period in *The German Ideology* and *Communist Manifesto*, it is in the later period that he incorporates the materialistic critical method developed from the German Idealist and Left Hegelian traditions into his analysis and critique of the categories and structures of political economy in the *Grundrisse* and *Capital.*

The incorporation of immanent critique, the dialectical method, and his notion of social practice into a critique of British positivism and their science of political economy forms the foundation of Marx' approach. We will see how the methods, developed within the German Idealism of Kant, Hegel, and Schelling, were transformed to meet the specific needs of Marx' social critique. His epistemology and the direction of his dialectical method are predicated on the very same problems and issues dealt with in this tradition. It will be shown that Marx did not simply take over an unreflected methodology, but was aware of the philosophical reasons for the necessity of a dialectical method, which was, for him, the only alternative to the inadequacies of traditional empiricism and rationalism and epistemology in general. Their attempt to deal with the questions of the foundations of epistemology and truth were grounded in a false set of assumptions about the nature of knowledge and consciousness. This connection of the original philosophical foundations of idealism and the problems it was responding to will help clarify some of the later difficulties of interpreting Marx' methodology in his political economy.

In particular, idealism was certainly a response to the issues raised

by David Hume and the crisis of science he precipitated. Hume's critique of the ability to ground philosophically deductive and inductive logic, his critique of epistemology and the logic underlying the very possibility of epistemology, his analysis of the 'dilemma of objectivity validity', and his skepticism regarding modern science are picked up by the German intellectual tradition and, in turn, by Marx. They remain to this day the crucial epistemological problems surrounding any attempt to ground a serious study of society. Kant attempts radically to solve these problems within the generally accepted framework of epistemology by synthesizing rationalism and empiricism within his transcendental logic. It is Kant's 'critique' of epistemology, correspondence theory of truth, the traditional relationships between subjectivity and objectivity in the knowledge process, and his development of a constitution theory of truth, which furthers and expands Hume's original insights. They also form the basis of the conventionalism of modern neo-Kantian philosophy of science in the 20th century which will be analyzed in part of Chapter Five.

However, it was Hegel in his *Encyclopaedia* and *Phenomenology*, who transformed epistemological issues into a phenomenological critique and social theory. That is, he realized that the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity and the formation of consciousness took place within the cultural value systems of historical societies. Consciousness itself was transformed from the abstract and transcendental subjectivity of the *Critique of Pure Reason* to the historical subject as it negates its own cultural expressions as external and alien and recognizes its own subjectivity as the only truth. Crucial at this early stage is that Hegel did not represent simply another form of idealism, but was, in fact, responding to the same types of questions as Kant in the latter's analysis of Hume's reflections on the nature of truth-claims and science.

At each point in this development the critiques of traditional epistemology and science became more vocal and more radical. Hegel still caught up in identity theory and the dialectical unfolding of the Absolute Spirit fails to make the final break which will be made by Marx. If subjectivity and objectivity are both constituted in the process of thinking and producing, knowledge and labor; if epistemology and science are undermined as legitimate forms of knowledge; if the relationship between concepts and reality becomes more tenuous and problematic after Kant, Hegel, and Schelling; if consciousness is formed not in a transcendental consciousness and logic, but under real conditions of social interaction and cultural development, then Marx takes the final step by stating that the criterion of truth is established by social practice within the material conditions of society. Epistemology has evolved from the consideration of the privileged forms of knowl-

edge through concepts (rationalism) and sense experience (empiricism) to an understanding that it is constituted in cultural and social formations (social theory). This is the Copernican revolution in sociology.

The response of both Kant and Hegel to these issues must be analyzed not only for the purpose of tracing the development of the critical method from German Idealism to Marx' materialism, but also for giving us important clues as to the ultimate underlying reasons for the development of the German alternatives to the traditional epistemologies. This will in turn give us crucial insights into many of the philosophical reasons left unarticulated by Marx for his approach to social critique. There is a profound logical discontinuity between Marx' methodological reliance on the German intellectual tradition and the later claims made by other theorists about Marx' positivism, materialism, and economic determinism. To have the latter there must be a complete rejection of the former. This I will argue is not the case. The application of science and positivism to his later works will be seen as highly problematic, if not improbable, given our understanding of the nature of the critical and dialectical method and its philosophical assumptions about subjectivity and objectivity and a constitution theory of knowledge. His method and logical approach represent philosophical responses to the serious deficiencies of traditional epistemology and philosophy of the social sciences. By incorporating this method into his political economy he was also incorporating the whole tradition with its philosophical problems and questions. Uncovering these questions will lead to an uncovering of many important methodological issues of Marx' critique of capitalism in *Capital.*

It seems that much of the secondary interpretations of Marx, when tracing the evolution of his method, show the connection between German philosophy and his political economy, between idealism and materialism, between philosophy and science; what is lacking, however, is an analysis of German philosophy as a response to the crisis of science and epistemology, which continues to be important to Marx in the formation of his new method of social critique. The same problems of objective validity, the critique of privileged representations, the relations between concepts and reality, theory and history, morality and social structures, knowledge and social action, *etc.* become incorporated into his meta-theory and his formulation of political economy in his later writings. It is this type of relationship between philosophy and political economy which must be investigated. German Idealism is not simply the historical predecessor to materialism and historical analysis, but continues to supply Marx with his underlying philosophical foundation, justification, and most important of all, his epistemological vision. To have a political vision one must also have a political

epistemology.

Within this discussion of the classical German tradition and Marx a central focus will be on the analysis of the evolution of the concept and method of 'critique' as a specific form of science that developed within the German philosophical traditions of the 18th and 19th centuries. As the method of 'critique' develops from Kant's transcendental analysis to Hegel's more radicalized and historicized form of phenomenological critique to Marx' critique of political economy, we will trace the development of the philosophical issues to which the critical method is a specific German response. This will greatly aid us in the later clarification of Marx' method in part two. This section also represents a critical analysis of the thoughts of Habermas and others relating to Marx' method of 'critique', which partially accounts for its more detailed exegesis and working through of the issues. Though Habermas is very interested in the question of the evolution of the critical method from Kant to Marx in *Knowledge and Human Interests* he does not continue the investigation into Marx' later political economy. The reasons for this are clear in that he accepts the positivistic interpretation of *Capital* as we shall see in Chapter Six and he also accepts the neo-Ricardian Cambridge School criticism of the metaphysics of Marx' labor theory of value. Habermas, therefore, turns away from the most interesting developments of 'critique' in German thought into analytic language philosophy and reconstructive phenomenological philosophy.

Though Marx himself has left us with little epistemological/ methodological writings except short pieces scattered throughout his lifetime of works, it will be argued that the foundation and justification of Marx' method of critique of capitalist social forms involves similar philosophical problems and issues found in Kant, Hegel, and Schelling. It is ultimately the relationship between the concepts of political economy and the historical social forms which create these problems for Marx. Only after we go through the above analyses does the relationship become clearer; they cannot be accepted as given from the start with some generalized notion of materialism and science. These categories themselves must come out of the textual exegesis, out of the discussion surrounding Marx' theory of objectivity, his critique of epistemology, and his method of dialectical critique in his political economy. Though it is generally recognized that Marx' method is grounded in materialism, the nature of the categories of materialism and their relation to the real world are something that must be examined further in light of the above issues in Marx' epistemology. There seems to be a real ambivalence about the nature of materialism in Marx, which is a direct result of Schelling's critique of Hegel's identity theory and the latter's synthesis of concepts and reality; it is Schelling who really questions the relationship between logic and history, the status of

categories and their range of applicability, even within the limits of his own metaphysics. The relation between logic and ontology in his works will be of real importance for Marx' solution to the problem of the relationships between concepts of political economy and social reality, theory and history, and method of research and method of presentation. Schelling's metaphysics supplies the missing methodological link between Hegel and Marx. The latter's idea of 'theory and praxis' is viewed as the response to this particular problem of objectivity validity. In the context of the German epistemological tradition Marx' methodological writings really call into question the positivistic theories of objectivity, truth, and science, which make their application to his developed theories very unlikely and improbable.

The goal of the analysis is to show that the concepts of materialism and idealism, theory and practice, history and logic are more complex and problematic than previously thought and that the political economy of *Capital* is not an example of positivistic science and, therefore, does not mirror, explain, or predict historical reality. Dialectical and critical categories cannot be made to perform methodological tricks which are not possible within their logical structures. The notion of the future used by both Hegel and Marx strikes right to the heart of the temporal dimension in positivism. The latter view of science uses a mechanistic and deterministic sense of time closely connected to the predictive capacity of future facts and events by theory. Marx in contrast to this uses the notion of time developed out of the dialectical method and Hegel's logical system. Here the notion of the future is understood as the actualization and realization of the logical principles (and with Hegel the ontological also) within Reason or the Absolute Spirit. The future does not drive beyond itself nor is it the result of the prediction of what is to come. Rather the future is the realization of the past, *i.e.* the past as its own logic. Rather than the anticipation of the "coming-to-be" of something not yet, it is the finishing of that which, logically at least, "has-already-been".

The future is a temporal dimension of the inherent possibilities both negative (economic crises) and positive (self-enlightenment) which lies in the present moment of time. The future unfolds itself from its own immanent principle (the Concept), its own rationality which exists within itself and is not imposed by science. Marx translates this as the internal contradictions of a class society which develops chronic social and economic crises due to its own internal dynamics. The key point here is that the future is not being predicted or imposed on history from an external authority, but represents the harmony and connection between the logic of the past and the present. The temporal dimensions of the past, present, and future are intimately bound together, while in the positivist tradition they are simply unconnected moments in a

mechanical world in which man is forever lost. The history of this process is nicely contained in William Weiss' work the *Domination of Nature.*

With the critiques of Hegel by Feuerbach and Schelling there is a split between history and social theory, ontology and logic which makes problematic any immediate correlation between concepts and reality. This means that Marx' notion of 'theory and practice' must continue to play a crucial role in his later writings, which opens up the question as to the epistemological status of social practice for Marx. Does practice structure the social context of the categories and consciousness (sociology of knowledge) or is it involved in determining the validity of the truth-claims themselves (epistemology). It is the acceptance of the later position which will force us back to the Greek classical tradition and forward to the post-empiricist philosophy of science of Kuhn, Feyerabend, and Rorty for further clarification of the notion of social practice and the normative foundations of political economy. It will be argued that the modern tradition will, in fact, help clarify and supplement some of the methodological assumptions of social practice that Marx' leaves unarticulated. In turn, if practice is involved in the definition and determination of truth-claims, then the methodological implications of this for political economy must also be considered.

Part II: The second part of this work deals with the application and implications of Marx' epistemology and its philosophical traditions to the real world critique of his political economy in *Capital.* That is, the translation of these philosophical questions will be examined in terms of their relation to the formation of Marx' method in his later economic writings. The methodological writings of the *Grundrisse* will be compared to the procedures used in Marx' presentation of his analysis at the start of *Capital.* The ideas of the critique of epistemology, traditional philosophical theories, and fetishism will be tied directly to the specific method and theories of economic development and crisis employed in *Capital.* The issues of false consciousness and objectivity from the *Early Manuscripts* will be taken up again in his analysis of fetishism at the end of the first chapter of *Capital.* When this is done, a different picture of Marx' method will emerge which differs greatly from the traditional view of a materialist and explanatory science. The method of beginning with commodity production and the contradiction between use-value and exchange-value is examined within the context of the nature of the dialectical method and the concept of time embodied in the notion of social totality (unfolding of the potentiality contained within the Concept of the commodity as a logically completed, but not historically completed totality).

The analysis of the simple market exchange and its normative assumptions grounded in the liberal values of equality, freedom, and liberty are compared to the actual nature of the market and labor activity within a developed capitalist economy. The past philosophical critiques of false objectivity and fetishism are connected to his critique of modern political economy with its emphasis on the factual, immediately given experience, and the formation of transcendent universal laws of economic behavior and social evolution. His whole procedure at the beginning of *Capital* and his methodological theorizing about the subject at the end of Chapter One clearly indicates a break with the positivist past and any residual positivism in his writings from the middle period. This, united to the philosophical foundations of his ideas in part one, paints a very strong picture of a method in which the relations between economic categories and historical reality are no longer privileged by a particular philosophical system. Marx' theory of surplus-value, unpaid labor, and his theory of value are analyzed within the historical context of the abstraction of the labor process from the form and quality of the production process (reduction of all labor to quantifiable time and historically specific production techniques). They are then compared to the initial liberal assumptions of the underlying political and cultural values of society in an immanent critique of the justification of the whole social system.

This process of abstraction is the key historical component of commodity production, for Marx, in which exchange-value is the result of the abstraction from all use-value characteristics of labor. Once he begins to analyze capitalist society, Marx combines his theory of value from Volume One of *Capital* with his notion of economic crises in Volume Three. Analyzing the distinction between the rate of surplus-value and the rate of profit accumulation in an historical situation characterized by the "rising organic composition of capital" - increasing use of technology in the labor process, and a rising imbalance between variable capital (wages) and constant capital (means of production), Marx develops an understanding of historical tendencies, which are the working out of the internal logic of the system in history (Concept as a logical potentiality). However, the nature of these tendencies are to be defined within the framework of Marx' meta-theory. Again the meaning of the relationship between his whole theory of economic crises and a possible breakdown thesis can be understood only after the nature of Marx' categories and their meta-theoretical status are clarified.

In the past these categories have been too quickly applied to the analysis and explanation of history without an examination of their logical and ontological status as products of thought. That is, the actual reference points of the theory were simply assumed to be the immediate historical reality. Marx was writing about the historical development of

industrial capitalism and commodity production, but he was not necessarily doing history or traditional science. Given the epistemological principles underlying his method, they do really not seem to be possible methods. The laws of capitalist evolution are not strictly historical laws, though they do apply to the historical and material conditions of capitalism; they are grounded in and are products of the real material relations of society. However, they are tendencies built into the logic of the capitalist system that work themselves out at different historical periods in different crisis forms. It is this strong idealist component that is crucial. Marx is not dealing with the historical reality directly, but with its immanent potentiality and future as expressed in his use of the method of 'critique', *i.e.*, the future as the development of the Concept and logic of capital. The end is already contained in the immediate abstractions of the original logical contradictions between a society built on material production for the satisfaction of human needs (use-value) and a society based on private accumulation and property for profits (exchange-value). The logical contradictions are the foundation upon which the historical crises manifest themselves. One, however, is not reducible to the other as logic is separated and distinct from history (the result of Schelling's critique of Hegel and Marx' partial return to Kant). How the emphasis on the idealist side of Marx will affect the treatment of his materialism will be interesting to follow. The relationship between these categories and history is determined not by the traditional form of correspondence between concept and reality, but by the transformation of the consciousness of those engaged in producing that society. The relationship is determined by the whole series of developments in the evolution of Marx' epistemology and methodology from his earlier essays to the social epistemology and sociology of knowledge in *Capital*.

This more systematic and comprehensive form of analysis drastically changes the nature of Marx' critique of political economy and the way in which it can be understood. When epistemology is tied closely to methodology a new picture of his intentions arises. Self-consciousness and truth become the result of social practice and the type of society which permits the development of a free and rational self-consciousness. Therefore, the nature of Marx' materialism, dialectic, and 'critique', viewed from within an expanded understanding of his theory of reflection, objectivity, and critique of epistemology also opens the door to further reflection on the nature of the good society and democratic consensus. Since the nature of truth and science has changed along with the relationship between 'theory and practice', then the importance of the justification of norms, moral action, and the good society becomes even more central. At the end of this part there is a comparison between Marx' epistemology and political economy and the

works of the post-empiricist philosophy of science (Kuhn, Feyerabend, Rorty, and Habermas). The major point here is to examine two apparently different traditions which come to similar conclusions regarding the critique of epistemology and foundationalism (of science) and the necessity to ground truth in social consensus. The comparisons will help clarify some of the philosophical issues about which Marx never dealt, while the philosophy of science will in turn be supplemented with ideas relating to a more sophisticated understanding of the nature of social practice in Marx' sociology of knowledge, his critique of ideology, and his examination of the nature of social interaction within capitalist societies. What might at first appear as an arbitrary juxtaposition will in the end lead to a further clarification of the possible range and value of Marx' notion of social practice as applied to his methodology. Much has already been written about praxis as an anthropological category, but everything in the German tradition now leads to praxis as the crucial category of epistemology and truth. However, this concept is not viewed from within either utilitarian or pragmatic interpretations.

Part III: Finally, the third and concluding part of this work centers around the relationship between the traditional philosophical subareas of ethics, epistemology, and social theory (political economy and social theory of knowledge). It will be shown that the traditional questions about the moral issues of right and wrong, good and bad, the nature of the good citizen and the good society, questions about the nature of knowledge, truth-claims, and the formation of consciousness are in the long run really questions about the ideals, nature, and structure of social institutions, *i.e.*, political economy. That is, the content and form within which moral issues are decided, the formation of consciousness and the justification of various claims to knowledge and truth are made within historically specific social relationships. Social class, power relationships, property ownership, political and economic power, and the social relations of production become the backdrop within which the traditional philosophical questions can be answered. Philosophy has traditionally raised these types of questions, but only within a new framework, which includes political economy, is there any hope for adequately dealing with them. It is a social theory grounded in political economy which unifies these philosophical and empirical/historical dimensions into a coherent whole; meta-theory becomes social theory.

Part Three represents the study of the implications of the previous two parts for social theory. The implications of joining Marx' epistemology, methodology, and theory of social praxis are drawn with an eye to further questions and research areas. In particular it will be shown that the traditional subareas of philosophy - ethics and

epistemology - must be understood today within the context of social theory broadly interpreted. Because of the contradictions inherent in traditional philosophy and its inability to deal with the real world, philosophy must be turned into political economy. Traditional questions of epistemology become questions of the sociology of knowledge and the critique of ideology. It also represents the broadening of the meaning of public and political, as democracy is now understood within the context of both political and social (economic) institutions; democracy, in turn, becomes a category of epistemology. Marx is tied to an expanded intellectual tradition which connects the areas of moral epistemology and political theory. In this tradition the epistemological foundations of knowledge are also questioned and resolved by the introduction of questions about the nature of the community, the economic system, the political constitution, and the social order.

This is the tradition that goes back to Aristotle's ethics. If Aristotle was concerned with the development of the virtuous man, his moral character, and the formation of a moral consensus in the polis, it is Marx who expands the notion of the public to include the whole of political economy. With a more sophisticated sense of ideology and false consciousness he is also aware of the institutions of capitalism which undermine democratic dialogue. He joins morality and democracy to the concerns of political economy. This widened scope of analysis is also part of Marx' attempt to overcome the fragmentation and alienation of traditional disciplinary division of labor and the resulting distortions of complex social problems and their possible solutions. Finally, brief mention will be made of the ethical direction in Marx' critique of epistemology, his use of 'theory and practice', and democratic theory.

There is one point of consensus regarding Marx in the history of modern thought and this is the idea that he was a revolutionizing force. However, it was in the epistemology and methodology of his critique of political economy that his truly radical nature comes to light. And these areas and issues are still very much with us today.

PART I

18TH- AND 19TH-CENTURY GERMAN PHILOSOPHY: EPISTEMOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS

CHAPTER ONE

Science and Critique: The Evolution of the German Perspective from Kant to Marx

I. INTRODUCTION

The recognized wisdom over the past few years has been that there have been fundamental breaks, divisions, and stages within the overall writings of Karl Marx. They have been characterized as epistemological breaks by Althusser or as the divisions between the young and old Marx, the split between the critique of ideology and historical materialism (Wellmer), or between the critical philosophy of praxis and scientific materialism (Gouldner). However, this chapter was designed to trace the development of the critical method from German idealism to historical materialism in order to show and stress the continuities within the German intellectual tradition and the epistemological and methodological continuities in Marx' own works. This is not to deny the discontinuities and radical breaks between Kant, Hegel, and Marx and the transformations that Marx' own works had undergone, but there is a transcending interest in the critical perspective, which is more powerful than any of their individual differences. By centering on the 'critique' many extraneous aspects of Marx' thought will be pushed aside in order to give central focus to this powerful methodological concept. The result will be a deeper awareness of the connections between idealism and materialism, the overall continuity in Marx' writings, and the necessity to rethink Marx' concept of 'theory and practice'.

From the transcendental deduction and synthetic unity of apperception of Kant's pure reason, to the dialectical and phenomenological critique of Hegel's Absolute Spirit, to the ethical humanism and non-positivist critical science of Marx, the concept of 'critique' as an epistemological, metaphysical, and sociological method needs to be analyzed. From the epistemological and meta-theoretical justification of the natural sciences in Kant, to the evolution of epistemology into phenomenology and social theory in Hegel, to the development of the critique of political economy in Marx, this singularly German methodological approach to physical and social reality represents an important starting point in reconstituting the philosophical foundations of critical social science. Though at least eight of the titles and subtitles of Marx' works contain the word "critique", there has been limited interest in investigating its meaning in

relation to his approach to social science in general and political economy in particular. Though 'critique' forms the epistemological and methodological heart of his work, its own origins have been shrouded in confusion and mystery.

This first chapter will be divided into four sections. The first will deal with Kant's notion of 'critique' from the *Critique of Pure Reason* with special emphasis on the chapter on the transcendental deduction of the categories; the second section stressing the 'Introduction' to the *Phenomenology of Spirit* will analyze Hegel's attack on Kant's epistemology and the latter's notions of consciousness and objectivity (the same theme will again be taken up in Chapter Five); the third section will be a brief overview of Marx' method, seen in the light of his view that science must be interpreted as 'critique' (the particular methodological implications for political economy will be developed in Chapter Four); and finally, the chapter will summarize the movement of the concept of 'critique' from its epistemological form to its embodiment in social critique and social science. All three authors are interested in the examination of the rational structure of knowledge and the illusions behind false claims to universality. By centering on representation (*Vorstellung*), experience (*Erfahrung*), or historical consciousness, they reconstruct the structure of consciousness in terms of formal transcendental categories, dialectical categories, or logical-historical categories. In his *Theory and Practice* Habermas had begun the process of looking at the methodological transition from Kant to Marx, but was sidetracked when he came to Marx; rather than investigating Marx' method in his works on the critique of political economy, he turned to Marx' philosophical anthropology and his notion of labor.[1] The two areas are not necessarily contradictory, but it must be questioned whether, after stressing Kant's epistemology and Hegel's critique of the false reasoning in forming first philosophies, he was mistaken in turning away from an analysis of the epistemological and methodological foundations of Marx' later economic work to analyze his anthropological foundations. Habermas missed the idea that the notions of praxis and theory are different in his early and later writings given the different assumptions of praxis as labor and praxis as theoretical and political consciousness. Thus this chapter will stress exclusively the evolution of 'critique' as a particular method of investigation from German idealism to German materialism. Its purpose is to give a quick but crucial overview of this new epistemological and scientific method, especially as applied to political economy. The rest of the book will take up various components of Marx' critical, dialectical method only briefly mentioned in this first chapter.

II. IMMANUEL KANT AND THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

For Kant, in the early stages of the analysis of pure reason, 'critique' referred to the examination of the roots and structure underlying the very possibility of cognitive experience. In the 'Preface' to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* he states that 'critique' is an alternative method to the study of knowledge and reason.

> It is a treatise on the method not a system of the science itself. But at the same time it marks out the whole plan of the science, both as regards its limits and as regards its entire internal structure.[2]

'Critique', then, is a form of metaphysics which studies the non-empirical *a priori* components of consciousness in the formation of the objects of experience and the judgments of propositions. It deals with the principles and categories of pure reason as they are applied to the experienced world. Though knowledge begins with experience, it does not necessarily follow that it arises out of experience. 'Critique', therefore, is the immanent metaphysical and epistemological method which reconstructs the structures of consciousness and objectivity in terms of the categories of the mind. It is a scientific undertaking which does not expand our understanding, but clarifies the structure, application, and boundaries of reason itself.

> It is upon this enquiry, which should be entitled not a doctrine, but only a transcendental critique, that we are now engaged. Its purpose is not to extend knowledge, but only to correct it, and to supply a touchstone of the value, or lack of value, of all *a priori* knowledge. Such a critique is therefore a preparation, so far, as may be possible, for an organon.[3]

Central to the concept of 'critique', as the method for the foundation of knowledge and science, is the epistemological question of the constitution of objectivity and the subjective moments that correspond to that activity. It is in the chapter on the 'Deduction' in the 'Transcendental Analytic', that Kant deals with the subjects of objectivity (the formation of the objects of experience) and sensation, appearances and the thing-in-itself, intuitions and thought, consciousness and reality, and the objective validity of the concepts of pure reason. This chapter remains at the heart of Kant's approach to 'critique' and represents a Copernican revolution in epistemology. Just as Copernicus had turned the astronomical world upside down with his claims of a sun-centered universe, so too had Kant revolutionized the theories of knowledge by the claim that previously all knowledge had to

conform to the objects of experience, but now the "objects must conform to our knowledge". The whole of the first *Critique* is an attempt to explain this change in the relationship between objectivity and subjectivity and the effects that this new theory of knowledge would have on our understanding of experience, natural science, and metaphysics. With the creation of this constitution theory of truth, Kant holds that consciousness plays an important part in the formation and constitution of the objects of experience; in fact, the universal and necessary elements in experience are the result of the *a priori* concepts of the understanding and not qualities and relationships existing between the objects themselves.

> For experience is itself a species of knowledge which involves understanding; and understanding has rules which I must presuppose as being in me prior to objects given to me and therefore as being *a priori*. They find expression in *a priori* concepts to which all objects of experience necessarily conform, and with which they must agree.[4]

The transcendental deduction, then, is that part of the *Critique* which shows how concepts relate to the objects of experience. By delving into the structure of the form of experience, the structuring principle of all experience, and the objective validity of the actual relationship between concepts and intuition, Kant established the meta-theoretical foundations of both experience and the natural sciences. The deduction, in seeking to establish the legitimacy of the application of the concepts of the understanding to experience, attempts to show that these *a priori* concepts are themselves the conditions for the possibility of experience itself. As Paton has said in his analysis of this problem, the categories derived from empirical intuition (empirical concepts) and those derived from pure intuition (categories of time and space) are immediately derived from experience; however, the concepts of pure thought are derived from the form of judgment and, therefore, require that the relationship and validity of the concepts be established transcendentally[5]; this is the heart of the problem of 'critique' and the to be discussed 'dilemma of objective validity'.

There are no objects in experience which correspond to the concepts in the same manner as the empirical concepts and those of space and time. Kant states that these concepts "speak of objects through predicates not of intuition and sensibility but of pure *a priori* thought; they relate to objects universally, that is, apart from all conditions of sensibility".[6] The transcendental deduction is made necessary by the very status of the concepts as not being immediately relatable to sensuous experience. In fact, Kant in B122; A90 of the

chapter entitled 'The Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding' continues to clarify the relation between thought and experience by stating that it is only by means of the pure forms of sensibility that objects appear to us. With the *Critique* Kant had changed his position from that of the ideas found in his *Inaugural Dissertation* of 1770 in which he said that the two sources of information about the world came from sensibility and intelligence. The former could give us knowledge of appearances (as they appear to us), while the second could give us knowledge of the thing-in-itself.[7] By the time of the *Critique* knowledge of the things-in-themselves had become an impossibility due to Hume's devastating analysis of the impossibility of metaphysics. In dealing with the foundations of science, Hume was skeptical that the conceptual order and framework were adequate to the experienced world. By undercutting the objective validity of immediate perception and the relation between the "relations of ideas" and "matters of fact" he was able to deprive science of its claims to universality and necessity.

Kant agreed with two aspects of Hume's position.[8] The first was that the formal connection between objects in relation to cause and effect must be universal and necessary to be called science; the second was that this formal connection was not possible simply between objects themselves. Kant thought that the relationship between objects must be viewed as *a priori* connections of the understanding "or must be given up as a mere phantom of the brain". In A93/B126 he further developed the implications of the meaning of his categories of appearance, objectivity, and experience.

> The question now arises whether *a priori* concepts do not also serve as antecedent conditions under which alone anything can be, if not intuited, yet thought as object in general. In that case all empirical knowledge of objects would thus necessarily conform to such concepts, because only as thus presupposing them is anything possible as object of experience. Now all experience does indeed contain, in addition to the intuition of the senses through which something is given, a concept of an object as being thereby given, that is to say, as appearing. Concepts of objects in general thus underlie all empirical knowledge as its *a priori* conditions. The objective validity of the categories as *a priori* concepts rests, therefore, on the fact that, so far as the form of thought is concerned, through them alone does experience become possible. They relate of necessity and *a priori* to objects of experience ... .[9]

It is not simply, then, that consciousness organizes the objects of experience or reflects on the ideas of the representations of experience

after the process is completed, but consciousness itself is involved in the process of structuring and ordering the objects of experience and thought.[10]

Having legitimated the objective validity of the transcendental concepts in Section One, Parts 13 and 14, Kant begins in Section Two of the 'Deduction' to establish more concretely the foundations and conditions of experience in the structure of consciousness. It is here that the concept of the transcendental unity of apperception is introduced. In this section Kant also undertakes a systematic exposition of the inter-relationships among intuition, imagination, and the understanding, along with the development of the idea that objectivity is tied to the unity of consciousness. Reality is that which is objective and which contains elements of externality and universality; it is always a mediated reality. Experience depends not on the ontological priority of the existent object (material unity), but on the synthetic unity of apperception (the logical subject), which gives the formal unity to sensations. The conditions for the possibility of experience thus become the conditions for the possibility of both objectivity and subjectivity. Kant asked what gives objective reality to our *a priori* modes of knowledge. This is accomplished by the transcendental concept of the object in general which organizes the sensations into a synthetic unity having objective validity.

> Apart from such synthesis it would not be knowledge, but a rhapsody of perceptions that would not fit into any context according to rules of a completely interconnected (possible) consciousness, and so would not conform to the transcendental and necessary unity of apperception. Experience depends, therefore, upon *a priori* principles of its form, that is, upon universal rules of unity in the synthesis of appearances. Their objective reality, as necessary conditions of experience, and indeed of its very possibility, can always be shown in experience.[11]

In the 'Deduction' Kant makes the necessary link between the transcendental subjectivity (synthetic unity of understanding) and the transcendental objectivity (concept of the object in general). Kant states that the appearances, as sensible representations, cannot be taken as objects existing outside of our representations. The object, then, can be viewed only as a something in general - x. This distinction is grounded in his dichotomy between the phenomenal and noumenal worlds; between the appearances and representations of consciousness only the appearances can be objects, for the latter are unknowable things in themselves. It is the unity of consciousness as the transcendental unity of apperception, the "I think", which constantly accompanies our

representations and constitutes the unity of the object. In fact, the synthetic unity of consciousness organizes and structures the appearances according to the concept of the object in general (concepts and rules) and thus makes possible their reproducibility "but also in so doing determines an object for their intuition". It is the transcendental self which makes possible the objects of intuition, since the self, through its own formal unity, guarantees the universality and objectivity of representations.

> ... - the unity which the object makes necessary can be nothing else than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations. It is only when we have thus produced synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition that we are in a position to say that we know the object ... .[12]

The objectivity and validity of representations are grounded in the synthesizing function of consciousness, in the formation of intuitions under the concept of the object in general. In earlier sections of the *Critique* the term "transcendental object" referred to the thing-in-itself, but now it refers to the formal unity of objectivity characterized by the synthetic consciousness and formal unity of the object. As Kant says in A112, without the universal functions of synthesis both objectivity and subjectivity would be impossible. The development of Kant's argument in the 'Transcendental Deduction' is a manifestation of the evolution of his understanding of the concept of subjectivity from its initial stage of pure subjectivity ("I think") to the analysis of the pure concepts of the understanding, to the subjective deduction and the threefold synthesis of the understanding (this point is further developed in Wolff's thesis on the logic of Kant's *Critique*).

III. HEGEL AND THE RADICALIZATION OF THE CRITICAL METHOD

Much of Hegel's work is a response to Kant's critical idealism. We will analyze here the phenomenological method as both an extension and radicalization of the transcendental critique developed by Kant. By stressing the *Phenomenology of Spirit* we will be able to analyze the specific response of Hegel to Kant's transcendental subject, the architectonic of Kant's first *Critique*, and the assumptions which underlie the latter's epistemology in the transcendental deduction. Implicit in this analysis will be Hegel's critique of Kant's meta-theory of the natural sciences and the weaknesses of Kant's analysis for the *Geisteswissenschaften*. Schroyer has written that "Hegel's unique

departure from the German Idealist tradition was a radicalization of its critical method."[13] Exactly which aspects of Kant's 'critique' were rejected and which were found valuable by Hegel is extremely important at this point.

> Phenomenological reflection begins with its position of immediate consciousness which it takes for granted and utilizes uncritically; but in reconstructing the self-formation process of consciousness, at every stage the standards of the preceding one disintegrate and new ones arise. Such a radicalized self-critique of knowledge moves within a phenomenological framework.[14]

For Hegel the meaning of 'critique' as the meta-theoretical foundation of experience and knowledge points to a more comprehensive interpretation of the meaning and application of the critical method. As a specific response to the transcendental deduction, Kant's method, and his concept of the synthetic unity of consciousness, the *Phenomenology* begins to develop a critical method which synthesizes both pure and practical reason within a broader interpretation of the transcendental subject; no longer the simple guarantor of the formal unity of objectivity, it is the Spirit itself which underlies the creation of social objectivity (language, culture, work, social relations, alienation, ideology, and enlightenment). Kantian subjectivity and objectivity become historical and social categories as Hegel transforms the question of the conditions for the possibility of knowledge into that of the conditions for the possibility of the historical self and knowledge in history. In the 'Analytic' Kant attempted to show that "the objects about which valid synthetic *a priori* propositions can be asserted are, strictly speaking, objects conceived by Newtonian physical theory."[15] For the transcendental deduction of Hegel the assumptions and foundations of the physical sciences represent only the initial stages for the development of human self-consciousness. From Kant's analysis of the structure of consciousness and the constitution of objectivity and the epistemological foundations of modern science, Hegel turns to the question of "what do I know I know?"

The *Phenomenology* traces the self-formative process of the development of self-consciousness; it is divided into two distinct areas - the development of the individual experience (consciousness, self-consciousness, and reason) and that of social experience (spirit, religion, and absolute knowledge).[16] As the 'Deduction' was the key to Kant's analysis, the 'Introduction' of the *Phenomenology* represents the methodological key to unlocking the secrets of Hegel's phenomenological method.

The 'Introduction' can itself be divided into three sections: the first

deals with the critique of epistemology and the assumptions which underlie the Kantian theory of knowledge. In the second section Hegel introduces his phenomenological approach and his notion of the Concept (*Begriff*). The third section analyses the problems and contradictions of science and the methodological problems associated with it; Hegel also introduces the distinction between being-for- another and being-in-itself to help explain his new theory of objectivity and rationality, which grounds the whole of his phenomenological method.[17] His major objection to Kant's epistemology in the first *Critique* rests on the assumptions of Kant's epistemology itself. He is opposed to the distinction between the appearances and the thing-in-itself, which, in turn, is the result of treating the epistemological question of cognition as a medium or instrument of knowledge by which consciousness interferes with the process of understanding the Absolute. This separation of cognition and being means, for Hegel, the separation of cognition from the very possibility of truth. Knowledge is not a matter of a simple correlation of the Concept (*Begriff*) with its object, the measuring of claims to truth by some objectively prior claims to epistemological primacy. It has been replaced in the *Phenomenology* by the requirement to trace the "way of the Soul which journeys through the series of its own configurations as though they were the stations appointed for it by its own nature ... "[18]

As Kant had done in his *Critique*, Hegel too is questioning the very possibilities and conditions of knowledge, but also the possibility of a theory of knowledge itself by his examination of the structure and foundation of consciousness. But this transcendental subjectivity with its *a priori* categories of thought and judgment is not simply given, but develops along with the historical and cultural development of Spirit itself. Hegel is still concerned with the problem associated with the distinction between consciousness and the objects of perception, consciousness and what distinguishes itself from consciousness, subjectivity and objectivity (between being-for-another and being-in-itself). It is upon this dilemma that Hegel feels traditional epistemological thought has foundered. He believes he has transcended the problem by raising the issue in a new way and in the process has created the phenomenological critique.

> Now, if we inquire into the truth of knowledge, it seems that we are asking what knowledge is in-itself. Yet in this inquiry knowledge is our object, something that exists for us; and the in-itself that would supposedly result from it would rather be the being of knowledge for us. What we asserted to be its essence would be not so much its truth but rather just our knowledge of it. The essence or criterion would lie within ourselves, and that which was

> to be compared with it and about which a decision would be reached through this comparison would not necessarily have to recognize the validity of such a standard.[19]

Here, Hegel seems to be raising the crucial issue, within a constitution theory of truth, which assumes an interactive, dialectical role between subjectivity and objectivity - about the standards by which truth-claims are evaluated. It becomes difficult given the fact that consciousness must either set the standards or respond to the standards set by the object (rationalism or empiricism); however, there is no clear division between both epistemological moments in Hegel, since consciousness itself is part of this constitutive process of objectivity. The clarification of these problems of the criterion of truth and the 'dilemma of objective validity' (relating and determining subjective concepts to objective reality) will occupy much of Hegel's philosophical time.

'Critique', as a distinctive method, initially developed out of the epistemological concerns of Kant to clarify the issue of the objective reality and validity of science, became, for Hegel, the basis for the establishment of the self-formative process of the individual in society, and, for Marx, it will turn into a sociological method of social critique. By examining the relationships between consciousness and reality, concepts and objectivity, and subjectivity and experience the three philosophers progressively transformed the method into a non-positivistic social science. The heart of 'critique' as a method represents the examination of both false universality (the epistemological moment) and false objectivity (the sociological moment) of social reality as a standard for moral and social truth. As Hegel and later Marx used the concept, 'critique' applies to the issue of the constitution of objectivity (experience, consciousness, and social reality), the validity-claims of that objective reality, and the positivity (fetishism/alienation) which it entails. It is both the reality and truth of the objective world which is being questioned in Hegel and Marx' use of the method, while, for Kant, it was the establishment of the objective reality of the concepts which was crucial. For Kant what is at stake is the constitution of nature, while for Hegel and Marx it is the constitution of society. Kant held that objectivity was constituted by the *a priori* conditions of consciousness and thus was not distinguishable as a reality independent of the synthetic unity of the imagination. Hegel now has redefined the issue of objectivity to mean the essence or truth of the object defined in terms of the criterion of consciousness itself in the process of its own self-formative development. The in-itself, as the moment of truth and objective existence, is the manifestation of the Concept, since, for Hegel, it is consciousness which sets up the standards by which it measures what it knows. Since Hegel thought that no external or

foreign criteria are introduced as in traditional epistemology, consciousness is able to investigate both being- for-another (the process of the formation of consciousness) and being-in-itself (universality of its own essential criterion which is then negated).

> Consciousness provides its own criterion from within itself, so that the investigation becomes a comparison of consciousness with itself; for the distinction made above falls within it. In consciousness one thing exists for another, *i.e.* consciousness regularly contains the determinateness of the moment of knowledge; at the same time, this other is to consciousness not merely for it, but is also outside of this relationship, or exists in itself: the moment of truth. Thus in what consciousness affirms from within itself as being-in-itself or the True we have the standard which consciousness itself sets up by which to measure what it knows.[20]

In the *Paris Manuscripts* Marx will later dispute this claim of Hegel by showing that the opposition between subject and object, consciousness and self-consciousness is "only the *history of the production* of abstract thought" and presupposes the Absolute Spirit, the identity between thought and being (identity theory), and a whole philosophical anthropology.[21] These presuppositions which underlie his critique of epistemology contain the seeds for Hegel's "uncritical positivism and uncritical idealism" in his later works.[22] Marx will pick up this idea that consciousness defines its own criterion of truth when he synthesizes the critique of ideology and the critique of capital. The determinate negation of the institutions of the capitalist social formation begins with the recognition of the social system's inability to actualize its own ethical standards and liberal ideals; it is liberal society which defines its own criteria and normative standards (being-in-itself) which are then negated by the 'dilemma of objective validity'.

The major problem faced by Kant in the 'Deduction' was the issue of the objective validity of the concepts and the validity of applying *a priori* categories to experience. The transcendental deduction is the attempt to validate the relation between the concepts and the world. However, he only really assumes this relation and never comes to terms with Hume's critique of epistemology and science. Though Kant spends most of his time analyzing the transcendental deduction, he never really philosophically justifies the relations between concepts and reality. These are assumed from the beginning, after which he merely fills in the substance of the argument with his transcendental analysis. Hegel, on the other hand, is concerned with this problem, but transforms it from that of the *a priori* concepts and experience to that of the concepts and the internal criteria of truth-claims by consciousness.

He attempts to deal with both nature and culture within this framework. Hegel thus establishes an immanent critique by permitting consciousness to establish its own criterion of truth measurement and to compare that criterion to the phenomenal world of experience (phenomenological method). This is what is meant by the dialectic between being-in-itself and being-for-another. It involves the examination of the forms of consciousness of the world of appearance without a preconceived notion as to the proper model or standards of phenomenal knowledge.

Beginning with the simplest form of experience (natural consciousness), the phenomenological method of critique traces the various forms of cultural objectivity and compares them to the particular level that consciousness has arrived at. By subjecting each stage to its own immanent criteria of truth, by constant questioning and investigating its own claimed privileged representations[23], consciousness recognizes that each claim to truth is inadequate and must be dialectically transcended. This inadequacy is the result of its failure adequately to specify the correct privileged representations, *e.g.*, immediate sense intuition, data of perception, the universal of immediate speech, scientific laws, *etc.* This negation, however, is positive in the sense that it determines more fully the further development of the subject (determinate negation).

> But when, on the other hand, the result is conceived as it is in truth, namely a determinate negation, a new form has thereby immediately arisen, and in the negation the transition is made through which the progress through the complete series of forms comes about of itself. But the goal is as necessarily fixed for knowledge as the serial progression; it is the point where knowledge no longer need go beyond itself, where knowledge finds itself, where Notion corresponds to object and object to Notion.[24]

This movement from one stage of consciousness to more complex stages is the dialectic and entails the necessary movement of the spirit towards its completion in the totality of phenomenal experience (concrete totality) in the Absolute Spirit. As with Kant and his claims for synthetic unity, the concept of the whole, and the transcendental unity of apperception, it is the totality for Hegel which is the truth. However, this totality is the movement of the Concept from the abstract immediacy of sense experience to the concrete truth of the total movement of consciousness in history as a series in its own fulfillment and self-enlightenment. It is the final closing of the gap between the Concept and its object, knowledge and being; the understanding of this

dialectical process is the critical method.

For Hegel the 'critique' must radicalize itself by taking critical epistemology as the subject of critical reflection. 'Critique' must now investigate, not only the conditions for the possibility of knowledge in general, but the very possibility of raising such questions within critical philosophy; by this is meant, that now 'critique' as method "must replace the enterprise of epistemology with the phenomenological self-reflection of mind".[25] According to Hegel, Habermas, and Schroyer, epistemology is incapable of making itself into a first philosophy, which defines the valid assumptions and presuppositions of knowledge, since each assumption itself is making a claim to valid knowledge that leads to a "bad contradiction". This is the reason Hegel wishes to begin the *Phenomenology* without presuppositions (immanent critique) and accept provisionally only the criteria of truth that consciousness presents at specific stages in its own development. Being incapable of an *Ursprungsphilosophie* (ultimate epistemological foundations), 'critique' turns to the questioning of the foundations of all forms of knowledge and all claims to truth in its own formative development. Thus the claim is not made based on access to privileged representations or ultimate structures of consciousness, but on the basis of a 'critique' of all forms of authoritative and ideological claims to truth until the final synthesis of the subject and object is reached in Absolute Spirit.

> Epistemology presumes to take nothing for granted except its pure project of radical doubting. In truth it bases itself on a critical consciousness that is the result of an entire process of self-formation. Thus it is the beneficiary of a stage of reflection that it does not admit and therefore also cannot legitimate.[26]

In his *Theory and Practice* Habermas develops in more detail the Hegelian critique of the Kantian presuppositions which are rejected in the phenomenological critique. These unacceptable presuppositions of Kantian epistemology are the normative concept of science (Newtonian science), the normative concept of the ego (transcendental unity of apperception), and the distinction between pure (theoretical) and practical (ethical) knowledge. They simply become another moment in the historical actualization of the Absolute Spirit.

IV. MARX' TURN FROM POSITIVISM TO SCIENCE AS CRITIQUE

As Hegel had radicalized the transcendental critique of Kant, so too does Marx radicalize the phenomenological critique of Hegel. Since the

major goal of this book is to examine Marx' critique of positivism and science in political economy we will stress only the later works of Marx in order to analyze the development of the critical method as a new form of social science. In the past the empiricist, rationalist, idealist, and positivist interpretations of Marx have drawn upon the limited writings in epistemology and method and created their own constructions of Marx' method. However, by stressing one aspect of his method, whether it is the conceptual framework, the historical evolution of the institutional framework, or the structural component of the social system, the critical component has been lost. Marx develops his notion of science based on the German tradition of 'critique'; his method as 'critique' is for him a science grounded in the Hegelian forms of the dialectic, immanent critique, concrete totality, and determinate negation. It is the phenomenological method he first criticizes in the *Paris Manuscripts* and later in the 'Introduction' to the *Grundrisse*. In the former he negatively analyzes the philosophical anthropology of Hegel in terms of the latter's theory of objectivity, consciousness, and labor. Marx' radicalization of Hegel's method does not occur in reaction to the Hegelian framework but within it. It is too simplistic to see the change as one from the realm of the self-movement of the Concept (idealism) to the development of the universal laws of social evolution (materialism). Marx' negative evaluation of Hegel was not that the latter was dealing with the self-movement of the Concept (*Begriff*), but that the Concept was not a reflection of the real world; Marx reintroduced the question of objective validity back into the phenomenological method in his criticism of Hegel's absolutism and identity theory. It was not the form of the phenomenological critique which Marx rejected, but the abstract content arising out of a transcendental subject. In the 'Introduction' to the *Grundrisse* Marx implies that the Hegelian method of moving from the abstract to the concrete category and the movement of an indeterminate subject (commodity production in capitalism) represented the only scientific way of proceeding.

This radicalization was not the result of the turn from idealism to materialism, from philosophical and conceptual abstraction to empirical categories relevant for utilitarian concerns. Rather it was the result of seeing that the method employed by Hegel could in fact be applied to the formation of real historical consciousness, the development of the species-being, and the ideological critiques of truth-claims based on the ahistorical evaluative and cognitive perspectives of both political philosophy and political economy. But how could Marx take the method of phenomenological critique and apply it to the study of history? Much of the confusion over Marx' epistemology and method of political economy (meta-theory) seems to arise from forgetting the fact that Marx had made the distinction in the 'Afterword' to the second German

edition of *Capital* between the method of presentation (*Darstellungsmethode*) and the method of enquiry (*Forschungsmethode*).[27] The method of presentation is a "critical analysis of capitalism by means of a critique of those concepts that could be shown to be germane to capitalism. It is within this context that the word 'scientific' is brought into play."[28] The critique of political economy is thus a 'critique' in the sense that Marx is not tracing the development of pure reason or the historical and cultural elements of the transcendental unity of apperception, but the categories of political economy. Instead of tracing the formation of Absolute Spirit by following the movement of the phenomenological Concept, Marx is tracing the development of the Concept of capital and the formation of consciousness within political economy.

> The exact development of the concept of capital is necessary since it is the fundamental concept of modern economics, just as capital itself, whose abstract, reflected image is its concept, is the foundation of bourgeois society. The sharp formulation of the basic presuppositions of the relation must bring out all the contradictions of bourgeois production, as well as the boundary where it drives beyond itself.[29]

Notice all the powerful, subtly rich, and methodologically complex Hegelian terms used by Marx to present an outline of his method - concept, abstract, contradiction, boundary, beyond itself. The 'Introduction' is also concerned with the question of the objective validity of the concepts and their relation to the experienced world. It is truly unfortunate that Marx did not delay his investigation into the economic categories long enough to give us a more concrete and developed picture of his ideas in this section. We can only speculate on the basis of hints here and there and the content of the later works. Marx maintains that the manner in which critical science appropriates reality is through the "method of rising from the abstract to the concrete". This section of the 'Introduction', entitled 'The Method of Political Economy', distinguishes between two interpretations of "concrete" which, however, are not clearly delineated because of the condensed form of this subsection. The first meaning refers to concrete as the final product and synthesis of the determinations of the Concept; concrete is a methodological category and refers to the method of presentation of the dialectic. The second meaning of concrete refers to the method of enquiry and the observational reality of perception.

> The concrete is concrete because it is the concentration of many determinations, hence unity of the diverse. It appears in the

> process of thinking, therefore, as a process of concentration, as a result, not as a point of departure, even though it is the point of departure in reality and hence also the point of departure for observation (*Anschauung*) and conception.[30]

The concrete totality is the systematic and coherent form in which science organizes the totality of thoughts and reaches beyond the world of appearances to the essential reality. But is this still only "a totality as it appears in the head, as a totality of thoughts..."; and the question arises 'is it the appropriate method by which we can appropriate reality?' It does not mean that this method takes the philosophical consciousness or the movement of categories independent of their real act of production in the historical world. The reproduction of the historical in the form of concrete categories entails a method different from an historical method, which examines how the concrete (second meaning) actually comes into existence. The distinction between the method of enquiry and presentation reflects in another form the Kantian concern with the objective validity of the concepts and the Hegelian concern with being-in-itself and being-for-another.

> In the succession of the economic categories, as in any other historical, social science, it must not be forgotten that their subject - here, modern bourgeois society -, is always what is given, in the head as well as in reality, and that therefore these categories express the forms of being, the characteristics of existence, and often only individual sides of this specific society, this subject and that therefore this society by no means begins only at the point where one can speak of it as such; this holds for science as well. This is to be kept in mind because it will shortly be decisive for the order and sequence of the categories.[31]

In this paragraph Marx is explicitly examining the weaknesses of the Hegelian dialectic and the necessity to relate concept and reality. Specifically, Marx rejects the notion that the concepts, the movement of the concepts, and the concrete totality are the result of "conceiving the real as the product of thought concentrating on itself, probing its own depths, and unfolding itself out of itself, by itself ... ".[32] Science as the concrete determination of the Concept, is the result of theoretical reflection, which is a reflection of and on historical specificity; that is, the concepts themselves are reflections of and expressions of the concrete economic and political circumstances, which, in turn, are encapsulated in the concrete totality of critical science. The economic categories are manifestations of both the consciousness of the political economists (and thus aspects of the legitimation of the social system)

and the structures of political economy. Critical science can, therefore, only refer to a particular historical period and not to a general philosophy of history. The scientific rationalism of Althusser[33] and the empiricism of Derek Sayer[34] are overly one-sided interpretations of this process.

In beginning *Capital* with an analysis of the commodity, Marx starts with a subject, which is immediately given in its simplicity and indeterminate abstraction from capitalist production which we find later in *Capital.* The concept of commodity thus begins with elements of both empiricism and rationalism, while the method of the movement of the Concept from the abstract to the concrete contains elements of both idealism (structure of the method) and materialism (realism and validity of concepts). How this critical method is, in fact, applied to a study of the structures of political economy is the subject of investigation in Chapter Four. The question arises as to why Marx constructs a method around the movement of the Concept, even if the Concept is a reflection of the historical experience. The answer lies in Marx' break with the epistemological traditions. For him, it is not a question of the privileged relation between objects and ideas resulting either from the presumed similarity of structure between the rationality of the mind and the world (rationalism) or that of perception and the objects of experience (empiricism). Rather Marx is taking a position similar to the immanent critique of Hegel in the *Phenomenology*; epistemology turns into a false circularity because of its unproven claims to knowledge. Phenomenal knowledge then is the result of relating internally the criteria established by consciousness itself to the objectivity experienced. Marx' theory of knowledge is tied to his theory of false consciousness, ideology, and 'theory and practice'. The truth-claims cannot be made simply on the basis of the internal rational coherence of deductive logic or on the apparent correlation between idea and reality. The simplicity of the empiricist and rationalist approaches had been rejected by Kant and Hegel and now by Marx. In Chapter Five this critique of the epistemological tradition will be further developed, especially in relation to Marx' notion of 'theory and practice' and its relation to the post-empiricist philosophy of science critiques of science and false objectivity.

Traditional epistemology has turned into a scholastic question[35], since, for Marx, the objective validity of the economic categories and their reference to objective reality are no longer questions confined to epistemology and theory. Concept and theory formation cannot be their own legitimation as Hegel had argued; they cannot ground themselves, which brings into question the whole idea of foundationalism. However, Marx cannot accept the idealist self-development of consciousness, the category of the absolute identity, or the

transcendental subject. The objective validity of the concepts rests neither with the concepts nor with the phenomenal world, but with praxis. This represents a further radicalization of the dialectic and of the 'critique' as method. The search for objective knowledge in terms of accurate representations of reality and the belief that the perceptions of the mind correspond to the objective world are lost in the German transcendental tradition, which stressed the conformity of the object to our knowledge. This tradition's view of rationality, objectivity, science, and validity is the foundation upon which Marx lays out "the dialectical unfolding of the categories of the bourgeois system..." whose adequacy is determined by a self-reflective process in which the Concept is seen as the historically specific social form of the new economic system.

> Instead, the dialectic is grasped as a critical concept which must now be seen as having arisen with the appearance of the commodity form and as being the only method adequate to a social form determined as a totality by commodity production (*i.e.*, capitalist society) with its historically specific contradictions. The Marxian dialectic, with its starting point in the commodity form, is therefore not only expressive of capitalist relations but, as opposed to Hegel, expresses them self-consciously - as being Subject; as a stage of a world becoming through and for the Subject.[36]

The adequacy of the Concept comes from the historicity of the content, the immanence of the 'critique' itself (no external normative judgments), and from the non-separation of the method from its object. Marx rejects positivist science as being inadequate to the phenomenal worlds, since it merely reproduces the phenomenal appearances as simply given. The objectivity of the dialectical categories is guaranteed by the examination of the origins and structure of the conceptual framework of political economy and their relationship to the social forms of production out of which they developed. The internal movement of the Concept is a reflection of a society dominated by the internal contradictions and logic of commodity production.

> The categories of bourgeois economy ... are forms of thought expressing with social validity the conditions and relations of a definite historically determined mode of production, *viz.*, the production of commodities.[37]

The analysis of the categories of political economy also represents an immanent critique of the ahistorical justificatory concepts of political economy in its attempt to legitimate the class structure. Stressing the

relations between content and form, immediacy and mediacy, appearances and essence, Marx undermines the validity of the form of theoretical and practical consciousness of the political economists. The latter's categories of labor, value, individualism, market equality of labor and capital, equitable contract, social justice of the market, *etc.* are rejected as inadequate as a result of his investigation into demystified commodity production. By examining the social relations of production that ground the categories of political economy, the historical framework of capitalist production, and the internal contradictions of the economic system founded on the law of value (exchange-value production), Marx was able to undermine the cognitive and ethical imperatives of the capitalist system.

There is one final question concerning the objective validity of the Concept and its relation to the issue of an epistemological break. The idea that there is a break between humanistic philosophy (critique of ideology) and materialism, between philosophy and science must be rejected. There does seem to be a further question, however, concerning the issue of conceptual validity being determined by the internal comprehensiveness of the concrete totality as in *Capital* or by the relation between theory and practice as in the 'Theses on Feuerbach'. These appear to be two distinct methodological approaches. In the earlier works the dialectic between subjectivity and objectivity is maintained and with it the Hegelian notion of 'critique' as critique of privileged representations. The later works stress the logic of the argument, its internal dialectical development, and the adequacy of the objective forms to capitalist development. There is, however, a latent objectivism and loss of subjectivity in terms of revolutionary social consciousness, if the later works are separated from the earlier ones. The earlier works are extremely critical of traditional epistemology and emphasize the formation of reflective class consciousness, while the later works stress more the formal method of Hegel's dialectic, but less his critique of Kant's epistemology. The mediating link between subjectivity (truth) and objectivity (method) is the immanent and historical nature of the method itself. The two are not contradictory, but there is always a danger of overemphasis on one side of the dialectic as opposed to the other. Thus a balance is maintained when the earlier critique of epistemology and Marx' notion of a theory of praxis is synthesized with the critique of political economy. Another way of stating this synthesis is to appreciate that Marx' emphasis on the historical nature of the categories of political economy and his critiques of all forms of structural and categorial fetishism lead back to the earlier critique of traditional theories of knowledge and the necessity to ground truth in practice. We will examine more on this in Chapter Five.

V. THE CRITICAL METHOD IN GERMAN IDEALISM AND POLITICAL ECONOMY

By stressing the underlying unifying principle of Hegelian social theory in the use of an immanent and determinate critique, Marx' method is brought into a clearer focus. For Kant 'critique' referred to the examination of the categories and structures of pure and practical reason in an attempt to show the origins and ground of theoretical and moral knowledge, pure and practical reason. His new understanding of the relationships between objectivity and subjectivity became the basis for his transcendental deduction of the synthetic *a priori* concepts of the understanding and the scope and limitations of their applicability. It also clarified the relationship between experience and metaphysics and the inappropriate use of the *a priori* concepts beyond sensuous experience. Kant's first *Critique* was, as we have seen, interested in responding to questions of the possibility of objectivity and experience, the conditions for the possibility of knowledge and judgment, and the conditions for the possibility of Newtonian mechanics. By explaining the foundations for the possibility of experience, Kant hoped to justify his interpretation of metaphysics and the limitations of its objectivity. In the process of examining the subjective conditions of knowledge, Kant developed a constitution theory, which, while combining elements of both rationalism and empiricism, created a new metaphysical foundation upon which his epistemology was to rest. By examining the subjective component of experience and the formation of the objects of experience, he was able to show the limits and weaknesses of positivist epistemology and its false claims to factual objectivity. He believed that the latter rested on unsound epistemological principles, since the rational understanding of the world entailed the use of mental categories, which themselves were active in the formation of that world of substances, causality, and ordered principles.

'Critique' contains the two moments of transcendental critique and epistemological critique; the former refers to the logical structure of subjectivity and the limits of the applicability of pure reason, while the latter carefully scrutinizes the truth- and objectivity-claims of other epistemological schools of thought. The transcendental critique involves the deduction of the general principles, laws, and concepts that represented the logical presuppositions of knowledge in the transcendental unity of apperception. In turn, this exposed the illegitimate and illusory claims of reason which transcended its proper place in the synthetic unity of sensible representations.

Hegel radicalized this critique of knowledge by placing the ground of knowledge no longer in a formal unity of the mind, but in a trans-

cendental subject of history and culture; he begins the *Phenomenology* as a 'critique' of the historical phenomenon of scientific knowledge and develops into a "post-transcendental" critique of the social and cultural illusions of historical rationality. Like Kant he attacks the dogmatic claims to objectivity of the empiricists and rationalists, but also those who claim universal practical knowledge of the social reality from the Greeks to the moderns. The 'critique' is thus an examination of the structure of rationality and the limits of its claims to universality both formally and historically. The structure of rationality can be viewed as a transition from the Kantian to Hegelian critical method, which represents a shift from an analysis of the internal formal structures of consciousness that give rise to *a priori* synthetic judgments and Newtonian science to a method in which both objectivity and subjectivity are moments of historical consciousness. The latter defines science as the examination of the dialectical movement of that consciousness.

> It shows up here like this: since what first appeared as the object sinks for consciousness to the level of its way of knowing it, and since the in-itself becomes a being-for-consciousness of the in-itself, the latter is now the new object. Herewith a new pattern of consciousness comes on the scene as well, for which the essence is something different from what it was at the preceding stage. It is this fact that guides the entire series of the patterns of consciousness in their necessary sequence....Thus the moments of the whole are patterns of consciousness. In pressing forward to its true existence, consciousness will arrive at a point at which it gets rid of its semblance of being burdened with something alien, with what is only for it, and some sort of 'other', at a point where appearance becomes identical with essence, so that its exposition will coincide at just this point with the authentic Science of Spirit.[38]

Thus, for Hegel, the transcendental unity of consciousness would represent one dialectical moment in the development of human consciousness, which would have to be incorporated into the concrete totality of the movement of Absolute Spirit. He evolves from the relatively static categories of Kant's intuition and understanding to a phenomenological reflection on the historical formation of consciousness itself; Hegel begins where Kant leaves off. As in Kant's work, the critical method was designed to negate all forms of illusory claims to knowledge and all forms of false application of concepts to experience. Both recognize that concepts are engaged in the process of creating reality, but, for Hegel, the concepts themselves develop in history and within culturally different circumstances.

It is Habermas' analysis of the differences between a transcendental

and phenomenological critique which is important for an understanding of the methodological implications of the critical method. It is because epistemology leads to a bad infinity and cannot be a first philosophy that Hegel turns to an immanent critique where the criteria for the truth-claims of the subject lie internal to consciousness itself. Consciousness constitutes and determines itself and reality by transcending its own inadequate claims to universality, the universality of a particular form of consciousness, and the corresponding objectivity of that stage; *e.g.*, the universal claims of consciousness at the level of sense certainty and the objectivity of the immediately given of the "here" and "now". The phenomenological self-reflection on the formation of consciousness is also a second-level critique of empiricism, rationalism, and positivism and their ahistorical limited claims to true consciousness and objectivity.

Marx rejects Hegel's ontological claims for abstract consciousness and the identity between the Concept and reality in absolute knowledge. The former, however, does not return to the Kantian distinction between phenomena and noumena, appearances and things-in-themselves, for he does believe that consciousness and the categories of political economy reflect the essential political-economic structures of capitalism. The categories do not explain or produce reality from the former's own internal dialectical dynamic. To understand the manner in which Marx uses the categories of political economy one would first have to know the relationship among consciousness (categories and ideology), reality (appearances and essence), and social praxis (will and ethics). Like Hegel, Marx views 'critique' as a method for the unfolding of the dialectical and contradictory moments of the Concept, as it develops its determinations and complex understanding of historical reality. The goal of 'critique' is not positivist knowledge, but a reconstructive understanding of history for the purposes of both self-realization and self-enlightenment. The latter can only be accomplished in the creative acts of forming history and society through social practice. The method of 'critique' refers to the fact

> that the categories of political economy were to be subjected to criticism not by formally comparing them with some object lying outside them but by drawing out the contradictions in these concepts and showing how, in practice, these contradictions had been resolved. This was a task which could be carried out only by somebody conscious of the fact that these categories were themselves a product and a manifestation of the actual emergence of the social relations of capitalist production.[39]

'Critique' as viewed by Hegel could not assume the givenness of the subject or object at any stage in the development of consciousness;

nor could Marx accept the givenness of the phenomena of bourgeois social relations or its science. As Geoffrey Pilling has insightfully remarked, the failure by classical political economists to recognize the historical origins of the phenomena, Marx likens to the "giving the science before the science".[40] That is, they assumed as given the very thing which was, in fact, to be explained - capitalist social relations. The fetishized categories of empirical science accept the givenness of experience without comprehending the critical roots of the phenomenal experience itself. Working with the categories of capital, labor, prices, value, profits and wages, Marx shows that they are fetishized social relationships and, therefore, neither natural nor ahistorical in form. Hegel had traced the various stages in the evolution of consciousness in order to reveal their phenomenal form as appearances. Marx, in turn, traces the genesis of capital as a phenomenal form in the social relations and structures of capitalist society. The critical method is Marx' method for overcoming the false consciousness of classical political economy (positivism) and at the same time the mystification of sensuous experience and the objectivity of fetishized social relations. Method as a 'critique' of ideology is also a 'critique' of epistemology as a "fixed body of knowledge ... rather than a theory of knowledge, a theory of how knowledge develops through man's practice".[41] Since the validity of political consciousness cannot be established transcendentally or phenomenologically, it can only be established through social praxis. Alfred Schmidt interprets praxis as referring to the life-process of society, revolutionary social change, labor, and the experiments of natural science.

> In fact, practice in general can only be the criterion of truth because - as a historical whole - it constitutes the objects of normal human experience, *i.e.*, plays an essential part in their internal composition.[42]

This is an interesting statement because Schmidt views social praxis as the criterion of truth, since it constitutes the objects of experience. An implication arising from this first chapter on the method of 'critique' in German social thought is that praxis not only creates the objects of experience, but also constitutes the consciousness and categories of that experience. In analyzing the epistemological role of Marx' praxis, Schmidt recognizes that Marx returns to Kant in his view of praxis and in the maintenance of the non-identity between being and thought. With the latter point, Marx goes behind Hegel and back to Kant. Schmidt seems to be more concerned with praxis as a category of constitution (labor) within the formation of knowledge, than with praxis as the criterion of validation of truth (social consensus). He thus makes the

same mistake as Habermas in the latter's *Theory and Practice*. The implications of this problem will be worked out in more detail in Chapter Five. The stage has now been set. We have introduced the critique of political economy and the epistemological foundations upon which it is based. The rest of the book will break up the various meta-theoretical components of this 'critique' for more specialized investigation. Of special importance will be the notion of time which underlies this new method, its new form of materialism and history, its method of applicablilty to the real world, and its form of social praxis. It is the temporal dimension which reveals yet another break with the positivist tradition and reconnects Marx through Hegel with Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and *Physics*.

CHAPTER TWO

Time and Critique: The Temporal Dimensions of the Dialectical Method

I. INTRODUCTION

After discussing the method of 'critique' and its intellectual evolution, this chapter will examine its temporal dimensions, while continuing to emphasize the writings of Hegel and Marx. The issue of time is the grammatical code within which method is understood. Through the temporal dimensions the range and boundaries of the categories are framed. This is important in Marx' critique of positivism because underlying both explanatory science and the critique of political economy are two entirely different understandings of the nature of time and history. The approach to the temporal dimension will form the framework within which history can be known; it will also form the methodological conditions and boundaries by which the external reality can be appropriated; it will structure the nature of our knowledge about the future, which can be anticipated; and, finally, it will determine the way in which social practice is ultimately understood. In explanatory science the elements of time are viewed as quantitative and discrete, separable moments capable of being adequately predicted by theoretical projections and manipulated by social intervention. This temporal dimension of positivism is built into its very categorial and logical structure.

There are some fundamental assumptions about the nature of rationality, man, and society and also about the mechanistic and deterministic form of the universe, which makes this method of approach applicable to the real world. The critical-dialectical method of the German tradition, on the other hand, uses another notion of time, which instead of predicting the "coming-to-be" of the future emphasizes the "having beenness" of the past. This simply means that the notion of the future in the German tradition is viewed as an anticipation of the past, as the telos of reality working itself out from its own logical and ontological beginnings. The future is not a separate entity, but is the actualization of the rationality and possibilities contained in the past.

The temporal dimensions of the past, present, and future have a more organic interrelationship to each other within the logical framework of the realization of the seminal principle of rationality and Being (Hegel) or irrationality and capital (Marx). The result of all this is that the underlying deep-structure of Marx' method of 'critique' contains a temporal dimension antithetical to the temporal structure and require-

ments of positivist science. Though the emphasis has been generally on the notion of history in Marx, the temporal dimension has more immediate value for an analysis of the epistemological foundations of political economy. The temporal dimension defines the range of applicability of the categories used and the form of the future envisioned. The notion of the future will set the methodological boundaries for Marx' later study of history and will finally answer the question of whether there is a theory of capitalist breakdown in *Capital.* The main question which has been asked is, was the purpose behind the writing of this work the prediction of the immediate future of capitalism? The study of time will also aid with the re-examination of the debates over materialism and idealism, since the limits of one's understanding of time limits the intellectual appropriation of reality. One can only do certain things and have a certain type of knowledge, *i.e.*, knowledge for control and prediction or knowledge of possibilities for self-enlightenment. The debate over explanatory sociology and the sociology of understanding also rests on this issue of time. Central to an understanding of reality is the nature of time used in the logic of investigation.

With an emphasis on an analysis of Hegel's *Science of Logic* we will examine and clarify the mystique surrounding Hegel's ideas on the dialectic and rationality (*Begriff*). Of special concern will be the examination of the underlying reasons for Hegel's specific methodological approach to understanding the nature of Being and reality and the special relationship between ontology and temporalilty, Being and time. Why did he eschew the more traditional approaches; why was he so critical of the empiricist and idealist perspectives with their emphasis on empirical reality or the appearances of the thing-in-itself? The formation of the dialectical method was his response to the difficulties of dealing with the internal, conceptual structure of reality. His work in the *Logic*, while examining the necessary relations among the categories of human experience, is also a study of the nature of reality itself, and further represents a synthesis of logic and being, concept and reality in his identity theory. Rationality and thought are not categorial frameworks, which make the understanding of experience easier through the organizing and integrating of the data of the senses; rather, they represent the internal dynamic and reality of the world itself.

> The rational, truly universal thought which is expressed in our categories is thus spirit's knowledge of itself. Since the external reality to which these categories apply is not only the embodiment of the Geist, but is posited by Geist as its embodiment, and hence reflects the rational necessity of thought, in grasping the categories of thought about things, we are also grasping the ground plan or

essential structure to which the world conforms in its unfolding.[1]

II. LOGIC, ONTOLOGY, AND TIME

The dialectic is the philosophical method employed by Hegel to analyze the necessary development of the categories and thus rational structure of the world from within itself - from within the development of its own contradictions, otherness, and determinations of Being. Logic is here understood as an expression of ontological reality by the identification of both as part of the same process. Hegel's work is divided into three main parts: The doctrine of Being, Essence, and Concept. The first part deals with the movement of pure indeterminate being to determinate negative being, being which is expressed by relations to others; it is an examination into the determinate and contingent world of things as they exist in their immediacy through experience. The second part examines the metaphysical dimensions of the underlying substrate or ground to what is - appearance and reality, essence and existence; external reality becomes a simply reflection of the underlying rational connection and ground of all things. The third part is concerned with the further articulation of the ground in terms of subjectivity and objectivity, particularity and universality. That is, the ground of objectivity and rationality and the self-conscious subject is in fact the Concept (*Begriff*), the formalized and logical expression of the universal Spirit. It is the complete totality of rationality that expresses itself through its own internal movement (through contradictions, otherness of objectivity, and return to self) and creates its own objectivity and external world from within itself in its 'closed future', formed by the identity theory and Absolute Spirit. Hegel is examining the logical structures through which Reason expresses itself dialectically and creates its own rationality and world through objectification. To someone trained in philosophy or the social sciences, especially of the Anglo-American kind, there might be a tendency here to stop because of the overwhelming metaphysical language of German idealism. However, to understand and appreciate the nature of Marx' epistemology and method, the rational core of Hegel's method must be uncovered. There are real relevant issues contained here for contemporary social theorists. This is the same method, with variations and reservations, used by Marx. Marx will strip the method of its metaphysical core, but keep its epistemology and temporal dimensions, both of which are crucial for an understanding of his later critique of political economy.

Time is viewed as an expression of its own past as reality is created

from within the totality of the Spirit (Idea). The structure of reality is thus built around the necessary development of the logical categories though their own contradictions with themselves. Totality is Hegel's idea for the framework within which this occurs as the objective world is created by the Concept (Spirit) from within itself and its own immanent logic. The future is thus an expression of is own beginnings and contradictions, that is, the future is an expression of its own logical/ontological possibilities contained in its determinate negation. The future realizes its own teleology. Aristotle's distinction between the actual and the potential is crucial for understanding the distinction in Hegel between reality/present (*Realität*) and actuality/past (*Wirklichkeit*).[2] The notion of future within the Hegelian system is thus not an autonomous category but one tied to the totality of the Concept. That is, it is tied to the working out of Reason in the world. This will later be important in the formation of Marx' method, since the dialectical method, though not requiring the identity theory of Hegel, does require the logical connection between categories, contradictions and the dialectical movement of the Concept within a methodological totality.

In fact, for all the important investigations of contemporary social theorists into the specific methodological foundations of Marx' political economy, more research needs to be undertaken into the logical substratum of his *Capital* and into the issue of how Hegel's logic, dialectic, notions of rationality and time have influenced Marx' work. This has been a problem endemic to critical theory. In Albrecht Wellmer's *Critical Theory of Society*[3], there is an analysis of Marx' method which leaves unresolved the seeming contradiction between Marx' historical materialism and his critique of ideology. With this study Wellmer attempted to uncover the objectivistic and scientistic foundations of Marx' thought. Habermas in a similar fashion also deals with Marx' later political economy in an unquestioning manner and thus fails to see the full implications of Marx' real challenge to traditional social science and the establishment of a new method of political economy; Habermas thus fails to study the *Grundrisse* and *Capital*, while relying almost entirely on the early writings of Marx, thereby ignoring the Hegelian schema of science in the attempt to understand Marx' methodological ground.[4]

While the mechanism of the dialectical method is important, it is not a simple cookbook recipe to be applied to the study of political economy. Rather Hegel's vision needs to be reconstructed. More important than an exegesis of the method and logic of Hegel's system is an analysis of the reasons for his particular philosophical interests, that is, why he raised the issues and problems in the manner he did. This would be an invaluable aid in an investigation into Marx' complex economic, political, and social theories, his epistemology and logic, and

his notion of revolutionary praxis . Any attempt to transform *Capital* into a positivistic, objectivistic, and predictive science, whose truth lies in the traditional relationships between subjectivity-objectivity and the traditional theories of rationality and truth, has failed to understand that truth for Marx is a characteristic of *Begriff* (dialectical movement of the Concept) and not *Richtigkeit* (correctness of correspondence between categories and reality). One cannot trace step for step the correlations between the development of Hegel's Being and Marx' *Capital*, for such a mechanical approach would destroy both systems. Therefore, I will trace Hegel's most important ideas in relation to Marx, the notions of temporality and science (Concept).

III. TEMPORALITY AND SCIENCE IN HEGEL'S *LOGIC*: DIALECTICS AND THE CONCEPT

According to Hegel, the purpose of philosophy is to present the truth in a systematic form that has developed from the immediacy of naive consciousness to the concreteness and totality of the Absolute. Philosophy is to be made into science by the very examination of the movement of the Concept, which encompasses the whole of the objective world. The inherent Nothingness (indeterminate and unrelated being) and being-for-other (partiality and isolatedness of being) of the objective world is never projected into the future. Philosophy cannot anticipate or give advice about the future because

> philosophy in any case always comes on the scene too late to give it. As the thought of the world, it appears only when actuality is already there cut and dried after its process of formation has been completed. The teaching of the concept, which is also history's inescapable lesson, is that it is only when actuality is mature that the ideal first appears over against the real and that the ideal apprehends this same real world in its substance and builds it up for itself into the shape of an intellectual realm.[5]

The Concept may be developed only at certain times when the actual world and self-conscious rationality have developed to such an extent that the real can apprehend its own Other in the ideal. This means that science as the systematic organization of the whole, can only be accomplished by a reconstructive recollection or *Er-innerung*. Like Plato, truth can be achieved by the memory which recalls something which has already occurred, since the totality can be grasped only after its completion in time. Knowledge can only be attained in a wholistic system (totality), which encapsulates the beginning and end in its logic.

Marcuse, in his *Habilitationsschrift, Ontologie und die Theorie der Geschichtlichkeit*, also stresses this point by arguing that ontology and temporality have become so interwoven as to form the necessity and unity of the scientific construct.[6]

Relieved of the doctrine of Being and Objectivity, *i.e.* the mystical trappings of traditional metaphysics, Marx will also recognize this essential correlation between truth and time that Hegel has so succinctly expressed in his idea that the "Owl of Minevera only spreads its wings at the falling of the dusk."[7] Actuality as the union of essence and existence, rationality and the external world, subjectivity and objectivity, is possible only when the end has been completed in the totality; the crucial point to remember here is that the totality and actuality do no have to exist in reality, but only in potentiality within the Concept. This explains the idea that the dialectic is remembering and unraveling the past potential inherent in the structures of rationality within the world. To form the Concept then the situation must be so advanced that the handwriting is already on the wall and, therefore, conceptualizable in a system of logic or phenomenology.

For this reason the central methodological category, for Marx, in his use of the Hegelian dialectic and method is temporality. The latter, as a methodological concept in his later writings, has logical priority even over history. The unfolding of the logic of capital is not a historical development of the social relations of production or the tracing of the historical development of capitalism itself towards its necessary conclusions in economic crisis and breakdown. Rather, it is the unfolding of the dynamic potential contained in the Concept of capital as embodied in the contradictory elements of a society grounded in use-value and exchange-value, that is, a society grounded in contradictory sociological imperatives. It is a combination of both logic and history. The logical totality defines the expression and definition of historical information; this is Marx' famous distinction between method of presentation and method of research analysed by Schmidt in his *Structure and History*.[8]

Reality is manifested for Hegel at a variety of stages of development and expressed by his terms being-in-self and the being-for-self. The being-in-self is reality in its embryonic stage of potential development; it is the self-identical moment of being in which its reality is still undeveloped within itself. The being-for-self is the exteriorized manifestation of its potential in its objective form that can be comprehended as it is before the subject. Existing simply as before itself, it results in an alienated form of consciousness with the separation of consciousness and reality. True self-consciousness is the return of the consciousness to itself from its externalization in objectified reality by means of the realization of the Concept (*Er-innerung* or return to the interior). The mediated reflection on Being reveals that its essence is its

past as a timeless Being, the Absolute. The idea of essence as *Wesen* has been preserved in the use of the German past participle "*gewesen*". The term is also used in its many variations as a noun, which expresses both a state of being and action (the "having been" is potentiality within the past) and expresses the essential nature of Being (*Sein*) itself. The noun use of the verb translated literally means the "having been", which refers to something which existed in the past, but is still expressing itself in the present. The "having been" as the potentiality existing in the past reality, but realizing itself in the present or the future. Mediated self-consciousness lies behind the immediate appearance both ontologically and temporally, for the present can only be understood as the process of realization in the objective world of the past (Concept). "Essence is Being which has passed away, ... "[9], "die Grundbestimmung des Daseins ist geworden zu sein: Dasein ist nur als Gewordenes, als Resultat".[10] The reader can clearly see the direct connection between Being and time in Hegel's *Logic*

Being is a form of temporality whose past is timeless and expressed in the actualization of the present. History is simply the manner in which the antecedent and embryonic elements of reality are manifested by the teleological principle; but history itself is a product of this prior ontological category of temporality. The present can only be comprehended by the *Gewordensein* (being as "having become" and "having been"), which is *Gesetztsein* (posited being), *i.e.*, by the objectivity which is an expression of the inherent possibilities of the actuality. For the foundation of critical science, whether the metaphysics for Hegel or political economy for Marx, the future for the theologian has no existence or reality in itself, but is only the realization of what should be a Concept, but is not. The future in itself, divorced from its pastness as ground, becomes merely the expression of the absurd and thus must be eliminated from science itself; it becomes a expression of the contingent arrangement of categories that form the models of explanatory science (world of appearances) and never reach to the structures of rationality and truth. What is really important are Hegel's definitions of Being as the *Gewordensein*, *Herausgesetztsein*, *Vorhandensein*, and *Reflektiertsein* - all expressions which stress the manifestation of Being in the present and its possibilities in the 'closed future' of the wholistic and integrated logical-philosophical system. This totality can only exist as a closed system and pertains to the truth in- and for-itself. Self-consciousness views its objectivity (objective world of social institutions and culture) as an expression of itself - the truth of objectivity being subjectivity. Since truth comprehends determinate being in its existence as both being and "having been", the future is only a manifetation of Being's own past or immanent potential. Determinate being, which is reason become objective and historical, is

something which is self-contained within itself through its negation of other possibilities. But contained within itself is another determination of its Being which is being-for-other. The being-for-other is the infinite moment of determinate being which goes beyond its self-identity into its own other (not-being). It overcomes its own set barriers and is pushed beyond by its own ought or seminal principle. As Hegel says: "Being-in-Self is the Not-Being of otherness, which is contained in it."[11] This is the negation of the negation, as Being contains its own negation and otherness which transcend the limits set by its own determination as being.

> Something has its Determinate Being only in Limit, and also (since immediate Determinate Being and Limit are negative of one another) that Something, which only exists within its Limit, severs itself from itself and points beyond itself to its not-being and predicates this as its Being, thus passing over into it.[12]

The nature of being-for-self is this passing beyond its own limit and the other (that which it is not yet), as it returns to itself as determinate being. The essential nature of being-in-self was the self-identity of the object, while the essential nature of being-for-self is consciousness and the recognition of the limits and barriers of determinate being and its ability to pass beyond itself to its own other. Thus Hegel's logic has gone beyond pure things in the world to include the importance of consciousness in its relationship to Being. Hegel has left behind the immediacy of the determinate world of simple empiricism. This recognition of the infinite nature of Being and the passing of Being into its own other is the beginning of the self-consciousness about the true nature of Being as Subject. History is the creation of reality through Reason and self-consciousness.

It is in the second part of his *Logic* on the doctrine of essence that the category of existence is introduced and explicated. The main characteristics of Being lie in the *Gewesenheit* and *Vergangenheit* since its essence is its *Hervorgegangensein*. "Everything, which is, exists."[13] The truth of Being lies not in the immediacy, but rather in a mediacy which has emerged from its own "having been" (*das hervorgegangene Wesen*) - from its own logical and, therefore, ontological presuppositions.

> The phrase 'Existence' (derived from *existere*) suggests the fact of having proceeded from something. Existence is Being which has produced from the ground, and has reinstated by annulling its intermediation.[14]

The truth lies always behind it for "the thing is, before it exists".[15] Just as the final form of the plant is present throughout all stages of its phenomenal development from the seed, flower, and fruit, the teleology of the world exists in its already posited ground. Its rationality only needs time to express itself in history. Existence can, therefore, only be a characteristic of mediated Being and not pure Being.

As the investigation of Being becomes more complex, with the addition of the categories of relationships, otherness, and totality, there remains the essential connection between temporality and ontology. If, however, the *Logic* begins with the immediacy of pure Being and pure contingency, then the question arises as to the place of necessity in science itself. The *Gewesensein* moves in its own identity from potentiality to its necessary actualization. But it does it within its own realm of freedom of self-expression and self-realization. This necessity, which returns to itself, does not begin from itself, but rather from contingency of the appearances. However, if science is the study of the self-movement of the Concept through its own negation and mediation and the explication of its immediate present in the form of the mediated, then necessity must be grounded and required in itself. Any other view would lead to the conclusion that necessity would be founded on the movement of the contingent determinate being, which is contradictory.[16] For self-movment of the Concept to be necessary, the necessity must come from within its own logic and must be present from the first stage of the development of Being. If we return to the immediacy of Being in the *Logic*, we notice that though Hegel seems to start with Being and Nothingness, he in fact begins elsewhere.

Beginning becomes its own epistemological, ontological and methodological category, since pure Being is itself mediated and determined by the Absolute Spirit within the totality. In the chapter entitled 'With What Must the Science Begin?' Hegel states that the methodological beginning of the work must be pure Being and this is, in fact, exactly the notion with which Hegel begins the first chapter of his work. Through this prefatory chapter Hegel clearly indicates he starts with the "beginning of thought" or "the idea of the beginning" which must be perfectly abstract and general without any content or presuppositions - pure Being. However, within this analysis Hegel is quite explicit also to say that "it has already been perceived that the absolutely true must be a result, and that, conversely, a result presupposes some primary truth".[17] It must represent its own foundation and ground and therefore cannot pressuppose anything or be mediated by anything. "The Beginning is therefore Pure Being."[18] On the other hand, Hegel rejects the position of Reingold, who holds that philosophy begins with the problematic or hypothetical, while he does accept Reingold's method of regressive progression.[19] The Absolute Spirit,

which is the concrete mediation of self-consciousness, represents the highest stage of Being as it alienates itself, passes beyond itself, and finally, regresses back into immediate Being. The essential characteristic of science is not the pure immediacy, but the principle of identity between the beginning and the goal.

> Thus consciousness is led back on its road from immediacy, with which it begins, to absolute knowledge as its inmost truth; and the first term, which entered the stage as the immediate, arises, precisely, from this last term, the foundation. Still further, we see that Absolute Spirit, which is found to be the concrete, last, and highest truth of all Being, at the end of its evolution freely passes beyond itself and lapses into the shape of an immediate Being ... What is essential for Science is not so much that a pure immediate is the beginning, but that in its totality it forms a cycle returning upon itself, wherein the first is also last, and the last first.[20]

The development of the Concept in science produces a dialectic spiral, where the immediate is transformed into the mediated Absolute, which again returns to itself through its negation of the negation. Though science begins with pure Being, the latter is in reality not simply pure immediacy but "the unity into which pure knowledge returns" and therefore "the absolutely immediate, is also absolutely mediated".[21] For methodological reasons, since it is the beginning, it must be treated in a one-sided fashion in its pure immediacy and not in its determinate and mediated content. Thus, philosophy begins with its own end and the foundation of the beginning in the Absolute. Science then is the uncovering of the principle (result) and foundation through which Being passes as it becomes its mediated other (Concept). The truth of pure Being as nothingness is therefore the development of Being from its immanent principle - its Becoming.

The identity theory (identity of logic and ontology and beginning and end) is the foundation of Hegel's view of science; for him it is the only method possible which comprehends (*Vernunft*) the necessity of the movement of the categories of reality. This identity theory has two important components - one metaphysical and one methodological. It is the thesis of this chapter that crucial to the understanding of Marx' method is the idea that the metaphysical component of identity theory is rejected, but the methodological component becomes integrated into *Capital*. Another difference between the two systems is that, for Hegel, the process is the result of the self-movement of the Concept (Subject), while, for Marx, the process is a mixture of an irreducible blend of logic and history. Hegel believes that philosophy gives us insight into the Concept of sensuous Being and sensuous consciousness, but while

it "emerges out of their dialectic and nothingness as their ground, it is in no way conditioned by their reality". From the opposite perspective in *Capital* the logic determines the ground, but not the specific content, direction, or development of history. The relation between logic and history in Marx' *Capital* needs to be more fully worked out, especially with reference to his return to Kant through Schelling.

The ground of Being is always a *Hervorgegangensein* and a *Gewesene*[22], which produces itself out of its own positedness in the cultural and social world. The result, as "having been" (the temporal expression of potentiality and the union of beginning and end), becomes its foundation and, thus, its development is not problematical but necessary. The identity theory is the basis of science because it contains necessity in its very negativity and temporality. "Pure Being is the unity into which pure knowledge returns, ... ".[23] The immediacy contains the full expectation and development of its Being in its Concept, for the latter is its essential nature from the very beginning. The conclusions are contained in the very beginning and are scientifically expressed in its universal and necessary development from the intitial contradictions between Being and Nothingness. The naive consciousness contains seminally its own foundation in its negativity and otherness.

Stated in another manner as Hegel does in the 'Preface' to the *Phenomenology*, the result is the same as the beginning, for the beginning is purpose. This inner purpose or Concept contains the potentiality for the realization of the concrete actuality.[24] The realized purpose is one and the same with the characteristics of the beginning, since it is the return into itself. The dialectical development of the categories from the lower to the more concrete levels by the actualization of the being-in-self beyond its limits, transcends the boundaries of internal negation and completes the realization of its Other as self. The Something passes beyond the barrier toward the ought, as the realization of what ought to be, but is not. As the plant passes over the barrier of the seed and over the barrier of the blossom, being-in-self passes over into identity with the Other.

Throughout the varied stages of the *Logic* and the development of Being, the ground appears as the absolute negativity and derision of Being through the movement of being-in-self and *Dasein*, Being and essence, inner and outer, and possibility and actuality. With its culmination in the Concept it loses its internal negativity, as the substance realizes the subject in its total freedom and necessity. With the infinite intro-reflection the Concept becomes the truth of the relations of substantiality, as the infinite self-relation of the ego. The Concept is the totality, which relates to and results from the reciprocity and interaction of substances and appears as their identity. This identity is the unity of the moments of Reflection, where each moment is the

movement of the posited Other in-itself. Being self-identical and self-related in itself through the various stages, the Concept is the identity in- and for-itself which constitutes the necessity of the substantial world.

For Hegel the unity of the Concept is formed by the synthetic unity of apperception, by the synthesizing ability of self-consciousness. The principle of the determination of the manifold of representations and intuition into objects of perception and understanding is the transcendental unity of apperception.[25] It is thought which determines the sensuously given and forms the something and the thing into an object, which has its own history. This is extremely important for the foundation of science, since the external must not be taken as reality. Both metaphysics and social science demand that the Concept become the foundation of science itself, because only the Concept has united necessity and freedom, the theoretical and moral into a unified totality. The Concept results from the negativity of Being and the intro-reflection (*Er-innerung*) of the essential structures of *Wesen*, but in the process of its becoming it transcends the sensuous material world by the reduction of the latter to the essential, which is the Concept.

> Philosophy is not meant to be a narrative of what happens, but a cognition of what is true in happenings, and further, it has to form a Notion out of the body of truth about that which in the narrative appears as mere happening.[26]

This examination of the essential qualities of science by Hegel is of utmost importance in understanding Marx' appropriation of historical reality and the economic structures in *Capital*. The external reality of history is never lost sight of, but is placed into a form that reveals its own essential nature. Truth seeks out not the happenings, but the real behind the occurrences. The ability to build a science with these goals presupposes as its ground the issue of temporality, not seen as the historicity of Being or the historical nature of economic and social institutions, but rather the possibility and comprehensibility of reaching the concrete totality of the self-identity of the capitalist social system.

The actuality reveals itself to be the union of existence and possibility, *i.e.* the "having been" and the future as related to the "having been". Totality is best expressed as the comprehension of the complete movement of Being and the intro-reflection of its identity with its own cultural objectifications as a self-conscious and self-contained unity existing through time. The real is understood by the ideal because both partake of the totality - self-reflection. In the 'Preface' to the *Philosophy of Right* and the 'Introduction' to the *Lesser Logic* Hegel states that what is reasonable is actual and what is actual is reasonable.[27] The

analysis of the concept of temporality shows that this seemingly puzzling statement, which philosophers have used to portray Hegel as a conservative defender of the status quo and the Prussian totalitarian order, is of a different nature than a mere defense of immediacy. It is a critique of the "myth of the given". Throughout the *Logic* the immediate is always negated and transcended. For example, in the sphere of Being, determinate being is negated, in the sphere of Essence existence is negated, and in the sphere of the Concept objectivity is negated. Instead of being interpreted as the admission that the reasonable is the real, it should be seen as a statement that the existing contains the possible fulfillment of its own Concept in time. This would mean its concrete actualization in the present or the future. This same idea is later expressed by Marx in his belief that the reasonable is actual or actualizable by the full development of culture, the material productive forces, the relations of production, and the class consciousness of the producers.

The present contains its own negativity and otherness, which is no longer otherness to self-consciousness, but the basis for the fulfillment of its Concept. There is a problem with this interpretation, since temporality is being used interchangeably with two different approaches to the future. On the one hand the future is expressed as the realization of the possibilities inherent in rationality and the dialectical process of the working out of that logic in social praxis. This dualism between the logic of the Concept and the realization of the Concept, which because logic and being are one, for Hegel, remains unproblematic. For him the two are inseparably conjoined. Marx, however, separates the two because of his critique of Hegel's identity theory and his political ideals of how the future is to be democratically formed. The former involves the 'closed future', while the latter involves the 'open future'; the former requires a temporal structure which is a self-contained totality, complete in itself and the latter requires a temporal structure, which realizes the freedom inherent to self-consciousness in the process of creating its own social and productive relations. A similar relation exists between Being and Concept and commodity and capital, for in both systems there is a movement from the abstractions of simple immediacy to determinate interrelations within a 'closed future'; that is, in both systems the conclusion is the result of a working out of its initial premises and contradictions as the future is an expression of the mediated contained in simple immediacy. With this use of the temporal dimension from Hegel's method, the analysis of commodity production and the social relations of capital are encompassed in a 'closed' logical system bounded by the past and the future, which is also a past (possibilities inherent in capital). This implies that the real future of history is open to change, since social theory built on the dialectical

method, does not predetermine the course of future events, as in positivism. The logic of the dialectic traces out the essential structures, but not the course that history must take; the dialectic cannot move directly into real history. The future is not determined by any natural laws of the market, but by the possibilities inherent in human reason and the social structures. This distinction between the moments and aspects of the temporal dimensions will have an important impact on the interpretation of Marx' 'theory and praxis' to be discussed in Chapter Five.

IV. REALIZATION OF THE CONCEPT AND THE CONCRETE TOTALITY

In the second book of the *Logic*, the Concept is, however, still an abstract determination, which must be realized in the external world. This determinate being of the Concept is no longer the simple Something over and against others, nor the Thing with its characteristics, but the particularizing of the Concept in existing objects as they form the realized Concepts. The Concept as the universal principle of reality (Absolute Spirit) now determines itself to be objectivity, that is, to be both real and existing. Hegel must now deal with the issue of the existence of this universal reality. Just as he begins the *Logic* with an acceptance of Descartes' argument for the existence of pure immediacy, he returns at this point to recreate the Cartesian notion of the ontological argument, but within an entirely different framework.[28] (Hegel also begins the *Phenomenology* with Descartes' method of radical doubt). In the *Logic* he rejects Kant's defense of the ontological argument and his union of thought and being. Reality cannot be predicated on a definition by the subject, for the conceptualization of an object in no way dictates the category of real existence. The mere listing of God's attributes does not necessitate the most universal and abstract of all attributes - existence. This argument of Kant is valid, for Hegel, only within the context of the history of philosophy, that is, it is valid as the expression of the ontological argument from Anselm through Descartes. However, it is Hegel's contention that the proof for the Being of God lies not in the discussion of the attributes of the subject, but rather in the necessity of the argument itself, based on the principle of non-contradiction. God, for Hegel, is the Concept, the subject, the concrete totality whose existence, if denied, involves an unacceptable contradiction in that the denial means the denial of the real itself.[29] The Concept is not "the Being greater than which none can be conceived", but is, in fact, the only reality. To reject God is to reject reality, which, for Hegel, is self-contradictory. The objectivity is the immediacy, in

which the Concept determines and realizes itself by the transcendence of its abstract universality.

In the third part of his *Logic*, the 'Doctrine of the Concept', Hegel analyses the twofold significance of subjectivity and the twofold significance of objectivity which are the two key moments of reality. It is also here that we arrive at the most important distinction in Hegel's thought, an understanding of which will lead to a more comprehensive understanding of Marx' method.[30] The reason for this is that it is at this point in Hegel's *Logic* that all the metaphysical, traditional, and ontological arguments come to the fore with the union of Aristotelian and Cartesian philosophy; the union of being and thought is accomplished on the most immediate level. This is the step that Marx refuses to take in his analysis of *Capital* (the metaphysics of identity theory). Marx' rejection of Hegelian metaphysics, but his acceptance of many of the methodological principles of idealism will be more clearly indicated by the examination of the relation between the *Denkgesetze* and the *Gesetze der Aussenwelt, Darstellungsmethode* and *Forschungsmethode*, and *Gedankenprozess* and *Seinsprozess*. The essential reason for this rejection lies in his acceptance of the Concept as science and the centrality of Hegel's notion of temporality, as the ground for the understanding of historicity. Marx, however, rejects the ontological argument of German Idealism along with the doctrine of Being and Idea.

The subjectivity contains the dual aspects of the Concept and the externally contingent world, while the objectivity entails its own opposition to the Concept and the fact that objectivity is in- and for-itself. The objective world is thus opposed to the subject. It, however, appears only at the immediate level of existence for it is the world into which reason comes and determines its form. Truth becomes the self-identity and self-containment of the subjective and the objective in the infinite as it moves toward the End (both the ontological and temporal meaning is involved here). This self-identity is also self-repulsion, in that the determined is external and indifferent to the Concept, while at the same time identical to it as the intro-reflected. The truth of objectivity and thus the meaning of the external cultural world is the subject, as the self-consciousness which created it.

In his analysis of objectivity, Hegel passes from static immediacy of the mechanism to the level of teleology where the End appears as the Concept's transcendence of the abstract universal. The objective world is seen as the immediate presupposition and positing of the external. The being-for-self has passed back over to being-in-self in the process of the self-determination of the Concept, where the latter has particularized itself in the concrete externality. At this point in the development of Being, the Concept is still distinct from the objective world, which remains in- and for-itself self-identical, but whose self-determining

identity is the Concept as Idea.

The Idea, as the final form of Being, is the realization and objective truth of the Concept. This happens because of the union of the subjective reality and the objective world, the Concept and objectivity. When the two do not correspond then the external entity is not in its truth but is still appearance - contingent and subjective. If the objective world does not conform to the Concept, the actuality must still implicitly contain it as "having been" or it would be Nothing. This Nothing is the not-being of the finite in the process of overcoming the barriers to the ought in the sphere of the mechanical, chemical, and teleological spheres. The abstract universality has realized itself by forming the determinate Being and particularizing the universal in the individual reality. The universal is now the Being-in-and-for-Self in the objective world, for the universal becomes concrete and external and is realized through further development within itself in the theoretical and practical Idea.

At the stage of cognition (Vol. II, Section Three), the Concept can only transcend its subjectivity by the actual realization of the Concept in objectivity. The Concept's goal, as Idea, is to determine the object, as the realization of the universal in the particular determination of Being, *i.e.* the transcending of the in-itself of the particular by the fulfillment of the for-itself of the Concept. The Idea is to attain its goal when the external world has the form of the Concept itself. The Concept, as the synthesizing process of self-consciousness, results in the synthesis of the manifold of representations and its logical categories. Hegel's theory of objectivity is based on the idea that the object becomes posited through the dialectical movement of these logical categories. This unity is still only an external relationship and for this reason subjectivity has not yet realized itself in the object, has not become fully self-conscious of the fact that it is the truth of objectivity; self-consciousness is the truth of culture and society. Cognition transforms the external reality into relations of propositions and laws, which, however, never form the necessity of the objective world as the realization of the in- and for-itself of the object. The ground of experience becomes the unity and relation of appearances, but not the unity of the subject. This ground is immediate existence and can never be the basis and justification for the necessity of the being-for-self. Whether at the level of definitions, classifications or propositions, the physical contingent nature of the external world becomes systematized by the external and comparative reflection and not by the intro-reflection (the return to self of Being), where distinctions are not contingent, but the result of the negative otherness of the object.

The synthetic unity of apperception is achieved by the process of distinctions and determinations created through the immanent critique of

the various concrete subject-object relations. Truth is not the external organization of the objective world into relationships and classifications, because these relationships could not become the basis of systematically organized truth in the form necessary for dialectical self-development. The latter comes only from the development of the Concept in the course of its dialectical movement caused by the inherently unstable position of each level of categories and their forms of knowledge about nature or society. Each claim to universality and truth is met by a dialectical counter-claim that forces reason to move to a higher level of truth-claim. It is important to recognize that truth is a characteristic of Being and not knowledge, since objects are true only when they are what they should be, "wenn ihre Realität ihrem Begriff entspricht".[31] To remain at the level of sensuous representations and appearances is, for Hegel, a "resignation of the Concept" for truth can only be grasped "through and from the standpoint of the Idea", which is the actualized Concept in objectivity. Thus sensuous representation and empirical perception retains their contingent, subjective, and external nature. Their beginnings are arbitrary and mediated by an undemonstrated subjective presupposition.

> Here this identity does not reach existence and remains the merely internal; or, it is that which is merely external, its determinate content being given it. In both views it is abstract and does not contain the side of reality within itself, and is not posited as identity which is determined in and for itself. Thus the Concept is excluded from this Cognition, and it is the Concept which is the only goal and is the infinite in and for itself.[32]

The identity does not reach existence because the theoretical Idea through cognition concerns itself only with the immediate present in the objective world. Existence can be obtained only by the self-movement of the Concept from its "having been" posited in its own past. The concrete and objective totality is not the one-sided appropriation of the Absolute, but the union of the subjective Concept and the objective Concept. The Concept has transcended the abstracted universality of the world's otherness and its inherent determinations of particularity by the very appropriation of objectivity for itself. The aim is the positing of its own determinations towards its realization in external reality (actuality). It cancels the reality of appearances as being null and void in and for itself. Cognition apprehends the negative self-identity of the Concept, while the Practical Idea posits the Absolute as the totality in its particularity and individuality. The Absolute is no longer a mere personality, pure subject, but an actuality. The real has become rational in the Absolute Idea.

The objective world now moves in 'free necessity' according to its transcendence of negativity and otherness.[33] This movement is free because it is the expression of the internal laws of the object and it is necessary because its process acts in accord with the mediating Concept, whose movement acts according to its own *Gewordensein* and *Vergangenheit.* With the Absolute Idea the questions of temporality and science are resolved in the totality of the Concept cancelling the determinations of the external world in order to determine it through its own movement. The Concept is now fully the self-identity relating to its otherness as existing and actual. Necessity, which is the highest point of Being and essence, is now united with the highest point of the Concept, *i.e.*, freedom. The latter is the self-moving universal and identity, which determines and forms the external actuality by its own forms and unfolding.

The *Logic* ends with the same discussion with which it began. The first chapter, 'With What Must Science Begin?', and the last, 'The Absolute Idea', both center upon the logical foundations of science with the emphasis on Beginning. Beginning with the abstract universality, the dialectic progresses through a series of truth statements which reveal themselves to be partial approximations to the totality. The concrete universal can realize itself only in the particularity of the concrete actual. The Beginning was determined as the immediate, where every progress was the revelation of the Concept as self-relating and mediated. Consequently the Beginning "must be made from the Absolute" and "in itself is concrete totality".[34] The absolute method begins with the determinations of the universal and not with external reflection. Determinations, differentiations, negations, and synthesis all occur within the self-development of the Concept as its immanent principle and soul. The method of the Dialectic may be seen from two perspectives - the analytic and the synthetic.[35] The former involves the concretizations and objectifications of the universal from the determinations of the Concept itself, while the latter involves the movement of determinations from the Other, which is seen as existing itself. The Concept is the realization of itself through its otherness, as the movement of its own determinations, as self-identity from the beginning as universal to the result as concrete and subject. The three moments of the Dialectic are the universal which is in-itself, the negative, which is for-itself and the result which is in-and-for-itself, as the self-identical whole. The conclusion is the immediate universal which is the Concept completed in- and for-itself as the complete determination of reality through the union of the "having been" (seminal principle) and the realized End. The Beginning is not abstract and immediate, but mediated and derived, a concrete totality which is already internally differentiated.

> This may be expressed now as the definite demand that the beginning, because it is itself determinate as against determinateness of the result, shall be taken as not immediate but as mediated and derivative: this may seem equivalent to the demand for an infinite backward progress in proof and derivation, while, from the new beginning which has been obtained, a result likewise emerges in the course of the method, so that the progress also rolls forward to infinity.[36]

Thus, the two moments of regression from the concrete totality of the Absolute Spirit and the progression from the being-in-self make up the elements crucial to Hegel's method. For him, the results contain their own beginnings and the beginnings contain their own results in the temporal unity as a "system of totality". Each stage of development is the further determination of the Concept, where the regression confirms and necessitates the beginning and the progression realizes it. The method of science is, therefore, the Concept in its negative self-identity of time (the identity of all temporal moments in the Concept). "Logic is the pure Notion." Science is seen as the method which returns upon itself in recurring circles. The foundation for this system of totality lies in the system of totality created by the unity of temporality in its pastness, where the beginning is the end and the end the beginning. The possibility for this system is given by its common foundation in its "having been" already posited in its totality. Thus every attempt to understand the historicity of the objective cultural world requires the comprehension of the structure of temporality, since the "is" exists only as "having been" and the "will be" already "is".

IV. TEMPORALITY AND SCIENCE IN THE LOGIC OF *CAPITAL*

Something very important for an understanding of Marx' method as 'critique' lies in these metaphysical wanderings of Hegel's logic.[37] He believed that Hegel conceived the real as a product of thought processes, as it developed out of itself. However, Marx rejected the doctrine of Being and the ontological argument, while accepting the general framework of the *Logic*. In the 'Introduction' to the *Grundrisse* he states that thought appropriates the concrete and reproduces it as the concrete in the mind.[38] Unlike Hegel, the development of thought from the abstract universal to the concrete totality involves no conversion of the real and ideal or the real and thought. Thought appropriates the reproduction of the concrete determinations of commodity production; in this process it develops its Concept from the immediacy of exchange-value and abstract social labor to its furthest extent in the historical law

of the falling rate of profit and the economic crises of the capitalist system. Thought reproduces and concretizes only thought determinations and not actual historical movements or economic institutions, *i.e.*, it does not complete itself in objectivity (critique of the identity theory). "The concrete totality is a totality of thought, concrete in thought, in fact a product of thinking and comprehending" and not the empirical totality of the given immediately in intuition or perception (world of appearance).[39]

It is Marx who incorporates into his economic and social research the main foundations of the Hegelian dialectic and method as Concept: the method of regressive progression contains the element of progression from the immediate abstraction to the concrete totality, and the content of temporality as the methodological ground for historicity. Marx rejects, however, the ontological and metaphysical arguments used by Hegel. This is an important point in the understanding of *Capital*, for it clearly indicates that Marx cannot be interpreted as a positivist interested only in a predictive, empirical-analytic science. He constructs instead a dialectical science in which capitalist social relations are analyzed from within the framework of their own internal contradictions and essential structures. The appropriate method of expression is that based on the Concept as the dialectical development of the categories as they evolve from one another out of their initial beginnings in the abstract universality of the commodity. But, as we have already seen with Hegel, the indeterminacy of the immediate in this method contains within itself a concrete totality. "The sequence is determined, rather by their relation to one another" and not by their historical genesis.[40]

There are many themes that could be examined when comparing Hegel and Marx, such as the relationships between the historical and logical, appearance and essence, substance and principle, abstract and concrete, as well as, the law of the negation of the negation, the problem of the contradiction and the logical structure of the system of categories. However, the relation between temporality and science involves the whole of the logical problems and thus includes all of the above. As we have already seen, Hegel's identity theory unites the subject and object in the complete Concept with the different moments of temporality in the "having been" already posited and the present in the 'closed future'. Since Marx rejects the metaphysical components of this analysis, he stresses instead the dialectical movement of the Concept of capital as it develops within the closed system of temporality in order that the negative and contradictory economic and social forces within the society express themselves, not as externally comparable and contingently relatable, but as necessary movements of the initial logical and historical conditions of the capitalist mode of production. The

internal dynamic of the social system is contained in its immanent principle as the Concept grounded in negativity and otherness. The form which this takes empirically is the contradictory systems imperatives of a society built around the rationalization of the productive forces for accumulation, property, and profit and around the rationalization of the social relations of production for the satisfaction of human needs and the general good of society. This contradiction lies at the logical foundation of capitalism, which can never be transcended, but finds itself manifested in different historical expressions and different economic crises. It is this complex relationship between logic and history that lies at the foundation of Marx' critique of political economy, which is further complicated by his rejection of the union of both in an identity theory. The latter is implicit in positivism. A more complete understanding of the relation between logic and history must wait until we examine the epistemological foundations of Marx' method in his later economic writings (Chapter Four), for only this will give us insight into the logical nature and ontological status of his categories. What relation did Marx see between the categories of science and the real world? Part of the answer lies in his and Hegel's response to the philosophical 'dilemma of objective validity' raised by David Hume (Chapter Five).

Just as Hegel begins with an abstract universal, which contains the totality of the temporal movement, Marx develops the dialectic in a similar manner to include the concept of the 'closed future' (the future as part of the logic of capital). Starting with the most immediate category, the commodity, he realizes, that as an existing historical reality, it contains the unity of both history and logic within the Hegelian framework of temporality. The structure of its categories has an historical moment because commodity production represents the actual development of the historical stages of mercantilism, commercial capitalism, and industrial capitalism, while the logical moment contains the "having been" posited principles of the concrete totality. These underlie the logic of capitalism and the potentiality of the laws of capital accumulation and economic deterioration. The commodity represents the germ of the future development of the capitalist system (similar to Hegel's seed and flower). Marx' method stresses the inherent logical problems of *Realisierungsschwierigkeiten* (consumption and realization problems and the overproduction of goods) and *Verwertungs-schwierigkeiten* (surplus-value realization problems and the crisis of overproduction of capital) that are the result of the development from the initial contradictions of the production of both use-value and exchange-value. The actual for him is already realized irrationality. The logical progress of the Concept or the underlying rationality of capitalism can be altered in history by the introduction of new and

improved technology, increased rates of exploitation, and state intervention policies used in its crisis avoidance and systems maintenance functions; but the underlying being-in-self of the system can never be altered, only its appearances. Economic crises are the phenomenological appearances of the working out of the logic of capitalism.

At the level of social science the rejection of objectivity is in fact the rejection of the historical argument, *i.e.*, the Concept of capital production relates and develops its own internal contradictions which are also expressed as historical crises. However, the actual development of these crises cannot be traced by the Concept, because it is enclosed in its own temporal schema of the dialectic. How the actual conditions of history express these contradictions and laws of economic deterioration must be investigated empirically (the history of capital).

> The value analysis of capital development postulates the possibility of crises by a mere consideration of the general nature of capital, without regard to the additional and real relations that form the conditions of the real production process.[41]

The critical method with its special temporal dimension is incapable of predicting the actual fall of capitalism through the falling rate of profit or the actual means used by the political and economic institutions for crisis avoidance and systems maintenance. Using this temporal structure Marx is capable of revealing the essential nature of modern social organizations and production along with their irrationality and the destruction of all values of man's freedom, creativity and community. The contradictions spill over into a critique of the political economy underlying the liberal value structure by revealing how its goals of freedom, equality, and liberty can never be realized in a system given the logical foundations of capital itself (immanent critique of liberalism).

In conclusion the main point to be considered is the inability of capital to be used for doctrinal planning, social engineering, or even revolutionary social change, because of the logically prior requirements of science as Concept and a methodologically restrictive definition of the future.[42] Capital does not permit in its methodological framework the introduction of a future which can be mechanically manipulated. The underlying epistemology which would allow this (positivism) is missing in Marx' method. The dialectic works only within a categorial structure of totality (beginning and end as concrete totality). The future in Marx' system is created by the critique of false consciousness and ideology and the development of a critical self-consciousness about the nature of the social relations of capitalist society. Will, self-consciousness, and social praxis are part of this process, and not reducible to science. It also indicates different logical foundations for different

activities such as the theoretical and the practical. Only when theorists realized that, for Marx, the Concept is science will the differences between dialectical, transcendental, and positivist logic be seen along with their opposing logical foundations and their perspectives regarding the dimensions and directions of social activity.

CHAPTER THREE

Materialism and Critique: The Schelling and Feuerbach Responses to Hegel

I. INTRODUCTION

The third aspect of the critical method to be examined is its relationship to both idealism and materialism. The key issue here focuses on the ontological dimensions of Marx' categories of political economy and the exact reality to which they refer. With this new approach to Marx' method the simple correlation or correspondence between concepts and reality has broken down and the interrelationship between these two dimensions has become very problematic and very complex. To what do the categories used by Marx in his analysis of British political economy refer? If your answer is the reality of British capitalism, I believe you are correct. However, what is this reality? Is it the immediate material and historical reality? Is it the reality of the appearances (the mirror of nature and society) or is it the reality of the essence and logic of capitalist society? If the latter, then how are these concepts justified, if the positivist method is not longer accepted? This last question will be dealt with in Chapter Five in the section on 'theory and praxis'. The two ontological dimensions are not always antithetically juxtaposed in Marx' own method. The distinctions between them are in most cases much more subtle than a crude opposition to each other.

Once Marx' meta-theory is examined outside of the positivist tradition, then the distinctions between idealism and materialism, as they are incorporated into his method, must themselves come under the critical method. This is made necessary because the reality to which the categories of political economy refer comes under closer intellectual scrutiny. If the critical method examines the essential structures of capital and rejects the method of reproducing the social appearances as in British science; if the method of 'critique' does not reproduce or mirror the immediacy of historical experience; and, if the epistemological foundations of Marx' science undercut the philosophy of science of positivism, then what is, in fact, the reality to which Marx' categories refer? The traditional distinctions of idealism in German Idealism and materialism in historical materialism along with the distinctions between essence and appearance, logic and history, must be reinterpreted, since, as we have already seen in the previous chapters, the epistemology and temporal dimensions of 'critique' have altered our understanding of the social reality, the method by which we understand that reality, and the

process by which our knowledge of that reality can be validated. With a closer exegesis of both Schelling and Feuerbach, their turns to materialism, their criticisms of Hegel's logic and metaphysics, and their philosophical preparations for the groundwork of Marx' own appropriation of history, we begin to see that Marx' critical method changes the traditional interpretations of both ontological dimensions. Through a clarification of their respect for and critiques of Hegel, more light is shed on the development of Marx' method and the manner in which he deals with the critique of positivism, the crisis of epistemology, and the 'dilemma of objective validity'.

With the deaths of Hegel (1831), Goethe (1832), and Schleiermacher (1834), the "Storm and Stress", the *Goethezeit*, the classical, romantic, and the German Idealist periods came to an end and the radical critiques of the identity of being and concept, nature and logic began at the hands of the adherents of *Lebensphilosophie*, Left-Hegelianism, and *Existenzphilosophie*.[1] Reacting to Hegel's critique of his early writings, Schelling began his critique of Hegel with the Munich lectures (1827-41), but developed them further in his 'Philosophical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology' which was the lecture series at the University of Berlin in 1842[2]; these lectures were well attended with the lecture hall packed to overflowing, "with students coming through the doors and windows". Savigny, Lichtenstein, Steffens, Burckhardt, Kierkegaard, Bakunin, and Engels were among them. This was the period of revolutionary transformation in the theoretical realm with the publication of Feuerbach's *Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Philosophie* (1839) and *Das Wesen des Christentums* (1841), Marx' *Kritik der Hegelschen Staatsphilosophie* (1841- 42), and Kierkegaard's *Either-Or* (1843).[3]

A generally unnoticed, and therefore unexamined, point of importance is that the idealism of Schelling is a crucial aspect of the philosophical foundations of historical materialism. These Berlin lectures were known to Marx through Engels. Friedrich Schmidt has argued that the way to historical materialism was from Schelling and Feuerbach to Marx with Hegel being only "a fruitful but fatal detour".[4] The latter, I believe, is certainly a pedagogical over-statement of the case, but it does point to the importance that a neglected Schelling has for an understanding of Marx' materialism and critical methodology. This third chapter will attempt to analyze Schelling's later writings and those of Feuerbach dealing specifically with their critiques of Hegel's methodology, his notions of *Begriff* (Concept) and the Absolute, and the issue of the objective validity of the concepts of reason.[5]

II. SCHELLING'S REJECTION OF HEGEL'S THEORY OF OBJECTIVITY AND IDENTITY

Within the past few years there has been a renewed interest in the later philosophical development of Schelling, who breaks ties with Hegel and returns to Kant's transcendental philosophy, Fichte's intellectual perception, and an identity theory mediated by Plato's dialectics and Aristotle's concept of possibility.[6] No longer is Schelling seen merely through the eyes of a Hegel critique (Michelet, K. Fischer, Erdmann, and Kröner) but as the beginning of existentialist thought (Löwith, Jaspers, Tillich, and Schütz)[6], as the completion of metaphysics (Heidegger) and German Idealism (Schultz and Oeser)[8], and as the foundation of historical materialism (K. Löwith, F. Schmidt, M. Frank, A. White, and Habermas, who was influenced by Heidegger).[9]

Schelling first began his critique of Hegel in the *Münchner Vorlesungen*, 'Zur Geschichte der neuen Philosophie', with an analysis of the confusion concerning the notions of *Begriff* (Concept) and *Gedanken*, concept and thought.[10] Schelling begins his analysis with the recognition that the *Begriff* (Concept), is for Hegel not a mere form of conceptualization, but is the true meaning of the thing, the creator of all things; it is the notion of God itself.[11] The Concept attributes to itself the objective meaning of the external world so that there is nothing external to it. The subjective and objective worlds are united in this one notion, since it is a simple logical-philosophical category which tries to explain the *Naturphilosophie* from within itself. Schelling returns to the most fundamental question in Hegelian philosophy - the formation of the beginning. Pure being is only the first level in the movement towards the Absolute Spirit; but this empty and abstract being is incapable of its own movement, which can only be attributed to the process of remembrance by the philosopher. Schelling argues that the necessity of the movement lies within the thought of the subject which "is accustomed already to a concrete, contentful Being. The Concept at this stage of pure immediacy is incapable of movement and the subject must be substituted for it in order to explain further development of being."[12] Hegel, according to Schelling, had ignored the necessity of beginning with both pure Being and the subject. However, as we have already seen in Chapter Two, Hegel's *Logic* does not begin with pure Being but with the end, Absolute Spirit.

> ... every beginning must be made from the Absolute, while every progress is merely the exhibition of the Absolute in so far as that which in itself is the Notion.... the beginning, which in itself is concrete totality can also be free as such and ... its immediacy may have the determination of an external existence.[13]

Beginning not with objective being but with the immediate abstraction of being, the latter becomes the nothing. Being permits of no thoughts about it and thus falls into a tautological position where it is characterized as nothing. For Schelling the difficulties of not beginning with the subject, but rather with the Concept, as immediately conceived, are reflected in an identity theory in which there is no necessity. With this beginning of the empty Concept of being and the inability to ground necessity within this static concept, the whole system of Hegelian science is questioned. When the beginning is made from the subject (as is the case with Schelling) the dialectic of being and nothingness is merely a question of possibility and realization. "Pure Being is still the Nothing, simply means: it is yet not the real Being."[14] Nothingness refers to the state of development as an abstract undetermined immediacy. For Schelling the end of the *Logic* is determined exactly in the same manner as the end of identity philosophy, that is, as the unity of subject and object, the unity of thought and being, and the unity of the ideal and the real. While Hegel began the process with the development of the Concept, Schelling began with the development of the "living essence". The end, for Hegel, was the result of the process of mediation of the Concept, while, for Schelling, it was a product of thought, as the thinking subject.[15] Thus Hegel in the foundation of his identity philosophy proceeded to the building of a metaphysical system and not a science of reason (*Vernunftswissenschaft*).[16]

Instead of beginning with simple objectivity, Schelling begins with "the subject in its complete objectivity." The subject is not merely posited, but moves within itself in the form of the objective to the point where there is an "indifference" (*Indifferenz*) between the subjective and objective. The subject becomes the carrier of the *Sein* in its "possibility". The beginning can only be made with the subject and determinate being, being *in potentia.* Being potentiality (*Seinskönnenden*) is the principle of movement and rests upon the "indifference" of being and thought.[17] Hegel held that indifference (*Gleichgültigkeit*) was the essential feature of being-in-itself, since being is indifferent to its own concrete determinations. The immediate pushes beyond itself toward its other as being-for-itself. *Dasein* and consciousness are inseparable moments of the same on-going process. Schelling takes a different approach in that indifference (*Indifferenz*) refers to the ontological distinctness of being and thought, which represents a return to a more Kantian perspective. This separation of being and thought by Schelling permits the philosopher the opportunity of transforming being by understanding its inner possibilities. The split is crucial since neither being nor thought is caught up with one another at the beginning.

If the beginning of the Hegelian system is an unscientific

abstraction and emptiness and the process of dialectical development is merely the relation of a tautology where no contradiction arises, then the Hegelian Idea realizes itself in empty movement between abstractions, which in no way relate to the external world. The Idea remains the abstract Idea and does not relate to objective reality. The identity philosophy of Schelling and the whole development of his later philosophy, on the other hand, attempts, according to him at least, to connect itself to nature and the empirical world from the start.[18] This development rests upon an empiricist foundation mediated by the accomplishments of German Idealism. This means that the empiricism, as conceived by Schelling as the foundation of the objective subjectivism, could never be interpreted as a return to Locke or Hume, *i.e.*, the British empiricists.[19] From the immediacy of the singular experience, the elements for the formation of synthetic *a priori* judgments are appropriated from the external world. Thus within the "indifference" of the subjective and objective there is the recognition that there are two types of experience and induction which form the ground of Schelling's Concept of experience.[20] The two spheres of induction and experience correspond to the separation of the Concept from reality. The initial process is one of induction of the elements of experience and the later stage is the induction of the thought process and the experience of the potential: one level states what is real and not real, while the other states what is possible and what is not. Schelling's goal is to create the conditions for the universality and necessity of the *Prinzip* through the creation of new *Seinsmöglichkeiten*, a new science of reason.[21] Nature is reinstated as the source of knowledge and as external to the experiencing subject.[22] This split between the two realms, which Schelling attempts to maintain through his criticism of Hegel's identity theory, is a missing link in the later development of Marx' method and the ontological status of his categories of political economy. It is also a missing element in the on-going problem of the 'dilemma of objective validity', which only social praxis can solve.

The objective moment, instead of being taken as the *a priori* of the self-movement of the Concept, is now seen as the result of thinking and the content of thought. As poetry can relate to the real as its objective content, it can also return to itself as its own object. Poetry can have itself for its object just as Hegel's Concept had itself for its own movement and content in complete abstraction from the external.[23] Schelling's notion of abstraction is not an ontological principle of reality constructed by the union of the singular and the universal, being and thought in "intellectual perception". The difference between "what" and "is" reflects the opposition between Concept and experience. Schelling re-establishes the link severed by Hegel to the history of philosophy, that is, he re-establishes the link to the medieval separation of the *es-*

sentia from *existentia*, understanding from experience, essence from being (*Dasein*).[24] Schelling attempts to begin with experience.

> We know not only this and that, but we know in general nothing but through experience, and by way of experience, and our whole knowledge exists in this respect from sentences about experience.[25]

The subjective conditions for knowledge thus come from experience, but the objective conditions come from the *Vernunftswissenschaft*, which is the *a priori* derivation of the Concept from the inner necessity independent of all experience. This view of knowledge rests upon the Platonic notion of recollection stimulated by the sensible world dependent upon the ideal world of *episteme*. Schelling's desire was to transcend the dichotomy of rationalism and empiricism, which resulted, in his case, in a methodological foundation of science quite different from that proposed by Hegel.[26] The *Vernunftswissenschaft* is constituted *a priori*, but to be realized it must be compared to and founded in nature and not merely, as in the Hegelian Concept, deduced from the limitations of the logical development itself, deduced from the necessity of the Concept. It is experience which decides on the validity and relatedness of the Concept. This conceptualization of the truth and the relation between the ideal and real, Concept and reality shows Schelling's position in relation to empiricism and Hegelianism, that is, in relation to the organization of categories through their dialectical and contradictory movement in the lawlike structure of Being. This system of rational empiricism deals with the thing itself, not as a self-relating Concept, but as relating to experience. Empiricism is no longer the only independent source of knowledge, but it does provide the basic material building blocks for the *Vernunftswissenschaft* and is later important as the source for the examination of the reality of the construct of reason.[27] This certainly is a development out of Kantian philosophy, but also beyond it.

For Habermas, in his dissertation at the University of Bonn, Schelling had divided his method into a negative and positive philosophy. The negative philosophy utilized the deductive method of pure thought to reach the essence, while the positive philosophy began where the negative philosophy left off and attempted to comprehend the reality of existence.[28] The real as essence is thought and comprehended through the *a priori*, while the real as existence is experienced as the *a posteriori*.

> Reason cannot from itself perceive or prove the actual real Being, it cannot perceive or prove the present existence, *i.e.*, the existence of

> the plant or the stone. This is accomplished only in the world of perception.[29]

The negative philosophy is *a priori* empiricism and the positive philosophy is empirical aprioricism and together they lead to a progressive empiricism which is the totalization of the *a priori* project and the empirical confirmation.[30]

Hegel's Concept as self-movement was an abstraction of becoming as it moved through the "resistanceless aether"; Schelling likens Hegel's system to romantic poetry, which glorified poetry in its poetry, but which he says is not real poetry, which must battle with reality to be real. The former type of poetry is pure abstraction. Being is expressed in thought only as an external object or determination of being, but never as abstract being.[31] For Schelling the truth of the Concept rested upon sensuous reality. It will be in the works of Ludwig Feuerbach, the Left Hegelian, that sense perception and empiricism will be taken out of the realm of German Idealism and become the basis for his critique of that intellectual tradition. Whatever the critique of Hegel, Schelling remains squarely within the framework of idealist philosophy, for the rational philosophy has its truth in the immanent self-reflection and self-determination of thought independent of experience.[32] These two statements are not contradictory, since the fundamental distinction between "what" and "that", Concept and perception, is reflected into the methodological conditions for truth, which include both material elements and *a priori* reflection; the stress is on the latter, however. "That the total Science must solve itself in the logical, I have myself first later - and not independent from Hegel - realized."[33]

The real idea is determined in exactly the same way in the *Logic* as in the identity philosophy of Schelling since the totality of being is comprehended in its logical development. Schelling, unlike Marcuse (in his exciting work on *Hegels Ontologie und die Theorie der Geschichtlichkeit*[34]), does not treat the *Logic* as the ontological realization of the Concept, but rather as the mere result of logical science, which then must transcend itself in order to unite itself with illogical and external nature. The transition from pure Being to sensuous reality does not lie in the necessity of the Concept, but in the subject as self-consciousness. Nature is to be conceived as outside the logical because the logical is the mere movement of the Concept, while, for Schelling, the identity system represents "the logical development of nature".[35] One can almost still hear the reverberations of Marx' jubilant shouts of joy at hearing this. The separation of the two realms offered Marx the philosophical justification he needed for his distinctions between research method and the critical method of presentation, between the historical development of capitalism and the logic of

capital. Each with their own logic and method; each within their own ontological realms; and each with different purposes - one to examine the phenomenological world of experience and the other the inner logic of history. To crudely unite the two would be to turn materialism into another variant of positivism.

It was Hegel's belief "that all, which exists, is in the Idea or in the logical Concept." All reality was attributed to the Idea and the Idea itself represented a negative outside of which nothing could exist.[36] With the question of existence there is also raised the question of the explanation of existence. If the Idea is the negation of existence then its explanatory powers are limited as in the case of mathematics and measurement. When nothing exists except within the Idea, then its ability to explain sensuous reality becomes problematic, since as simple reason it cannot encompass the totality of the other. "The three concepts Being, Nothingness, Becoming presuppose nothing outside themselves and are the first three thoughts."[37] Schelling, on the contrary, holds that the Absolute, instead of being pure immediacy is really the subject. The Absolute is also the "indifference" of the subject and object. The subject in uncovering the reality of the world of experience becomes the de-subjectivized subject or the possibilities within the objective realm.[38]

Indifference is thus the "equal possibility of the subject and object." Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* is still seen by Schelling in his late philosophy as the most fundamental work of which Schelling himself was the completion.[39] Schelling attempted to overcome Kant's synthesis of the material substratum with the formal structure of the mind by the later establishment of the laws of being, rather than the laws of thought.[40] His work represents a continuation of the schema of Kant, in that, the given of experience is united to the categories of the mind[41] not to form objects of experience, but to form the law of being as possibility. Marx' *Capital* could, in fact, be best described as a work about the law of being as possibility. The possibility contains in its principles reality in pure thought independent of experience. As a product of thought-procedures it contains its own teleological necessity and synthetic understanding of the possibilities of nature.[42] The reality of the world of experience, the "that", is obtained in the world of reflection of the "what". The relation of the reason to experience is extremely complicated in that Schelling, within the Kantian foundation of synthetic *a priori* statements, returns to Fichte and the classical Greek period to produce the results of his late philosophy as the science of reason. It is this question of the relation between the constructions of human reason and the content of experience or the philosophical construction of that which does not appear in experience and experience, which will become essential later in Marx' materialism as the relation of the constructs of critical and social science to the

historically given world of experience. The ontological break, however, contains its own seeds for the ambivalence and ambiguity of materialism. To what do materialist categories of political economy refer, when there is a separation between thought and reality? The answer lies in the purpose behind Marx' meta-theory.

> The realized Idea at the end of the Logic is exactly determined as the Absolute at the end of the Identity-philosophy, as Subject-Object, as the unity of thought and Being, of the Ideal and Real, *etc.*[43]

The difference between the Hegelian and the Schelling system of the Absolute lies not in the conclusion as Absolute, but in what this Absolute represents. For Hegel, the Absolute is the result of science as the becoming and realization of the Idea in history; but, in reality, this is a logical structure which pushes itself to its own limits at which point it can either remain a purely logical construction of the Idea, or cross over into the philosophy of nature. The Hegelian concept of Nature, according to Schelling, is the *ausserlogische entgegengesetzte Welt* which no longer is the *a priori* construction of the *Logic.*[44] The end of the *Logic,* as the union of the ideal and being, subject and object, is a union which occurs within the movement of the logical *a priori* construction of pure Being. Nature lies outside the *Logic* and cannot be appropriated by the movement of the Concept; its acceptance results not from the realization of the Concept, but from the fact that nature exists. This analysis of Schelling, taken from Hegel's *Enzyklopädie,* is quite different from that of Marcuse where Hegel's *Logic* is interpreted in light of Heidegger's *Being and Time*, that is, the logic is seen as an ontology. For Schelling the *Logic* is a pure *Begriffslehre* with nature outside its structure, while the Concept in reality represents the logical development of nature itself as nature lies within its very movement. Schelling held this position because of the necessity of overcoming the problem of the "double becoming".[45] There are not two worlds of reality, the logical and the experiential, but only one, where "the subject in its abstract development is the first step in nature" which needs no further explanation for the transition from the logical to the real.[46] Hegel's system represents the opposite position, since there is not only a logic but also a philosophy of nature, that is, the completion of the idea in *a priori* thought is only a part of Hegel's total philosophy.

The method of the representation of the movement of being itself and not the mere simple subjective thought over and against a simple objective is called by Schelling "intellectual perception".[47] "Intellectual perception" constructs in pure thought the thing itself as the absolute unity of the subject-object. It is the methodological examination of the essential structures of the 'what' in pure thought, independent of the

immediacy of experience.

> While the identity philosophy concerned itself with the pure what of the thing, without expressing itself on the real existence, only in this sense can it be called Absolute Idealism, in opposition to the simple relative, which denies the existence of external things ... . The Science of reason is Absolute Idealism, in so far as it does take up the question of existence.[48]

Thus "intellectual perception", in dealing with the concept of being as the movement and infinite potentiality of being (*das Seinskönnende*), as the inner possibility of thought within the structure of the indifference of the Subject-Object, is the explanation of the thing itself but not its existence.[49] Although logic and nature are united in "intellectual perception" and are integral parts of the Concept, unlike the division in Hegel's thought, they still represent being as it is in pure thought or the contemplative independence of existence. While Fichte had wanted to use this method to prove the existence of the "I", Schelling wants to prove the existence of the universal subject-object.[50] Concept and being are one in the realm of the logical science of reason, but in fact must be proven in relation to the experiential in order to be the total reality. Reason produces not the reality, but only the real, which must be further joined in actual experience to be considered the apprehension of reality. Like Kant and the transcendental logic, reality is the product of the unity between reason and experience, but it is reason which forms the understanding of the laws of being which makes this comprehension possible. Without the knowledge of possibility, the present moment becomes lost in the mere series of undifferentiated moments of immediate sense impulses.

The material as immediate and undetermined is the means through which the real thought expresses itself in developing forms and determinations. The *materia prima* cannot be that which is actually thought, for "when thinking is concerned with the determination of this material, it thinks not on this basis itself, but only on the determinations of the Concept, which are set in itself - it is therefore part of the process of thinking, but not actually thought itself."[51] As geometry contains the inner and spiritual content of the black table across the room, so too does "intellectual perception" contain the real as Concept. Hegel conceives the absolute as the result of the logical procedure of the development of the dialectical contradictions within the Concept, but Schelling, with closer ties to Kant, must confirm his perceptions with experience. "That the constructed really exists, only experience and not reason can say." Schelling wanted to construct the real world in reason, but this world-reality must be tested by the criterion of experience.[52]

Hegel's *Logic* is the metaphysical construction of a chimerical world that has no relation to the physical concrete world; it is simply a philosophy of reflection.

Schelling realizes that, for Hegel, the end becomes the beginning and the movement from the beginning is nothing other than the realization of the end through its dialectical moments (*Endursache*). The totality of the moments is constructed not only of movements toward the end, but already forms the end realized in the present moment as the possibility of actuality. The result thus becomes its own principle from the beginning, but reaches its fulfillment only in the end. The beginning, end, principle, and every dialectical moment are all present at every stage of development of the Concept in Hegel's identity philosophy. The Absolute, as the highest and most concrete form of the Spirit, as the truth of Being, is the pure subject independent and unrelated to being. The movement within the *Logic* from being and essence, to Concept and Idea is the movement toward the total inclusion of being into the Concept, the subsumption of empiricism into rationalism. The conflict between the inner and outer is eliminated along with the conflict between essence and the appearance, that is, the external world of experience is transcended in the Concept as Idea.[53] Here too the 'dilemma of objective validity', raised by Hume and later by Kant and Hegel, is overcome in the logic through philosophical *fiat* and not through philosophical or practical justification. The dilemma remains and will be passed on to Marx who then takes a surprising turn with the problem. If his solution does not solve it, it certainly takes it to a higher level.

Schelling intensifies and expands his Hegel critique of the *Münchner Vorlesungen* in his 'Philosophische Einleitung in der Philosophie der Mythologie', with a new approach to the dialectic and category formation. This formation for Schelling is only a category or predicate system which excludes its own foundation in the synthetic unity of apperception, *i.e.*, the subject. The Absolute is the highest and richest category, but does not reach the subject from which the predicates receive their worth.[54] The *Dialektik* is thus a *Prädikatenlehre* for it begins with undetermined being and with no subject upon which the development is based. Schelling attempted to replace this *Kategorienlehre* with a *Transzendentalenlehre*, the dialectical contradiction of Being and Nothingness with the opposition between possibility and reality.

III. FEUERBACH'S REJECTION OF HEGEL'S SYNTHESIS OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND REALITY

From the time Feuerbach entered the University of Berlin in 1824, he

became interested in Hegelian philosophy and method, especially since he attended Hegel's lectures on logic (twice), metaphysics, and the philosophy of religion.[55] In the *Philosophical Fragments* Feuerbach begins to question the philosophical foundation of Hegelian thought by questioning the relation between logic and nature, the idea and being.[56] Tracing the determinations of the essential structures of the concept of being from being, nothingness, something, otherness, finite, infinite, essence, appearance, and passing, he inquires into the necessity of the transition of these categories into the determination of objectivity (objective reality). He answers that these one-sided determinations cannot reach the objective sensuous world of sense perception because "that which is other than logic cannot be deduced from logic".[57] Hegelian philosophy transcends the contradiction between being and Concept as found in Kant's transcendental philosophy, but within the limits of the thought process of the negative dialectic.[58] Thought externalizes itself in the process of its own realization as thought only, even as it predicates being to the subject. In September of 1839 Feuerbach published in the *Hallische Jahrbücher* his first critique of Hegel under the title 'Towards a Critique of Hegelian Philosophy'; the editors were A. Ruge, Wigand, and Echtermeyer.[59]

According to von Gagern, Feuerbach's critique of Hegel can be divided into three areas. The first is the critique of the method. Second, there is the critique of identity theory. And finally, he critiques the relation between rational speculation and mystical theology. These three areas ultimately depend upon the Hegelian overcoming of the dualism of being and Concept - philosophy as the absolute reality of the Idea in the process of its development in both nature and spirit. Each moment in its movement is only a necessary step in its own self-realization. This form of perception and method lies exclusively within the sphere of the 'exclusive time' of the Absolute and not within that of the 'liberal space' of discrete events. As the process of the self-development of the Idea, Hegel's system is one of subordination and succession and not of co-ordination and co-existence. The Idea as the realization of the totality, includes the notion of the particular transcended within it.[60]

However, nature can be viewed in a manner different from that of the ruling reason, *i.e.*, through the senses which do not attempt to transform the external world into a process of the Idea, but appreciate it from the perspective of the senses. "Nature is bound up with the monarchical tendency of time and with the liberalism of space."[61] The truth of the external world, nature and the animal world is lost when transcended in the Hegelian philosophical system. The objects of sense perception, for Feuerbach, organize the sensuously given, but not

under the rubric of a totalitarian hierarchy of development, where the truth lies only in the final level of the Absolute. Feuerbach emphasizes the co-ordination of the external world, where the egoism of the manual laborer is overcome by the love of the artist, who instead of subjecting the external to the dictates of human reason perceives it through the passionate respect of the ears and eyes. Unlike the self-realization of the flower through its own Concept, in which each process is a timely succession toward the realization of the totality, Feuerbach argues that the spatial totality lays particular emphasis on the individual. For him the petals and flowers represent coexistent determinations of the same concept, without the subjugation of one element or moment to another in the process of its realization. The developmental stages of nature do not simply have historical and temporal meaning. Each moment is a totality both within itself and the temporal totality of the form of perception.[62] Hegelian philosophy, like the Christian religion, organizes itself as the totality in the process of the negation of previous philosophy and religion. Hegelian philosophy thus becomes the absolute reality of the idea of philosophy. Feuerbach negatively views the uncritical acceptance of the idea that the species can be realized in the individual, that philosophy can be realized within philosophy. This principle of incarnation destroys history and reality. The latter is viewed only through the faculties of the senses and passion, while in the former the appearances become lost in the Idea never to be appreciated in themselves as self-existent totalities. History and incarnation are incapable of simultaneous existence. Feuerbach, like Lukács later, sees that philosophy develops according to the determinations and conditions of specific time periods, that is, according to the requirements and presup- positions of previous philosophical experience. Each philosophy begins with a presupposition which can either be accidental or rational.[63]

Feuerbach now turns his attention to the question of beginning in Hegel's philosophy. He, like Schelling, inquires as to the status of the concept "beginning" itself. While Hegel starts with an abstract and presuppositionless beginning, only pure Being, Feuerbach inquires into the nature of the beginning and asks whether it is too easily and uncritically accepted as immediately and universally true.[64] Hegel begins with the Concept of being and Feuerbach questions the reasons as to this beginning. Why not begin with being itself or with reason? The beginning is never presuppositionless, since the philosopher never begins to think at the point when he starts writing, but rather, when he is certain of the total picture of his thought. Something is presupposed only when there is a subsequent justification for that presupposition; therefore, the foundation of a scientific methodology is grounded in circular reasoning, where the beginning is the return of the ending. What was originally for us now reappears as the for-itself. "The sys-

tem is only a circle, which does not develop into infinity but returns in the end to the beginning."[65] Hegel's systematic thought can be described as representing thought and not thought in-itself. The beginning starts with the pure undetermined, an abstraction from all being.[66] Hegel begins "with the Concept of beginning" in this process of succession and *Verzeitlichung* of thought. In this scientific representation of being the lost identity is reproduced when the first is no longer the undetermined or unproven, but the mediated form of the beginning. Being is realized in the end as the totality or the Idea of being; the end itself is a return to the beginning. The Idea as the completion of the mediating process transcends the representing thought process and the development of the various stages of the Concept in the "extensive existence in the idea".[67]

The production of the Concept is only a formal production of spiritual material through which truth is achieved in the return to the source of determinations and mediation in language. Language is the realization of the species, whereby the ego and the other are mediated in the formation and transcendence of the individual in the unity of the species. Truth is the realization of individual thoughts into thoughts, which are in and for themselves, that is, thoughts which unite the I and the you. Each system is, however, only a medium or means by which the truth is expressed. Formal thought systems hide and limit the sensuous material world behind their formal language and this results in the destruction of the *Erfindungsgeist*.[68] The traditional separation of *Vernuft* (reason) and *Verstand* (understanding) in Hegel's thought, where the latter is merely a moment of the former, is criticized by Feuerbach, since the *Vernunft* abstracts from the *Verstand* of the thing in its material perception and from the subjectivity of that real perception. Feuerbach reverses the importance of these categories in his critique of the Hegelian identity theory and the union of subjectivity and objectivity in a speculative and systematic philosophy.

"Thought is earlier as the representation of the thought."[69] The representation of the Concept is the means through which being is represented or proven, through its development from the immediacy of pure Being to the absolute totality of the Spirit. Hegel appears to begin without presuppositions in the immediacy of being, but in fact, he presupposes the *Phenomenology* and the Absolute Idea in his comprehension of the Concept. The reason for these presuppositions lies in the necessity of the construction and demonstration of the truth of the scientific system. To overcome the skeptical doubts, the objective foundation for the self-realization of the Concept must be achieved before the beginning of the representation itself. "Who finds himself in the beginning in the Being of the Logic, finds himself also in the Idea."[70] Feuerbach objects to this line of reasoning by Hegel in his

analysis of the process of objectification and abstraction.[71] The immediate being is only an abstraction from the real being.

In the process of the critique of Hegel the Hegelian vocabulary itself enters upon a process of substantial change. The contradiction between abstraction and concretization takes on a new meaning for Feuerbach. The concrete no longer is the designation for the methodological and structural principle of the self-movement of the Concept, as it determines itself through transcendence of the negative totality at each level of truth-claims. The meaning of the term concrete has undergone substantial change at this point. Rather the process of concretization becomes associated more with the return to the "concrete" empirical sensuous perceptions of the senses. Hegel concerns himself with pure Being, while Feuerbach desires a return to real empirical being. This represents a critique of Hegel's method and content and his notions of form and matter. For Feuerbach the Concept of being contains all determinations as the union of differences and contradictions but should not be interpreted as having real historical meaning. Totality exists as a unity of the concrete and empirically existing, not the end result of the self-formative process of the Concept. Feuerbach questions the capacity of philosophy to prove its truth and reality, in view of the contradiction in the sensuous reality and in the *Verstand*. Logic is grounded on the denial of the *Verstand* and of the rational, empirical, material world.[72]

Instead of the contradiction between Being and Nothingness, Feuerbach recommends the opposition of being and sensuous being. Feuerbach recognizes that the beginning of the *Logic* was merely formal, since the Absolute Idea is the immediate truth. The dictates of the scientific form were instrumental in the introduction of pure Being at the start. He distinguishes between formal and substantial certainty and truth, and also distinguishes between Hegel as thinker and writer. As a thinker Hegel was absolutely certain of the truth of the Absolute Idea; but as a writer, he restricted himself to the representational method and the formal uncertainty of the beginning. In the former, truth appears as an immediate absolute, while with the latter it is represented as a self-creative process from the immediate uncertainty to the mediate end. However, the methodological appearances reveal that the presupposition of Idea is being and essence - in reality the presupposition of being and essence is Absolute Spirit.[73] It is the end which lies at the foundation of the whole process of the Concept. Feuerbach attempts to show the contradictory foundation of Hegel's *Logic* in which the beginning first lies in the end. It is Feuerbach's desire through this critique to bring into disrepute the logical foundation of science, *i.e.*, the identity theory. The Hegelian method of the transition from the abstract to the concrete, from the ideal to the real is interpreted as the

reversal of the true process of truth discovery; the transition from the ideal to the real can be accomplished only in practical philosophy, where the knowledge of reality is obtained through the perception of things and their essence obtained in the objective reality itself and not through a speculative philosophy grounded in false abstractions.

With the Hegelian method the end is the beginning and the beginning is the end. The Idea speaks only of being and essence, but thinks only of itself. Being and essence are both the Idea which, because it is not realized as scientific certainty, remains hidden in the categorial development of its determinations. Feuerbach objects that the Idea produces itself out of the formal appearance of opposition and not out of the "empirical-concrete perception of the understanding".[74] Being is in-itself already the absolute. The contradictions within the Hegelian system do not represent true contradictions between opposing ontological entities, but the imaginary projections of the Idea. In the process of proving being, the proving of the Idea is the natural result. The *Verstand* and the subjectivity are overcome by the false opposition of the Idea within itself. For Feuerbach, Hegelian philosophy is the culminating point of modern philosophy from Descartes and Spinoza since there is a complete rejection and immediate break with sense perception.[75] In the attempt to comprehend the sensuously given external world, Hegel in 'Sense Certainty' was forced to come to the conclusion that the truth of immediate sense experience lies in the formation of the universal categories of the mind.[76] The singular sense objects cannot be comprehended; but only through the universal is it expressive. The truth of this level of the Concept is its own negation. Idealism objectifies the life and reason of the I into the sphere of nature resulting in the identity of the subject and object, spirit and nature. "Nature is the objectified I." Feuerbach states that his brother's name is Johann, but since under the Hegelian schema of things there are no singulars, then the name expresses not his brother but Johann-ness as its truth. This first chapter of Hegel's work is only a word game that confuses sense certainty with the conceptualization of sense certainty and the sensuous individual with the conceptualization of the sensuous individual. Though there is a great difference between the two, they are immediately and unconsciously united in the identity of the subject and object in Hegel's system.

Feuerbach replaces the subject in the realms both of time and of space, whereby the reality of the external world, external to the I, represents a limiting factor on the very movement of the individual. The trees limit my movement and inhibit me from moving in their places by their own objectivity and command of sensuous space. The "this" and the "here" are no longer merely generalizations of the language, but are concrete empirical facts which can be perceived by perception. The

external is no longer a production of pure thought and the "here" and "there" are no longer logical forms. "The Phenomenology is nothing other than phenomenological logic."[77] The *Phenomenology* and the *Logic* both begin with the development of the immediacy of objectivity, as the self-movement of the thought process proceeds with no real contact with the external. Everything is reduced to a state of phenomenological solipsism. Hegel begins with an absolute contradiction and break with the sensuous consciousness by beginning not "with the Being-other of thought, but with the thought of the Being-other of thought." Schelling, remaining with the philosophy of Identity, opposes to the *Idealismus* of Hegel that of the *Naturphilosophie*. And for Feuerbach "the goal of the philosophy of Nature is to make the objective first and to derive the Subject from the objective."[78] Thus, according to Feuerbach, philosophy becomes the science of reality in its truth and totality, when the content of reality is seen as nature. In many instances the Schelling confrontation with Hegel was taken over by Feuerbach. The major point that Feuerbach stresses in relation to Schelling is the latter's emphasis on the fact that reality cannot be reduced to the Idea, that is, the concrete empirical cannot be reduced to thought procedures and practices.[79]

The unity of thought and being is in reality the union of thought with the imagination. In Schelling, Feuerbach found many arguments against the idealism of Hegel, such as, the critiques of the vicious circle of reflection as the presupposition of being, of the relation between Concept and perception, and of the relation between immediacy and mediacy. Feuerbach found in Schelling the foundation for the anthropologizing of the theological and speculative realms and the principle of materialism. Frank divides the relation and similarities between Feuerbach and Schelling into the areas of agreement, which helped both to delineate the problem of the critique of Hegel and to organize their opposing views into a more comprehensive schema. Both philosophers argue for (1) the impossibility of the reduction of being into the Concept, (2) the necessity of the inversion of the relationship between subject and predicate, (3) the transition from logic to a philosophy of nature, and (4) the ontological priority of nature.

Hegel subordinates the formation of nature to the development of the Concept which presupposes at all times the identity of *Sein* and *Begriff*. This identity philosophy is the necessary extension and result of the theological conception of God as the essence of being. The speculative philosophy has only generalized and rationalized the theological system and replaced the notion of God with that of the Concept.[80] In the 'Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft' Feuerbach shows the inability of the ontological argument to be the foundation of the identity philosophy, since the proof of that outside of thought

requires an agency other than thought. Being cannot rest upon the Concept, because the latter only reproduces itself in its own development; it is thought without reality. The existent other can only be proven by the forms of perception. Being is not an abstraction that can be comprehended under the metaphysical form of the Hegelian system.

> Being is no general separable Concept from the things. It is one with that which is. It is only immediately conceivable, only conceivable through the predicates, which ground the essence of the thing. The Being is the position of essence. What is my essence is my Being.[81]

For Feuerbach the beginning of philosophy lies not in the notion of God, the absolute of the being as the predicate of the Idea, but in the reversal of the relationship of the subject to its predicates. That is, the determined, the finite, the real represent the beginning of philosophy.[82] The source of the sensuous consciousness, the latter being the real unity of the spirit and nature, is the concrete empirical, while for both speculative philosophy and theology the realization and reality of the Idea is achieved in the realm of the objective world in which existence is itself a criterion of truth.[83] Only what is actual is real, only what is thought has reality - this represents the identity of thought with itself. With Hegel the subject is the self-moving Concept and its predicate is the sensuous as mediated by the Concept. These contradictions in Hegel are overcome when sensuality is made the subject of investigation itself. "The real in its reality or as the object of meaning, is the sensuous."[84] Truth, reality and the sensuous are identical.[85]

The objectification and alienation of the absolute or God is only a process of thought-abstraction formulated into a systematic logical construct. Objects thus achieved are only productions of the imagination and thought and do not reflect objects in the true sense. The latter can only be objects of the senses. To be realized in the speculative philosophy required the process of progressive regression and the concretization of immediate abstractions. Feuerbach, on the other hand, interprets this to mean that thought can only be realized when "it is itself made into an object of the senses."[86] The new philosophy of Feuerbach rests upon the independent existence of the thinking being and of the other being, which is an object of being. "The Being as an object of Being is the Being as sense, perception, sensation, love." The faculties of perception have ontological and metaphysical meanings hidden within them, for such interaction of the subject with the object, whether it be in love or pain, reveals the ontological separation of these two spheres formerly united by Hegel in the Concept.

> Man becomes himself only through the senses, ... through the identity of subject and object; abstract thought in self-consciousness becomes truth and reality only by the sensuous perception of man by man.[87]

Feuerbach sees that the empiricists were correct in assuming that our ideas came from the senses and the the idealists were also correct in their idea that men were the cause of ideas. The very criteria for truth and universality rests in the society of men. Attempting to overcome the solipsism of Cartesian philosophy, Feuerbach stresses the point that certainty of the external is a social product.[88] The subject is no longer the abstract spirit, reason, *etc.* but the total essence of man - theology is transcended into anthropology. Deeply indebted to Feuerbach, Marx will extend his epistemological and ontological materialism into the social world of economic and political activity. Feuerbach's notion that the reality of man depends upon the reality of his objects - if you have nothing, you are nothing - will appear later in Marx' writings as the materialistic ground for the self- creation of the objective world in labor and as the critique of the fetishism of the commodities as the basis for social interaction.

IV. THE EMPIRICISM OF SCHELLING AND FEUERBACH AND THE AMBIVALENCE OF MARX' NEW MATERIALISM

The traditional critiques of Schelling's philosophy and his political conservatism are well-known, even the critiques of him by Marx and Engels in their early writings.[89] However, for a few contemporary authors Schelling's critique of Hegel, his *Vernunftswissenschaft* and his *Naturphilosophie* represent an important stage in the development of Marx' methodology and his critique of political economy. Manfred Frank, Alfred Schmidt, Friedrich Schmidt, and Jürgen Habermas have developed theories showing the importance of Schelling in the development of philosophy from idealism to materialism.[90] His influence on the formation of a materialist perspective is crucial, since the result is a form of materialism in which the categories of political economy deal with the historical world, but in a manner in which the relationship between concepts and reality are always problematic and ambivalent. This is important for the clarification of Marx' critique of traditional theories of knowledge and an understanding of the complex interrelationships between economic concepts and historical reality in his later political economy. Once the positivist interpretations of his later works are rejected, all the questions, issues, and problems as-

sociated with the prior one hundred years of European philosophy become relevant again for an understanding of Marx. Critique positivism and the floodgates of the history of philosophy open up wide. How one deals with it answers the question of whether one is washed away by the torrent or cleansed by it. Alfred Schmidt in his doctoral dissertation *The Concept of Nature in Marx*, written for Horkheimer and Adorno at the University of Frankfurt/M, argued that it was Schelling's ideas on the philosophy of nature, the resurrection of nature, and his crypto-materialism which influenced Feuerbach's naturalism and even Marx' early writings on nature; the importance of labor as the individualizing element in nature is taken up in the *Grundrisse* as the "constant individualization of the elemental" and is incorporated throughout Marx' writings.[91]

Frank argues that Schelling is extremely important to an understanding of Marx though neither Marx nor Engels ever explicitly acknowledged this. "He critiqued Hegel's vicious circle, his having required Being from the beginning as simply the expression of the Idea (reflection); he radicalized Schelling's opposition of perception against the concept."[92] Both Frank and van Leeuwen outline the specific references made by Marx to Schelling's works in his early writings: in a letter to his father, in the references to Schelling in his dissertation, in his 1843 letter to Feuerbach, and in the *Paris Manuscripts* itself. Schelling is viewed as a crucial component in the philosophical foundations of Marx' historical materialism. Schelling seems to supply the missing link between Marx' critiques of traditional theories of knowledge in the 'Theses on Feuerbach', the development of the dialectical method, and the problem to be developed in Chapters Four and Five on the 'dilemma of objective validity'. That is, Schelling gives us insight into Marx' complex response to the relationships that exist between the categories of political economy and the reality they seemingly reflect. This issue has remained relatively unproblematic, since it has generally been assumed that Marx' later works on political economy in the *Grundrisse* and *Capital* utilized the scientific method of positivism.[93]

> Schelling seems to be the only one of the idealists to have recognized and expanded the presupposed unforeseen consequences from Kant's own perspective of the impossibility of grounding unity upon reflection, experience of being upon a category - in general: to deduce being from the consciousness, that one has from it ...[94]

Schelling objects to Hegel's claim that the Concept (mind) evolves from being and has being for its content, since the content of the Concept is only consciousness and the stages of consciousness'

dialectical development. Consciousness never transcends or gets out of its own "iron cage" and thus the Concepts have no reality of their own. Schelling is, therefore, undermining the connection Hegel makes between logic and existence. Frank argues that Hegel had reduced self-consciousness (*Selbstbewusstsein* and *Selbstreflexion*) to self-reflection and this self-reflection is an "abstract thought-determination" (*Gedankenbestimmung*), which cannot be brought to existence through this science".[95] Frank contends that there are six arguments which Feuerbach takes over from Schelling's critique of Hegel in his Munich lectures of 1827/28 and continues to develop in his own writings. The *first* thesis is that Hegel's philosophy is not presuppositionless (*voraussetzungslos*). *Second*, the process of mediation, whereby the truth of the immediate is negated, is done within a formal representation, where the mediated becomes the new immediate; since the content of the thing comes from consciousness itself, there is no outside criterion for distinguishing between consciousness and the content of consciousness. *Third*, Hegel never examines the process of objectification and externalization of the subject into the existing world; he never clarifies how the Concept becomes other and is externalized into the objective world. *Fourth*, Hegel reduces being to the Concept, reality to consciousness; he combines the Concept of being with the Concept of potentiality. *Fifth*, Hegel never gets beyond reflection and when he does deal with being it is always the Concept of being; the beginning point of Hegel's system is only the beginning point of reflection. *Finally*, Hegel foundered on the clarification of nature itself, since it is only a clarification of an abstract ideal.[96]

Frank completes his analysis of Schelling and Marx in a section entitled 'The Ontological Difference of Essence and Reality - Schelling's Theory of Time as the Archetype of a Materially Grounded Dialectic'. Schelling wrote that the being of the past and future exists only in thought. Frank notes that "in distinction to Hegel's *Logic*, what Schelling called Spirit, was not the essential possibilities of externalized existence, but the existence of possibilities to non-conscious existences".[97] This does not represent a reflection of what is the case (positivism) or the logic of existence (Hegel), but rather the logical possibilities which lie within existence. This point cannot be over-emphasized and represents the heart of Schelling's contribution to Marx' method.

Logic does not determine these possibilities because logic is separate from existence; it has its own distinct ontological realm and validity. Thus Schelling's critique of Hegel's *Logic* supplies us with crucial information that will be extremely valuable later to an understanding of the relationship Marx' sees between logic and history and the exact ontological status of concepts. If the economic categories

are of a different ontological order than the historical world, then what is their role and function, their real status, their ultimate purpose, and what form of knowledge do they produce? Schelling's critique and Marx' use of it later can best be understood only within the general epistemological context we have been developing with Marx' notion of science and his radicalization of the critical method from Hegel's phenomenology. Schelling supplies the missing link between the critique of traditional theories about the relationship between concepts and reality in both empiricism and rationalism in Marx' early writings and his method of the critique of political economy in his later ones. The missing link lies in Schelling's (and Feuerbach's) critique of Hegel's Absolute Spirit and the latter's interpretation of the relationship between logic and being and the split between concept and reality. If there is this break between concepts and reality then the concepts neither mirror, reproduce, cause, or explain the social world. What then do concepts do? It is here that the materialist tradition is of little help. Although Marx is a materialist and his categories refer to the real historical world, the methodological framework of his analysis is so ladened by the German philosophical tradition that a split has resulted between concepts and reality which even materialism cannot transcend - thus the ambivalence of Marx' new materialism. His method has too much of idealism and the idealist's critiques to be simply characterized as historical materialism; in fact, this term will only result in a too simplistic understanding of the very complex relationship which exists between concepts and reality, idealism and materialism. Marx recognizes this very early in the *Paris Manuscripts*, where he rejects both categories in favor of a humanistic naturalism. The problem becomes more intense and difficult to settle in his later writings, where the method and theory become more complex and integrated with British economics.

The objectivity and rationality of both Hegelian metaphysics and of positivism presupposes a direct link between concepts and reality; in the former case, logic is a direct expression of being and in the latter, valid concepts reflect or correspond directly to being. In Hegel's ontology and modern science the mechanism used for the validation of ideas is either the internal dialectical movement of the Concept or the empirical correspondence of ideas to reality. Schelling adds the new dimension that concepts perceive the essence and reality of being in a form which maintains the distinction between the two; logic cannot deal with being, but only the potentiality of being. And essence should never be mistaken for reality in the sense of positivist truth as in the case of some French structuralists like Althusser. For Marx, as we will see in the following chapters on the logic of *Capital*, the Concept of capital reflects the moral and structural essence (contradictions) of the capitalist

system, but at an extremely high level of abstraction and distance from the immediate reality.

Both history and logic are the crucial ingredients in his analysis, but whether the latter reflects the historical reality depends on the ontological status of Marx' categories. Both Schelling and Feuerbach insist on the distinction between concepts and reality; the critiques of both Hegel's ontological argument (Logic is Being) and positivism (Theory is Being) force us to reconceptualize the objective reference, status, and validity of Marx' categories. Depending on how they are understood the categories could reflect the essence (structural possibilities and tendencies) of the system, while at the same time not the actual historical evolution (present) or necessary outcome of its development (future). Everything depends on Marx' meta-theory - his epistemology, methodology, logic, and normative assumptions as to the nature of truth and 'critique'. It is quite possible, as we shall shortly see, that the logic of capital does not reflect history, only historical possibilities. Marx develops a method to understand not the actuality of the modern social formation, but its potentiality - moral and historical. The result then is to rethink his theory of truth and the further relevance and implications of Marx' works, viewed through this epistemological change.

After the critiques of Schelling, Feuerbach, and Marx himself, the latter will develop an alternative form of justification (foundationalism) for his critique of political economy, which will include three main elements: *first*, an immanent critique of the structures of capital by the juxtaposition of the cultural values and ideas of liberalism and its actual institutions; *second*, an analysis of the logic implicit in the internal antagonism in the dynamic and structures of capitalism itself (logic of capital); and *finally*, praxis or the development of class self-consciousness and social change. Praxis is important for a variety of reasons - some anthropological (man as creator), some political (emphasis on activity within a democracy), and some methodological (criterion of truth). This latter is a reflection of the Kantian element introduced in Marx' thought by Schelling. Marx could neither accept the abstractness and idealism of a transcendental unity of consciousness and experience as in Kant nor the dynamic unfolding of the transcendental subjectivity as in Hegel. For him social praxis plays this role of uniting concept and reality, potentiality and actuality. There must be some mechanism that connects concepts to empirical reality once the Kantian distinction is re-introduced into the debate. The first two aspects of Marx' theory of knowledge have been characterized by Habermas as the critique of the structures and ideology of capital.

In Marx, therefore, theoretical analysis of the value form has the

> double task of uncovering both the steering principle of commerce in a market economy and the basic ideology of bourgeois market economy. The theory of value, serves, at the same time, the functional analysis of the economic system and the critique of ideology of a class domination that can be unmasked.[98]

With this recognition of the new additions and issues to the philosophical foundations of historical materialism discussed in the previous chapters, of which Schelling's critique represents only one aspect, there also occurs the need to question the nature of the dialectical method. There must be a re-evaluation of the ontological status of Marx' concepts in his later writings - to what do they really refer, what is the relation between essence and existence in relation to the concepts themselves, and what is the justification for these concepts? For a long time people have recognized the necessity to interpret Marx within the framework of Hegel's *Logic*, but in a contradictory breath they have also stated the necessity to view Marx' later writings as positivistic science. The contradiction never seemed to be resolved until one begins to see the formerly missing pieces of Marx' meta-theoretical puzzle - the critique of traditional epistemology in his early writings, the importance of Hegel's logic in *Capital*, the Schelling and Feuerbach critiques of Hegel's identity theory and ontology, and the centrality of praxis in Marx' method. When these have been clearly put together, then and only then, will the complexity and subtlety of Marx' approach to political economy be resolved.

This will also help in going a long way in clarifying the generally ignored statement in the third volume to *Capital* that the tendency toward a gradual fall in the general rate of profit is a logical necessity. The basis for the split between concept and reality, logic and history, and historical research (*Forschungsmethode*) and dialectical presentation (*Darstellungsmethode*)[99], lies ultimately in Schelling's method and his critique of Hegel. The Marxist tradition has generally interpreted Marx with an emphasis on either one side of the dilemma or the other - on the side of his dialectical philosophy or the historical mirroring of empirical reality. Either logic or history, philosophy or positivism are emphasized to the detriment or elimination of the others. This has also led to the continued interpretation that there is a split between Marx' early philosophical writings and his later scientific economics.

When all the pieces to the meta-theoretical puzzle have been put together we find that Schelling's work is crucial and that Marx has not fallen back into an emphasis on logic (idealism), economic determinism (materialism), or scientific rationalism (positivism). Marx is even more of an epistemological radical than has ever been thought. He combines

the traditionally separated components of logic and history, self-consciousness and social practice into one, but only at the point of self-conscious social action. He does not do it in theory (logic) or in science (positivism). When concepts and reality are joined for Schelling, it is in a theory of possibility and only at the level of theory. Add this to the temporal dimension of Hegel's *Logic* and we see that the synthesis of the two is only possible when the theory itself deals only with possibilities (seminal principle of the "having been"). For the concepts to reflect reality, they must be actualized in reality through social praxis. This radically alters the epistemological meaning and function of both theory and praxis. Theory cannot validate itself for Marx either in rationalism or in empiricism. As Aristotle argues in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, moral knowledge cannot be scientifically validated, Marx argues in a similar fashion that historical knowledge cannot be scientifically validated.

For Habermas too, it was Schelling who prepared the way for transcending idealism through his double system of negative and positive philosophy. He also saw that Schelling had anticipated several perspectives and intentions of the later views of historical materialism.[100] Schelling's notion of the Idea of a God returned-to-himself had three points of similarity with the thought of the young Marx. *First*, Nature, for Schelling as for Marx, was seen as the process resulting from the interaction of nature and man. Marx saw the species-being creating nature in the economic process of production, while, for Hegel, nature was the result of a mythical process in the collective consciousness of the species. Labor and mythical consciousness were the creating forces in the 'process'. Schmidt also recognized a similarity between Schelling and Marx in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, especially over the reconciliation of man and nature. *Second*, the identity of nature and humanity is broken and is falsely united in the "materialist return" in the form of the State, which represents the institutionalization of the political domination of man over man. *Third*, both agree that the corruption of the world lies not in nature, but in man and the egoistical principle that regulates human society.[101] For Schelling this principle is the result of the disorganized creations of the first man on a physical and moral plane, while, for Marx, it refers to the private appropriation of social wealth in the form of private property. Habermas holds that the anthropological writings of the *Paris Manuscript* represent the economic translation of the metaphysical ideas of Schelling's *Freiheitschrift*.[102]

Schelling thus can make an enormous contribution toward an understanding of the relationship between a theory of thought processes (logic) and a theory of being (history) in the works of Marx. Marx too rejects the identity of thought and Being, subject and object as the basis

for the foundation of his *Darstellungsmethode*. Capitalism is seen as the self-movement of the *Begriff* (Concept) of the commodity, as the progressive contradiction between use-value and exchange-value intensifies. The Concept as capital has a reality that must be seen within the context of the analysis of Schelling's conception of the relationship between rationalism and empiricism. The determination of the logic of *Capital* as either a product of *Erzeugung* (productive activity in history) or *Reflektion* (conscious reflection) rests upon an understanding of the whole methodology that underlies Marx' later writings. His distinction between the *gedanklicher Prozess* and the *Seinsprozess* and therefore (1) the rejection of the ontological argument as applied to capital, (2) the development of a scientific analysis of commodity production from the abstract universality of *Anschauung* and *Vorstellung* to the concrete universality of the Concept, and (3) the reconstruction of the totality of capitalist development with the union of logic and history (on the second level induction) presupposes an understanding of the methodological implications of Schelling's later writings. Works dealing with the logic of Marx' *Capital* (Rosdolsky, Rosenthal, Morf, Reichelt, and Kosík)[103] must be more systematically studied in light of these revisions of the Hegelian framework offered by Schelling. However, Marx' reaction to the critique of the identity theory and the relation between objectivity and subjectivity in the Concept is more complex and involved than most researchers would care to admit.

It is my belief that Schelling and Feuerbach had helped Marx see that a critique of Hegel's Absolute Spirit and identity theory entailed a new understanding of the relationships between theory and praxis, subject and object, and idealism and materialism. Marx' ideas that "the chief defect of all materialism ...", "the question whether objective truth is an attribute of human thought - is not a theoretical but a practical question", "that materialism does not comprehend our sensuous nature as practical activity," *etc.*, all of which are taken from the 'Theses on Feuerbach', indicate, if only sketchily, the dissatisfaction that Marx felt toward the traditional philosophical interpretations of objectivity, materialism, and theory.[104] Many of the misunderstandings over the distinctions between the early or late, structural- or praxis-oriented Marxism could be resolved by seeing in Marx a further development of the concept of 'critique', as it is mediated by the empiricism of Schelling and Feuerbach. There are no true epistemological breaks with the possible exception of the positivist interlude in Marx' middle period - the *Communist Manifesto* and *The German Ideology*, both written under the positivist influence of Friedrich Engels. What there is, however, are epistemological transitions with their quests for the further clarification of the critical tradition and its different forms of application to the analysis of political economy; in this sense there are distinctive

methodological approaches, but much of the underlying meta-theory remains the same. Throughout is the synthesis of Kant, Hegel, Schelling, and Feuerbach. The Schelling and Feuerbach critiques maintain the distinctions between thought and history, concept and being. This is in line with the interpretations of *Capital* as a work of the Concept and the logical-ethical critiques of capitalist production and class relationships. It is not a science of explanation and prediction, but one of understanding and enlightenment. The theory becomes praxis not by giving either technical directions or by predicting the future, but by transforming the objectivity of the world, its interpretation, and the methodological grounding for that understanding into subjectivity. Praxis as revolutionary action lies at the foundation of the 'constitution theory' itself with its three major elements: theory as praxis (theory breaks the bonds on consciousness and social change), idealism as materialism (the theoretical is a social force and critique of objectivity), and the truth of objectivity as subjectivity.

Logic and history, for Marx, are dialectically interrelated in *Capital*, but this at the same time does not mean that history and the logical critique of political economy have lost their independence as moments of the dialectic. They have and have not. The analysis of the Concept of capital cannot be reduced to a positivistic interpretation of the future historical movements of capitalism - as Schelling and Feuerbach have never tired of telling us, the worlds of logic and being, logic and nature, logic and history are dialectically interrelated, but not reducible to each other. As Marx has also said:

> The totality as a conceptual entity seen by the intellect is a product of the thinking intellect which assimilates the world in the only way open to it, a way which differs from the artistic, religious, and practically intelligent assimilation of the world. The concrete subject remains outside the intellect and independent of it ...[105]

V. THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MARX' MATERIALISM

A summary of the crucial insights that both the Schelling and Feuerbachian critiques have had for Marx' meta-theory include: (1) the critique of empiricism and rationalism; (2) a synthesis of the subjective and objective conditions for knowledge in experience and reason; (3) development of a science of reason or a system of empirical rationalism - a transcendence of the traditional dichotomies between existence and consciousness; (4) a negative and positive philosophy (the real as two distinct moments of essence and existence); (5) a unification of theo-

retical and practical knowledge; (6) the application of the *a priori* structures of reason to the realm of the logical only; (7) the truth of science is seen in the *a priori* logical realm and not in nature - the totality of Being is comprehended in the logical development of its possibilities at the same time that the movement of the Concept is separated from nature ("intellectual perception"); (8) the identity theory represents the identity in the logic of nature and not the identity of nature and logic; (9) Concept and being are united in a logical science of reason but still independent of perception and existential reality; and (10) reason produces the real, but not reality - truth is seen as understanding potentiality. A redefinition of the role, range, and applicability of rationality, and thus science itself in terms of this theory of potentiality, is necessary.

Feuerbach, in turn, expanded his analysis which represented an important element in the formation of Marx' notion of critical science. Besides those elements in Feuerbach's thought which corresponded to Schelling's critique of Hegel, the former also stressed (1) the necessity to return to the concrete empirical world; (2) the social totality is empirical; (3) the transition from the ideal to the real can only be accomplished in practical philosophy; (4) critique of empiricism and rationalism; (5) metaphysics as mystification and distorted consciousness; and (6) the subjective is the anthropological essence of man and vice versa.

It was the continual emphasis by both Schelling and Feuerbach on the critique of Hegel's ontological argument, his synthesis of being and Concept in the identity theory, and his failure to deal with the empirical historical world that influenced the writings of Marx. It forced him into a re-evaluation of both the Kantian and Hegelian attempts to synthesize the empiricist and rationalist traditions. By rejecting the correspondence and Hegelian theories of truth, Marx began to emphasize the dialectical nature and the separate distinctiveness of the realms of theory and reality and the necessity of praxis to mediate between the two. Potentiality is not actualized by the power of the concepts of logic, but by human intervention and creation. Truth is always constituted in the process of creating a rational society. By viewing the movement and development of capital as the dialectical movement of the Concept from its initial contradictory phases of use- and exchange-value, Marx was clearly allying himself with Schelling and Feuerbach against Hegel.

As Schelling had tried to synthesize both empiricism and rationalism within a new identity theory that did not unite the Concept and being, but remained within the logic of being, Marx too developed the Concept of capital that was not an examination of the historical reality or being of capitalism, but only its internal logic and ethic (potentialities). Marx was able to synthesize both logic and history, but at the second

level of negative philosophy (Schelling). We can see that this interpretation leads to the following: (1) the Marxian rejection of the traditional mediation of empiricism and rationalism in German Idealism; (2) Marx' separation of the realm of history (nature) and the Concept of capital (logic), but within this separation, at the second level of thought, there is the synthesis of history and logic in the Concept itself; (3) subjectivity-objectivity, theory and praxis, and idealism and materialism are integrated and also kept distinct; (4) the separation of the 'thought process' from the 'process of being' represents a separation of theory from historical reality; (5) theory is reunited to reality and praxis in a form that has been mediated through the thoughts of Schelling and Feuerbach's critique of positivism, empiricism, rationalism, and Hegelian idealism; (6) finally, this union of logic and history by Marx within the framework developed by Schelling (positive and negative philosophy) reopens the interpretations of meaning, enlightenment, self-consciousness, practical action, and practical knowledge in a form similar to that developed within Greek philosophy (especially Aristotle's ethics).

A major weakness in this turn is that theory enlightens and gives us practical wisdom, but it does not direct us in the sense of social or piecemeal engineering. It cannot because it neither has the temporal nor the ontological dimensions to do that. Theory does not become the domain of an intellectual elite, nor does it dominate and enslave through its universal and totalitarian dictates. The beauty of Marx' thought and his return to Aristotle at this point is that theory permits both self- and class-enlightenment, public articulation of values, ethics, and political decisions, and keeps the future open to the possibilities of new and free forms of social interaction. Unlike both Hegelian and positivistic theories of the truth, the future is always closed or its logic is always anticipated by the immediate or given social institutions: the future is pre-defined and pre-determined by the logic of the empirical or by the logic of identity. Marx' reinterpretation of the identity theory, in which the social totality and the whole is given in the immediate contradictions of use- and exchange-value, is not reducible to an ontological argument because of the very discussions of Schelling on this matter.

The implications of this can be further summarized as the following: Marx' identity theory of capital permits him to analyze capitalism in terms of mediated and dialectical concepts, the social totality, and the Concept of capital. At the same time that its concepts are logical, universal, and necessary, they themselves in their critique of capitalism do not forecast, predict, or determine the development of the historical phenomena because there is always a distance between logic and history. The categories of political economy reveal the essence of the system in terms of its internal contradictions and crisis potentials; they

reveal what the system is capable of becoming and "is" its heart; therein lies the possibility for an ethical critique, since the system is never capable of realizing its own normative ideals. Liberalism is a self-contradictory social formation. It is through Schelling and Feuerbach (and most importantly Hegel) that Marx fashions this new "critical science" that examines the concrete universality and social totality, that aids in the development of practical wisdom and social enlightenment, and that keeps social knowledge, experience, and articulation open and free to the future unbounded by the mediated past (identity theory) or the immediate present (positivism). These temporal and historical dimensions are to be known and understood, but not to be reproduced as the future.

PART II

EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHOD IN MARX' LATER WORKS

CHAPTER FOUR

RETHINKING METHOD: THE REFLECTIVE RECONSTRUCTION OF HISTORY

I. INTRODUCTION

The previous chapters have been an attempt to transcend the limitations of viewing Marxism as an either/or proposition. That is, it has been customary to view Marxism as either a critical social theory (Critical Marxism: Lukács, Korsch, the Frankfurt School, Sartre, Goldmann, *etc.*) or a science (Scientific Marxism: Althusser, Godelier, Poulantzas, Therborn, *etc.*).[1] Both perspectives have different views regarding knowledge, truth, ideology, the nature of science, social action, the possibility of revolutionary change, *etc.* Korsch, Colletti, Merleau-Ponty, Aron, Marković, Anderson, and Gouldner have been aware for some time of the existence of the two perspectives of Marxism. The two Marxisms have evolved from the confusions and apparent contradictions within and between Marx' works. On the one hand, they see the Marx who stresses the notions of praxis, self-consciousness, and revolutionary change, that is, the Marx of the *Manuscripts* and the 'Theses on Feuerbach'. The other Marx is the scientific investigator who is studying "the natural laws of capitalist production ... these laws are in themselves the tendencies which work out with an iron law of necessity towards an inevitable goal."[2] These different perspectives stress the distinctions between a deterministic, positivistic Marx, who is seen attempting to develop the iron laws of capitalist evolution and the critical Marx, who is concerned with self-understanding and enlightenment for the purpose of giving man the possibility of making his own history. In the former the methodological priority rests with the positivism of the British political economists, while in the latter the priority lies with the development of self-consciousness in German Idealism. According to Gouldner, the first type of Marxism grounds itself in scientism with its technological and instrumental knowledge, while critique uncovers not laws, but the potentiality inherent in the social situation; the latter can free consciousness from the forms of mystified and reified social experience that have kept man in bondage throughout history. The distinctions between idealism/materialism, critique/science, voluntarism/determinism, and existentialism/structuralism are all related to these different interpretations of Marx and the relative weight given to science or critical theory. This basic dichotomy, however, simply does not stand up to a re-reading of the original works.[3] As we have seen so far, materialism, science, determinism, and structuralism

refer not to a theory of positivistic Marxism, as Colletti would have it. In an article on this topic he begins by quoting from Hilferding's *Finance Capital* and proceeds to argue for a mechanical breakdown theory based on the laws of physics.

> "Marxism, which is a scientifically logical and objective doctrine, is not bound to value judgements." The task of Marxism as a science is to 'describe causal relationships' .... The laws of the capitalist mode of production inescapably lead the system to its end. The extinction of capitalism is inevitable. It is made fatal and almost automatic by the explanation of its own laws.[4]

It is also contrary to Althusser's perspective of Marxian science, since for him Marx' notion of science is grounded in the Hegelian concept of science and not in the orthodox views of positivism and empiricist epistemology. For the latter to be true, social theorists would have to explain away the whole of Marx' writings dealing with the three issues of prime epistemological importance which develop out of the idealist tradition - his theory of objectivity (the critique of false universalism and objectivity in the *Paris Manuscripts* to the critique of fetishism in *Capital*), his constitution theory of truth (praxis and objectivity), and his method of political economy as 'critique'.

Yes, there are differences of emphasis, direction, and methodological procedures, but these differences are moments of the total picture of Marx' meta-theory and should not be examined outside of this totality. The re-examination of *Capital* in light of our understanding of Hegel's notion of time, science and 'critique', Hegel's critique of epistemology, and the Schelling-Feuerbach critique of Hegel's identity theory and theory of consciousness brings us to the final recognition that science and critique are synonomous for Hegel and for Marx. Marx' actual method in his critique of political economy must be examined in the same manner as we have already done in the previous chapters of this work, *i.e.*, with special attention to the epistemological details of Marx' writings and their relation to the German philosophical tradition; but now in the context of their application to social science. The reasons for the many misinterpretations of his method are complex and varied, but the two chief ones have been an inability or unwillingness to recollect and reconstruct hermeneutically the Hegelian and Marxian approaches to science and 'critique' and the more ideological attempt to remake Mark into a positivist. Gouldner sees Marx as an "idealistic materialist" who combined two methods, epistemologies, and social theories into one. The point already made in this book has been that Marx was not at one time a critical philosopher and at another a scientist, but was in fact a critical scientist. With the full development

of his ideas in the *Grundrisse* and *Capital*, the formation of critical science was ensured. This is not to say that at various periods in his life he did not stress one aspect over another or that he was very clear himself about what he was doing. However, there is a definite pattern of development from his Paris to his London writings, held together by his theory of objectivity, reflection, and 'critique'; its form of application and the types of issues have changed, but the underlying telos of Marx' analysis has not radically altered as some have attempted to show. The first part of this book has shown the epistemological continuity running throughout his work. This chapter will examine the methodological foundations of Marx' political economy, with special emphasis on his later writings in the *Grundrisse* and *Capital*. It will analyze the manner in which Marx incorporates the Hegelian method of dialectical critique and science (and their epistemological assumptions) into the framework of his concrete and historical analysis of the social relations of capitalism and the structural forms of practical activity. The relationship between meta-theory and political economy will be made explicit.

Hegel's notion of *Begriff* (Concept) and his critique of epistemology (rationalism and empiricism) become the basis for an understanding of Marx' view of the non-positivist science of political economy. The formal structure of *Capital* is arranged around the dialectical unfolding of the categories of commodity production; the content of Marx' work centers on his theory of value and the examination of the forms of labor activity in a capitalist society. We have also already seen the ambivalence created in Marx' idea of materialism by his acceptance of Schelling's critique of Hegel's identity theory and the resulting and necessary ontological split between concepts and reality. What then becomes of materialism in Marx' study of political economy in *Capital*? Does materialism refer to the historical content of the political economic categories or does it make an ontological claim as to the reality of the categories? Schelling made the distinction between concepts and reality and Hegel emphasized the difference between reality and actuality and the temporal dimensions of historical categories. That is, it appears that materialism refers to Marx' general orientation in dealing with the social reality of capitalism and its political-economic configuration. However, materialism is neither a metaphysical category nor a methodological category designed to overcome the 'dilemma of objective validity'. Though he deals with the social reality, the philosophical status of materialist categories are not as clear as we could hope for; the categories themselves are not simple reflections of the material reality. There is too much Hegelian and Schelling subtlety in Marx' meta-theory for this simple reflection theory. Marx' categories reflect more the potentialities of history

(Schelling's essence, not Hegel's), as it is expressed in its Concept. This opens up another area of investigation for it makes praxis into a crucial methodological/epistemological category, especially for the interpretation of *Capital*. The meta-theoretical underpinnings of Marx' methodology makes it extremely difficult, if not virtually impossible, to go back to the old positivist interpretations of his later economic writings. It also raises two important questions. Where are the works which develop Marx' postivist epistemology and show its relation to his economic methodology and why have their defenders not responded to some of the types of questions raised in this book? Without an adequate response to both questions, the meta-theoretical foundations of political economy are anything but secure.

The emphasis in this chapter will be on the formal aspects of the political economy. There is a substantial body of literature on this topic already, but there seems to be a good deal of inconsistency in the interpretations of the relationships between Marx' epistemology/ methodology and his analysis of economics. Some authors will grant the Hegelian influence on Marx' works, but then proceed to analyze his political economy, with its underlying and pervasive view of methodology, objectivity, and social applicability, as if the Hegelian influence were non-existent. This chapter will examine the implications of Hegel's meta-theory for the methodology of political economy and Marx' thoughts on 'theory and practice'. Central to it will be the analysis of the relationship between thought and being, knowledge and reality and, most importantly, knowledge and practice. That is, it will examine the relationships between Marx' economic theory and its methodological foundation, on the one hand, and the ontological status claimed for its categories about the social reality examined (the 'dilemma of objective validity') and the epistemological relevance of social praxis to that reality, on the other.

Economic theory - concrete reality - social practice becomes the tripartite framework within which the logic of capital will be examined. There are a few major questions to be asked: what is Marx' concept of truth, what is the criterion by which truth is judged and evaluated, and what relationship does praxis play in the formation of the categories of a critical science and its truth-claims? It has generally been assumed that Marx' categories reflect or correspond to the historical reality, but is this compatible with the assumptions implicit in a dialectical analysis, which, for Hegel, meant the rejection of epistemology and, therefore, all traditional claims to truth? A central question throughout the German Idealist tradition has been that of 'objective validity' or the question of justifying and guaranteeing the adequacy of the cognitive relations between the knower and known, subject and object. Will this tradition affect Marx' understanding of the issues? Is praxis the framework

within which truth is developed (sociology of knowledge) or the framework within which it is distorted (critique of ideology); is it the structuring process within which social objectivity is created (ontology); is it the social basis for the creation of institutions, interaction, and the self (philosophical anthropology and social psychology); or is it the criterion and measurement of truth itself (epistemology)? Since Marx only implied the epistemological and ontological dimensions of praxis, the concept can be better understood when examined within the framework of Marx' economic theory; the theory will reveal the constraints and potentials for applicability and the form that applicability may take. The analysis of the logic of capital and Marx' view of science may throw more light on the range of applicability of its categorial structure. The logic of theory will help us in clarifying the logic of praxis itself. If the meta-theoretical foundations of political economy imply a certain type of epistemology and theory of objectivity, this then will have important consequences for the meaning and form praxis may take. It is now time to join the philosophical tradition to the empirical and historical study of the social relations of production and the technological and industrial forces of modernity.

II. EPISTEMOLOGICAL GROUNDING OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

In the 'Afterword' to the second German edition of *Capital* Marx stated that his dialectical method was not only different from the Hegelian one but was its direct opposite. "To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, *i.e.*, the process of thinking, which under the name of the 'Idea', he even transforms into an independent Subject, is the demiurgos of the real world and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of the Idea. With me on the contrary the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind and translated into forms of thought."[5] Whether it was the concepts and theories of the Left Hegelians, utopian socialists, or the British political economists, Marx held that they were really working with theoretical abstractions which were for him "metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties".[6] These abstractions were the result of various processes of reification resulting from the fetishized social relations and interactions in the economic and social spheres and were reflected in bourgeois thought as eternal relations (*Verdinglichung*).[7] However, when perceived materialistically they become social processes where the real class and power relationships are uncovered, hidden beneath the fetishized objects by the very movement of the categories themselves informed by historical reality. This is crucial, for in a letter to Lassalle Marx says that the

Grundrisse was "a critique of the economic categories."[8] What level of analysis was Marx engaged in when writing his political economy - was he detailing the development of historical experience (empiricist epistemology), was he analyzing the *a priori* self-movement of the categories of political economy (rationalist epistemology), or was he doing something else? From Chapter Two on the temporal dimensions of the critique of political economy, we have seen how Marx' view of science evolved out of his understanding of Hegel's use of the Concept (*Begriff*) and the Schelling/Feuerbach critique of Hegel.

> It does not originate from the specific properties of the knowing subject and it is also not an axiomatic and mathematically necessary logical sequence; it is rather the intellectual translation of the structure of the object itself; the intellectual expression of objectively existing necessity, whereby this 'necessity' is newly understood in the sense of substance as self-developing by contradiction. The logical form of truth cannot be the simple aggregation of perceptions, in which they are merely written down and juxtaposed without developmental connection, without the necessary sequence specific to 'conceptualizing'.[9]

The traditional views of knowledge and epistemology were not what Hegel considered to be science, but the unscientific ordering and classification of categories around the *Verstand*; it was the realm of understanding and not reason. Marx will take a similar position.

The rejection of positivism as the scientific paradigm and epistemological model by Marx, along with its application to the analysis of political economy and the replacement of positivism by the critical and dialectical method now leads us to an analysis of that method itself. The clarification of the epistemology still leaves the question of Marx' method of political economy, especially in the relationship between the conceptual and historical realms. It is now no longer a question of what can you do (epistemology), but what, in fact, he did do. What once was an abstract philosophical question about the nature of knowledge, now becomes a question about the actual method of a practicing political economist.

For many the epistemological disputes have been interpreted within the antinomies of empiricism/rationalism and materialism/idealism, but these distinctions within Marx' critique of political economy are not incompatible once we begin to discuss more fully the interrelationships between the conceptual and historical worlds and the importance that the methodology behind the identity theory played in Hegel and Marx' notions of science, truth, and objectivity. It has been generally accepted that Marx was very critical of Hegel's identity theory because of its

speculative and metaphysical assumptions and implications. However, Marx can be seen as being critical of really only one major aspect - the ontological aspect of the theory and only some of its methodological assumptions and implications. It is this meta-theoretical compatibility between Hegel and Marx that is crucial for an understanding of Marx' notions of science and critique. The transposition of Hegel's method to political economy has drawn a great deal of interest. The emphasis here will be on the generally unanalyzed assumptions and epistemological presuppositions that Marx draws from Hegel and the German Idealist tradition. It is this cultural unconscious which forms the heart of Hegel's theory of reflection, objectivity, and critique of epistemology, and which will also form the heart of Marx' methodology.

> Hegel accordingly conceived the illusory idea that the real world is the result of thinking which causes its own synthesis, its own deepening and its own movement: whereas the method of advancing from the abstract to the concrete is simply the ways in which thinking assimilates the concrete and reproduces it as a concrete mental category. This is, however, by no means the process of the evolution of the concrete world itself.[10]

As we begin the examination of the relationship between thinking and the historical world, the notion of "concrete" becomes important. Some have interpreted this idea of "concrete" as referring to the material world, thereby justifying Marx' materialism and methodological positivism - the examination and explanation of the factual and concrete. The idea of "concrete" has been variously interpreted leading to further complications and confusions regarding Marx' method. This idea, mentioned in Chapter One, brings to the attention of the reader the mixing of two uses of the term and the unarticulated blending of both idealism and materialism in his method. There are two uses of the term "concrete" - one referring to materialism and the other to idealism. As used in the statement "the concrete world itself" the word refers to the materially given historical substratum, while as used in "concrete mental category", the term refers to the determinate negation and to the dialectical method, where the categories of political economy are formed, expanded, and given more substantive detail in the process of clarifying the nature of capitalist social relations. One use of the word refers to the empirical historical world, while the other refers to the Hegelian use of the Concept as meaning the further determination and development of simple categories. The formation of the concrete world and concrete categories are two separate processes and necessarily so, given Marx' critique of Hegel's identification of both the subject and object in the Absolute Spirit. To have missed this distinction could

lead to a too simple definition of and correlation between concept and history. Zelený, in his analysis of the logic of *Capital,* has stated:

> It is, according to Marx, 'a product of the thinking head which appropriates the world in the only mode possible for it'. Without that 'ideal' procedure, in merely sticking to real history, it would be impossible to explain the character and essence of capitalism. This 'ideal' procedure of reproducing reality in ideas is necessary in order to grasp historical reality, but it would be an error to take it as the direct copy of real historical fact.[11]

From another perspective, Sayer in his work *Marx's Method* has said that "the dual opposition of simple and abstract/complex and concrete fairly evidently, if rather imprecisely, attempts to grasp what Marx is later to conceptualize via the single opposition of the essential relations/phenomenal forms."[12] The idea of "concrete" is used at the methodological level as a term relating to the phenomenal world. However, this is the very point that Marx is rejecting, for it is only a one-sided use of the notion. Like Hegel, he said that "the concept concrete is concrete because it is a synthesis of many definitions, thus representing the unity of diverse aspects."[13] As the method used by Marx it can be characterized as transcending both idealism and materialism. It seems that the term "critical method" is more appropriate and less confusing than these traditional metaphysical labels given to Marx' method. Habermas, too, has noted that Marx' theory of value has the double function of serving as a critique of the logic of capital and a critique of ideology, *i.e.*, it has dual moments of idealism and materialism.[14]

Kofler had recognized in his *Geschichte und Dialektik* that in objective idealism there is no theory of knowledge, which is at the same time not a theory of thought processes (logic) and a theory of Being, *i.e.*, logic and ontology are inherently involved in Hegel's methodological undertakings.[15] Thus, when Marx stated that his dialectical method was the exact opposite, he meant that in using the dialectic in critical science he was examining the logical contradictions inherent in capitalist society. These contradictions are expressed in the conceptual totality and reflective reconstruction of the concepts and theories of political economy (science and ideology critique). While he rejected the theory of identity of the subject and object and the identity of the Concept of capital (self-consciousness) and real economic crises, historical tendencies and historical reality, he did accept it at the methodological level of the social sciences (logic), without which the latter would have been impossible. This means that, like Schelling but unlike Hegel, the identity of theory (the inherent possibilities of the

"having beenness" of the past) and history (the content of logic) are united only at the level of consciousness and not at that of history itself. Subject and object could not have been united at the level of reality and ontology, for Marx could not have joined logic and metaphysics. This was, in fact, the basis of Schelling's critique of Hegel and Marx' critique of positivism. The social totality, where the commodity represents both the beginning and the end, is similar to Schelling's identity theory in that both synthesize concept and reality but at the level of logic only. Marx held that the next step of synthesis in the real world was to be taken not by theory as 'critique', but by 'critique' as social praxis. At the moment, this clarifies nothing because all the same epistemological problems about truth, foundations, and justification could still be raised regarding social praxis. How does the latter eliminate and solve the issues raised by the critique of positivism and the crisis of epistemology?

At the methodological level of actuality and potentiality (historical tendencies), the subject and object could be united in the notion of the commodity as both abstract universality and historical reality. Science, as defined by Hegel and Marx, is critical at its heart and entails, as Chapters One and Five indicate, the reconceptualization of the meaning of objectivity, methodology, concept and theory formation, and verification. At the methodological level, the Marxian term "conceptual totality" should be seen as a de-ontologized and de-mystified notion of identity. For Hegel, the identity was between the subjectivity and objectivity, pure immediate Being and the Absolute Spirit; for Marx, it is not an identity between thought and reality, concept and history, but between the conceptual totality and the historical totality, between actuality and reality, potentiality and reality within the logical framework established by Hegel and Schelling's notions of time. Both men return to the Aristotelian distinction of potentiality and actuality. While modern science represents an examination into the objectivity and rationality of the actual, both Hegel and Schelling attempted to develop a science which dealt with potentiality. Marx turns this distinction between the givenness of experience and immediate objectivity and the possibility of the ideal hidden within the actual into another distinction. This one develops between ideology as false consciousness and an acceptance of the given property and power relations in a class society and the immanent critique of the social system based on the system's own stated liberal ideals and possibilities - the liberal ideals in a repressive society. Marx' view of science then is a *Wirklichkeits-wissenschaft* based on the Hegelian dialectic and phenomenological critique and Schelling's *Vernunftswissenschaft.*

The totality as a conceptual entity seen by the intellect is a product

> of the thinking intellect which assimilates the world in the only ways open to it, a way which differs from the artistic, religious, and practically intelligent assimilation of this world. The concrete subject remains outside the intellect and independent of it. ...[16]

The concrete subject, as the actual historical movement of capitalist accumulation through periods of real economic and social crisis, cannot be completely captured by a critical science for the two realms of thought and history can never be synthesized into a higher unity. They can be joined at the logical level, but not the historical level and certainly not by using pure theory or pure consciousness. For Aristotle science could not determine or validate moral norms, while for Marx science cannot necessitate or justify our picture of the social reality. They represent, as we have already seen, two distinct ontological realms of being. This might seem to the reader to be unduly philosophical and obtuse a point to make in a section devoted to clarifying Marx' method of political economy, especially when there are other interpretations around which are much more clear and distinct on this issue. I would, however, argue that this immediate clarity may have been gained by sacrificing comprehension and complexity when dealing with seemingly unappetizing and unrewarding abstract issues. But as we have seen the issue of the objective validity and ontological status of Marx' concepts have been made problematic by the whole critique of the Western tradition by the German Idealists. Hume and Hegel had undermined the issue of the philosophical foundations of Western science and the objective validity of its categories, while Schelling and Feuerbach had undermined the objectivity and ontological reference of Hegel's metaphysics. Where was Marx to turn? What would be his guide in the formation of concepts and theories? After this the reference point of Marx' concepts must be viewed in the context of this Aristotelian and Hegelian distinction between actuality and potentiality.

Marx' materialism was expressed in the priority he gave to the empirical historical world and the sociological and historical priority of the acting subject - negating in the process the ideas of the Absolute Spirit and the subject-object identity in either a philosophy of history or economic historicism such as defined by Karl Popper.[17] The separation of the two realms not only reaffirms the materialism of Marx, but also justifies the conceptual totality, which has its own method and logic and, therefore, its own meta-theoretical assumptions. Science would thus have to be re-defined to take into account just these assumptions. Though Marx saw Hegel as unconsciously representing in his works the highest achievement of penetration into the essential realities of the bourgeois world, penetrating the contradictions and divisions of that society, but in a mystified form, he also saw that a unified

formal logic could not encompass the complexities and exigencies of both realms.

III. THE HEGELIAN NOTION OF *BEGRIFF* AND POLITICAL ECONOMY: HISTORY AND LOGIC

Marx by accepting the logic, epistemology, and methodology of Hegelian science, separating it from ontology and metaphysics, is continuing the line of thought developed in the 'Theses on Feuerbach', in which he was critical of both classical materialism and classical idealism.[18] The self-movement of the Concept, as an expression of the materialist relations of production and social forms, is, in fact, detailing the essential structures of capital itself in its material and conceptual form; it comprehends the essence (conceptual and ethical potentials) of the capitalist social system, but not its future reality. The forms of thought as developed by the Concept of commodity production reveal the inner structures and relations of capitalist accumulation and social formation, since they represent in elementary form the full contradictory potentials of the modern economic system. It is in the idea of potentiality that the unity of subject and object, logic and history exists; the unity exists theoretically at the level of logic and only potentially at the historical one. This does not mean that the content of Marx' categories are not historical, for they most definitely are. They reflect real institutions, relationships, and structural dynamics, but in their theoretical form within the Concept, not as they are in reality. Marx never deals with the issue of a different methodology for the historical sciences as opposed to the critical science. So in the relationships between concepts and reality there are two levels - the theoretical one in which identity exists as the social totality and the historical one in which identity is ultimately a characteristic of self-consciousness and practical activity - democratic social change through worker-controlled industries.

Marx is critical that Hegel's appropriation of the objective world, in thought forms only, is "an appropriation of thoughts and movements of thoughts." Marx was not simply analyzing the movement of categories from one level of abstraction to another, but rather he was dealing with historical objects whose "relations had already existed historically before the entity had developed the aspects expressed in a more concrete category."[19] The conceptual development was analyzed within the context of the historical totality and the contradictions of capitalism itself. Marx' critical science represents the investigation of the historical reality of the perceived world, but the historical reality reflected in the thought processes of the self-development of capital (as Concept). That is, history has to be rewritten before it can be critically understood and

its essential structures outlined. Only the dialectical method was capable, for Marx, of accomplishing that task. This understanding continues to maintain the ontological distinctiveness of both logic and history joined together by two crucial components of Marx' theory of truth - potentiality and historical tendency.

> The economic cannot have the qualities of a given (of the immediately visible and observable, *etc.*), because its identification requires the concept of the structure of the economic, which in turn requires the concepts of the structure of the mode of production....[20]

> One can see that with this method, the logical exposition need by no means be confined to the purely abstract sphere. On the contrary, it requires historical illustrations and continuous contact with reality.[21]

The scientific analysis of commodity production exists precisely in the process of developing from the abstract universality of the pure historical immediacy to the concrete universality of the Concept. It is the development of thought from the level of the reified immediately given objects (appearances) to the higher concrete abstractions of the reality of those appearances (essence). The theoretical-scientific, logico-historical precepts are established by the necessity of the logical development itself, but expressed within history, from the simple abstractions to the multifarious determinations and relations of the concrete. "Capital is the self-movement of the Begriff (Concept) of the commodity as the progressive contradiction between use-value and exchange-value. The Concept has reality ... ."[22] The question becomes "what kind of reality"? It is not a reality which can be perceived through the senses and understood through the traditional sciences. It is a reality which can only be understood, for Marx, through the dialectical method which uses categories which are formed through both induction and deduction. There seems to be a very complex and confusing set of meta-theoretical issues involved here.

Perhaps it would be helpful to inquire into the difference between the notions of *Reflektion* and *Erzeugung*.[23] The latter denotes the meta-theoretical procedure by which reality is produced by virtue of the thought process, while, in the former, the concrete totality is merely reflected in the mind. Thinking does not create or resolve the contradictions in the process of social production, but recreates them, not as they exist presently or in the manner in which they developed historically, as economic crises, but rather as they express themselves as a result of their own logical negations and mediations, *i.e.*, as a result of

the transcendence from the abstract to the concrete. It is only this latter method and not positivism which Marx held to be 'scientific'. It is this complex relationship between the categories and reality and the dialectical interplay between them which makes an understanding of Marx so difficult.

Marx' major contribution to the methodological argument in the social sciences lies mainly in the area of the relationships between theory and existence and appearances and reality. While Hegel was able to unify in the Absolute Spirit both thought and reality in their development from the appearances, Marx distinguished between *der gedanklicher Prozess* and der *Seinsprozess*, between the process of thought production and the process of being itself. Even within *Capital* there are a variety of different levels of method being employed, such as the analysis of the history of the development of the theories of surplus value (*Theories of Surplus Value*), the history of the real historical condition of the working class in England in the mid-ninteenth century in the chapters 'The Working Day' and 'History of Modern Machinery', and the development of the Concept itself (the whole of *Capital*).[24] To understand society scientifically, according to its universal and necessary categories, requires the dialectical method. It should be clearly noted that these are three distinct elements or moments in Marx' analysis which include the history of ideas, historical research and the acquisition of data (*Forschungsmethode*), and the dialectical method itself (*Darstellungsmethode*). The historical research and analysis into the questions of the working day and modern machinery should be seen as historical clarifications of where and how the dialectic breaks into reality. They also represent important expositions into the real problems and issues of the working class and thus are expressions of the underlying dynamic or logical contradictions within that society. These contradictions, however, express themselves historically and only historical research is capable of examining them in any detail. The dialectical method would be totally inappropriate to deal with this type of question, since the former only deals with the internal logical and ethical contradictions within a particular society. It is important to keep separate the ontological status, the methodological distinctiveness, and logical incompatibility of the realms of the dialectic and history. They both need each other in ways which will be examined in this chapter, but they are not to be confused as the same, certainly not since the Schelling-Feuerbach critiques.

The ideas of universality and necessity cannot be and must not be interpreted within the limited methodological framework of the positivist school of social science. According to Marx the "historical facts" can only be appropriated by the logical reconstruction of the historical development of capital, if the goal is to comprehend critically capitalist

production. It is thus a logical-historical, idealist-materialist method. The logical representation (*Darstellungsmethode*)[25] of the historical process is in reality a reflection of the reality of the capitalist social relations in thought for "the categories express forms of existence and the conditions of existence."[26] What is the status of the relations between the categories of political economy and the structures of capitalist society? Either the development of the contradictions of the economic structure, the value composition of capital, and the chronic crisis conditions, *i.e.*, the laws of capitalist development, reflect the Being of society or they reflect the forms of the social appearances. In truth they reflect neither for they reflect the potentiality of the system (Schelling). If the relation between thought and reality is one of a picture reflection in which the categories reflect the actual historical structures (Comte, Ricardo, and J.S. Mill) or a relation in which they represent Being itself (Hegel), then Marx has unknowingly fallen into what he himself calls an "uncritical positivism and uncritical idealism."[27] How are we to overcome the dilemma? If the former is true then the critiques of Dahrendorf and Popper are correct, while if the latter is true Marx becomes another metaphysician. Does political economy also founder on the 'dilemma of objective validity' and the inability to validate the relationships between cognitive structures and the structures of reality as occurred in empiricism, rationalism, and idealism? The way out of the problem has been partially provided by Schelling and Feuerbach.

Marx himself never explicated the problem in these terms, for he thought he had transcended the limitations of both idealism and materialism, positivism and metaphysics by his realization that the economic and sociological categories were only a theoretical expression of the social relations of production. But he never clarified their exact relationships at the epistemological and ontological level. Instead of reducing all relation and social forces simply to logical categories, both Marx and Engels were cognizant of their historically grounded nature.

> In the first place I do not start out from 'concepts', hence I do not start from 'the concept of value', and do no have 'to divide' these in any way. What I start out from is the simplest social form in which the labour-product is presented in contemporary society, and this is the '*commodity*'. I analyze it, and right from the beginning, in the *form in which it appears*.[28]

> The logical method of approach was therefore the only suitable one. This, however, is indeed nothing but the historical method, only stripped of the historical form and diverting chance occurrences. The point where this history begins must be the starting point of the train of thought, and its further progress will be simply the

> reflection, in abstract and theoretically consistent form, of the historical course.[29]

What is the difference between the self-movement of the Concept in Hegel's works (Absolute Spirit) and the self-movement of the Concept in Marx' *Capital*? If anything it is not a simple matter of negating Hegel and turning him on his head. Marx has not transcended Hegel by simply shifting emphasis of the dialectical method to the economic and social world. In fact, Lenin, Kojève, Hyppolite, Marcuse, and Lukács have stressed the materialist elements in Hegel's works. Hegel has written extensively on such materialist themes as social anthropology, political economy, work, alienation, and praxis. The central difference revolves around the question of ontology. Marx was not concerned with this question in the traditional sense of the concept of Being, *i.e.*, uncovering the Being or reality-in-itself which transcends historical movement or is, in fact, imposed on history. He was, however, still caught in the necessity to utilize aspects of the identity theory at the methodological level; this identity theory, however, was not grounded on the identity between subject and object, consciousness and reality, but rather on the theoretical identity between actuality and possibility in the Concept of capital (Schelling's identity theory).

That is, the identity was grounded in a view of reality and temporality in which the future is simply an expression of the articulation of the past - the future of capital never transcends the contradictions between use-value and exchange-value, material production and value production, the production of goods to satisfy human needs and the production of commodities to make a profit. How history will unfold is a question the dialectical method is epistemologically and methodologically incapable of answering. For that matter it is incapable of even asking. The explanation of history and the prediction of the future require different meta-theoretical assumptions as to the nature of objectivity, temporality, rationality, and scientific validation. This is certainly a reason for taking seriously other approaches in the social science, such as Weber's neo-Kantian ideal type and historically comparative method and Durkheim's empirical research. Weber's comparative sociological analysis is different because not only was it asking different questions about the nature of history, which required an entirely different set of methodological and epistemological assumptions about the nature of knowledge and research. Weber was dealing with a different ontological entity than Marx within a different time and space framework, even though both were concerned with capitalism. The two paradigms were grounded in different meta-theories, different assumptions, and different issues. Weber asked the question of the conditions for the possibility of capitalism and historical knowl-

edge, while Marx raised the issue of the contradictions and economic crises of the capitalist system. This becomes crucial when examining Marx' notions of historicity and temporality in relation to his ideas of science and objectivity.

Nicolaus has argued that *Capital* begins with the development of the commodity itself, unlike the first attempts at a methodological beginning in the *Grundrisse*, where Marx was following Hegel's *Logic* with its beginning in the abstract universal and indeterminate being. In the 'Introduction' to his translation of the *Grundrisse*, Nicolaus argues that in the *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* and in *Capital I*, Marx begins with the concrete, material, and historically specific reality.[30] Postone and Reinicke respond to Nicolaus on the grounds that he was too influenced by Engels and Lenin, for he failed to see the idealism of Hegel's logic still present in Marx' method of the dialectical development of the Concept of commodity and also not understanding the "historicity of the concept", *i.e.*, that the dialectical method was itself historically specific and the "only method adequate to a social form determined as a totality of commodity production".[31] They are more comprehensive than Nicolaus in their analysis of Marx' method, but still a serious problem arises. They reincorporate the positive elements of Hegel's method back into Marx' dialectical critique and state that "the critique emerges from the thing itself, from the contradictions and limits which unfold from its motion".[32] The critique represents for them a logically and historically immanent critique of capitalist social relations. This is the problem - how do they justify the relationships between Marx' economic categories and the social reality? Everything hinges on this idea that the dialectical categories express both the social relations and the bourgeois forms of consciousness. This does not explain the relationships between concepts and reality, subjectivity and objectivity, but only clearly states and assumes what is, in fact, to be explained. In the same issue of *Telos* Postone and Reinicke were, in turn, critiqued by Keane and Singer for their "latent objectivism" in their return to the dialectic with its logical unfolding of the contradictions of the commodity, which for them resulted in the loss of both the subject of history and the possibility for the self-conscious direction of social change.[33] There appears to be a conflict here between two perspectives - one emphasizing that Marx begins with an actual historical entity (the materialism of Nicolaus) and the other that he begins with an abstract universal category that is historically specific (the idealism of Postone and Reinicke).

However, both moments are true if we understand the commodity to be both an historical category (method of enquiry) and a theoretical abstraction (method of presentation), that is, an expression of the social relations of production and the forms of thought based on abstraction-

ism, which contains within itself the concrete whole. As we shall see in a moment, Marx begins with both the simplest historical reality, but places it within his schema as an abstract beginning, which will dialectically develop into a concrete, but logical, end. So the approaches of the *Grundrisse* and *Capital* are not contradictory, they simply represent further refinements of the dialectical logic and the problem of methodological beginnings. Both moments are contained in this one category of commodity production, as Schmidt states in his work *Structure and History*. Following closely Hegelian logic "the individual act of exchange of one commodity for another, already includes in an underdeveloped form all the main contradictions of capitalism".[34]

Beginning with the commodity, Marx is not starting his analysis with an extension of a mere *Augenschein*, or with a system of deductive reasoning, classification, or a systematization of social facts, *i.e.*, his method is not that of a *Tatsachenwissenschaft*.[35] Rather, as he states in the 'Introduction' to the *Grundrisse*, the scientific thought proceeds from the particular to the individual, from the abstract to the concrete.[36] Although Hegel cannot begin the *Logic* with matter since "it is in the course of the Science that we are to discover what matter is"[37], Marx begins with the immediate historical world, but only a categorial abstract form of it - the commodity. Hegel's identity theory is established in his *Logic* quite early when he states:

> Thus consciousness is led back on its road from immediacy, with which it begins, to absolute knowledge as its inmost truth; and the first term, which entered the stage as the immediate, arises, precisely from this last term, the foundation. -- Still further, we see that Absolute Spirit, which is found to be the concrete, last, and highest truth of all Being, at the end of its evolution freely passes beyond itself and lapses into the shape of an immediate Being: it resolves itself to the creation of a world which contains everything included in the evolution preceding that result; all of which, by reason of this inverted position, is changed, together with its beginning, into something dependent on the result, for the result is the principle. What is essential for Science is not so much that a pure immediate is the beginning, but that it itself in its totality forms a cycle returning upon itself, wherein the first is also last and the last first.[38]

Marx in his analysis of the concrete concept and his method of political economy in the 'Introduction' holds fundamentally the same position. "It [the concrete concept] appears therefore in reasoning as a summing up, a result, and not as the starting point, although it is the real point of origin, and thus also the point of origin of perception and

imagination."[39] The laws of capitalist accumulation already exist in the contradictions of commodity production. The end, as fully developed capitalist production, is already logically and potentially (history) included in the beginning as commodity. Abstract and concrete refer not to the sensuously given of the rules of the understanding (*Verstand*), which only recognizes the external movement of the physical and historical and fails to capture the internal dynamic and logical necessity of the social forms and institutional structures themselves. The internal logic of capitalism understood as an historical totality is expressed by and permeates every aspect of the social whole and all its phenomenal forms (*Vernunft*).

IV. THE DIALECTIC AND THE LOGIC OF *CAPITAL*

Marx begins with the dialectic and contradiction buried within the commodity between its dual moments of use-value and exchange-value. The commodity represents both an empirical category (materialism), and one which is also an abstract universal (idealism), which in itself is the simplest and most general form of representation of the material production of the capitalist system. Because of the internal logic of capitalism and the contradiction of a society grounded in the production of commodities for immediate consumption and for exchange on the market, for socialized production and privatized distribution, for material rationalization (production for human needs) and value rationalization (production for profit), and for the increasing mass of profits and decreasing rates of profit, the history of capital is revealed in its own internal logic.

> Contradictions will emerge demanding a solution. But since we are not examining an abstract mental process that takes place solely in the mind, but an actual event which really took place at some time or other, or which is still taking place, these contradictions will have arisen in practice and have probably been solved. We shall trace the mode of this solution and find that it has been affected by establishing new relations, whose contradictory aspects we shall then have to set forth, and so on.[40]

The formal and structural aspects of these contradictions and their resulting social laws are independent of and separate from the external historical appearances, which make up their substance and context, but, in turn, are defined and structured by history. The commodity is the *Keimform* of all bourgeois productive relations. It represents the germ of the development of capital as it is structured by the interconnection of

the social relations of production and the technological forces of production. Though it is the simplest category it contains within itself the totality of all forms of capitalist social structure and their contradictions (effective causality).[41]

It is scientific theoretical thought which begins with the abstract universal - the commodity - and develops its own internal contradictions, negation, and mediations to higher levels of contradictory social and economic structures. The commodity forms the basis of the thought form and gives it its existential and empirical foundations in the historical world of the appearances. Balibar, whose position is certainly far removed from the one developing here, nevertheless emphasizes the idealist side of the dialectical method which is an advance, but unfortunately one which fails to incorporate the materialist moment that Engels had mentioned above.

> We never leave abstraction on the way from Volume One to Volume Three (of *Capital*), we never leave knowledge, the 'product of thinking and conceiving': we never leave the concept.[42]

It must be added that because of its contradictory nature, there are two life-structures found in the commodity each having its own categories and developed structures. The historical determination of capitalist production becomes transformed into logical structures and forms. As Postone and Reinicke have stated, the capitalist system is capable of presenting its own history as logic because the capitalist system is the only historical social formation which is a dynamic totality. "Only capitalism--not the history of humanity--reveals a totalizing logic."[43] For only in capitalism are the various institutional organizations so totally encompassed by the logic of capital accumulation.

> The mature Marxian dialectic critically grasps and expresses developed bourgeois society as the first real social totality: one whose entire determinate reality can be unfolded from a single abstract structuring form--the commodity in its double character as total system. Because that dual character gives rise to contradictions which tend to unfold beyond itself--to money and then capital--as a constant dynamic in time, this first real social totality is the first historically dynamic form: as a totality it unfolds in time.[44]

Marx' letter to Engels dated August 2, 1862 indicates that Marx did have the entire picture of the development of *Capital* through the three volumes already in his mind at this early date, *i.e.*, before the first volume was published.[45] The abstract formulation of commodity production, as the pure commodity, was only the beginning of an already

completed totality (at the conceptual level only). This idea contains the temporal dimension of the critical method discussed in Chapter Two. It is the beginning/end framework from Hegel's *Logic* and *Phenomenology,* within which the dialectic works. Both Marx' methodological statements and the actual organization of his material itself leads to the conclusion that the historical totality must be viewed within an revised, materialistic, identity theory that rejects any assimilation of the subjective and the objective, the conceptual and the historical, but still represents a conceptual totality - a completed conceptual whole that comes out of history, but remains a logical totality. The concepts are not created from nothing, but are the rethinking of the essence of historical events into an analysis of the logic of capital. The totality contains within itself both the beginning and end of its own logic, as it is played out in the historically contingent world of experience.

Schmidt and Balibar come from two entirely different schools of thought and interpret Marx quite differently. Despite this, there is agreement as to the split between history and logic. What this split means is, of course, interpreted differently. Categories, according to Alfred Schmidt, are *Daseinbestimmungen* which, while reflecting the essential reality of the contradictory nature of material production, are nevertheless independent of the empirical. Balibar states "that there is no common homogeneous space (spirit or real) between the abstract of the concept of a thing and the empirical concrete of this thing. ... ."[46] Balibar and Althusser do not seem to recognize the dialectical interplay between the concept and history, idealism and materialism and have ignored the meta-theory of German Idealism in Marx' *Capital.* Both also ignore the historical context of the dialectical movement of the Concept; there is no examination of the content of the critique. Political economy seems irrelevant to philosophy. They are more interested in the metaphysics of the dialectic. This creates a problem for the interpretation of the theory of the accumulation and breakdown thesis of capitalism, as it does for the relation between concept and reality.

The Concept, though grounded in the historical, for Marx, moves according to its own logic constantly adjusted and informed by history; history frames and shapes the content of the logic, for the former is always explaining itself through the latter, but the latter does not determine the particulars of that content, only its universal form. In the latter logic moves according to the internal contradictions of capitalism, but it still retains a logical structure and logical status. The logic evolves out of history, but it cannot create it. It can, however, structure the content and set limits within which capitalism develops, while the content gives substance and meaning to the form. The two cannot be separated, but because of the universal nature of the temporal dimension of Marx' categories and the impact of Schelling's critique of Hegel, the

two cannot be reduced to each other, nor can they be used to explain each other. Thus the split between method of research and method of presentation, the development of capitalism and the logic of capital.

Logic cannot be made to form history and history can never change the underlying logic of capital; the economic crises come and go and can be countered by political and economic measures, but the contradictions in the system can never be transcended and are an ever-present reality. There is an extremely subtle interrelation here between history and logic and this interrelationship changes with the emphasis on the temporal dimensions of the past, present, and future. Since the future is the realization of the "having been", since it is an expression of the past as an immanent principle, the future itself is a logical construct. The future, as the open possibilities created by the present in which social praxis takes place, involves a different model of time than the dialectical notion of time. There is thus an emancipatory notion of time and a dialectical notion of time. The former is open to the possibilities of human history and human intervention directed by freedom and rationality. The latter is structured not by the possibilities of rationality, but the potentialities as they exist in the irrationality of the capitalist system. If the two are joined in social practice that system must be transcended. This is what is meant by the iron laws of history in *Capital*. These laws are "iron" because they are universal and immutable in the logic of the capitalist social system.

How the contradictions are worked out in the social reality is an historical question, which can only wait for the intervention of social action on the structures of political economy. Nor does the logic of capital explain history in the fashion of a positivist theory. It cannot give the reasons and underlying causes of particular events; nor can it predict future crises or breakdowns in the system. It cannot be used as a crisis avoidance theory, predicting the future and determining the time and place for politico-economic stabilization measures, nor can it be used as a predictor of revolutionary social change. The logic can only examine the essence of the structures and principles of capital. If this sounds too much like a metaphysical answer of someone falling back into philosophical obscurantism, I can only assure the reader that this is not the case. The real metaphysics lies in the normative assumptions of positivism. There is another alternative, once one rejects the positivism of science, and this lies in an alternative method ('critique'), with an alternative logic, set of justifications, and ultimate goals about the nature of social knowledge. If knowledge is a process of learning and political participation, if its goals are self-enlightenment and self-realization in a social setting, then the whole framework of western epistemology must change. With Marx it did.

Unlike in Hegel, logic and ontology are not combined in reality, but

only in Marx' thought. Thus an identity theory (social totality) exists only in theory and not in being.

> It would be inexpedient and wrong therefore to present the economic categories successively in the order in which they have played the dominant role in history. On the contrary, their order of succession is determined by their mututal relation in modern bourgeois society and this is quite the reverse of what appears to be natural to them or in accordance with the sequence of historical development.[47]

In the process of synthesizing and transcending materialism and idealism in Marx' 'critique', he transcends the limitation of a crude philosophy of history and an economic determinism. The dialectical method, therefore, appears appropriate only for developed societies whose social relations of production are characterized by commodity production, *i.e.*, characterized by clear internal contradictions.

> ... my view that each special mode of production and the social relations corresponding to it, in short, that the economic structure of society, is the real basis on which the juridical and political superstructure is raised, and to which definite social forms of thought correspond; that the mode of production determines the character of the social, political, and intellectual life generally, *all this is very true for our own times*, in which material interests preponderate, *but not for the middle ages, in which Catholicism, nor for Athens and Rome, where politics reigned supreme.*[48] (emphasis added)

Critical science is not transhistorical and, therefore, cannot develop from the single examination of the becoming of history in its appearances, but must be founded in the dialectical unfolding of the Concept of capital as a particular moment in history. The Concept must not be mystified into the Absolute Spirit, but must express and be grounded in the historical reality. The contradictory moments of use-value and exchange-value develop within the historical context of the competitive marketplace, ideology of possessive individualism, and the technization of the workplace (rising organic composition of capital). Contradictions within capitalism cannot be understood except by 'critique', which is the only method appropriate to examine the limits of the categories of political economy and their relationships to and relevance for capitalism. It is an undermining of the rationality of capitalist legitimations and the actual structures being legitimized. Though Marx stated that the dialectic was applicable to capitalism alone, it must

be verified at the practical level before it becomes truth. Thus he is not simply replacing an empiricist epistemology with an idealist one, but interconnects idealism with material confirmation in social praxis (this will be further developed below). This connects his 'Theses on Feuerbach' with the methodology of *Capital.* Idealism and materialism interconnect at the point of both theory construction and validation. If *Capital* were to be rewritten today, much of the 19th-century metaphysical terminology of Hegel's system building would be replaced with a crisper and cleaner language. However, despite this, the metatheoretical questions would remain and would remain valid for the contemporary analysis of capitalist society. This includes especially Marx' critique of positivism and epistemology.

Critical science investigates the objectivity (defined by Hegel as *Gewordensein* and the *Gesetztsein*), which express the inherent contradictions and possibilities of the actuality.[49] Science reveals the truth of the capitalist system in its essential nature; it reveals the Concept of capital, which is the logic of capitalist history. It attempts to transcend the antinomy between reality and consciousness by undercutting the fetishized scientific categories which maintain those distinctions. Thought appropriates the concrete historical form through its dialectical categories and reconstructs it as the concrete determination of the mind. It is the movement of thought processes from the abstract universal of the commodity to the concrete totality and universality of capitalist crises.

V. SCIENCE, POLITICAL ECONOMY, AND ONTOLOGY

Materialism is, therefore, not simply a turn from the Absolute Spirit and the categories of Being to the Concept of capital and the categories of political economy. As we have seen that Marx' method is also highly idealistic. Thought and consciousness are not divorced from the struggles for human existence and human emancipation. There is a synthesis of man, nature, consciousness, and the quest for freedom. What unites the subjectivity and objectivity in Hegel's works is the historical movement of the Spirit in the Idea, while, for Marx, it is the joining together in class consciousness of both the logical moment of capital and the moment of historical crisis. At that point in time when history does become logic and logic becomes history the truth of science is capable of being realized. Science cannot do this for itself since it requires another element not discussed, but to be examined in the next chapter - 'theory and praxis'. Since truth can only be verified practically within the community, Marx' analysis of *Capital* was itself an analysis of the logic of the system. The positivists assume that

verification is achieved when there is a correspondence between the concept and the empirical referent; when the theory correctly predicts the 'future' event. Marx holds that the science is true when logic and history are joined not by the transcendental subject or the Absolute Spirit but by class consciousness and social action. This is the process of human emancipation examined in 'On the Jewish Question'.

The confusion over Marx' method is exemplified by Marcuse who states:

> The concept that definitely connects Marx' dialectic with the history of the class society is the concept of necessity. The dialectical laws are necessary laws; the various forms of class society necessarily perish from their inner contradictions. The laws of capitalism work with 'iron necessity towards inevitable results,' Marx says. This necessity does not, however, apply to the positive transformation of capitalist society.[50]

Marcuse implies further on in his analysis that there are two concepts of 'necessity' working within Marx' thought. One refers to the laws of societal development within capitalism and the other refers to a necessity born of ethical imperatives that do not have the force of natural laws. The second concept of necessity is used in the "sense that the full development of the individual is necessary".[51] For Marcuse, the determinist categories refer to capitalism, while the free and conscious subject refers to socialism. Marx, as has been shown, does not make these clear distinctions in terms of social formations, but the two are intermingled. To understand adequately the meaning of the supposedly inexorable, inevitable, and necessary laws of capitalist production, we must briefly return to Hegel's concepts of necessity and contingency. This requires an elaboration on the theme of temporality as it is applied to methods. Hegel states in his *Logic* that

> Absolute Necessity then is the truth into which Actuality and Possibility in general pass back, as well as Formal and Real Necessity. -The truth was reached that Absolute Necessity is Being which in its negation--in Essence--relates itself to itself and is Being. It is simple immediacy or pure Being as much as simple intro-Reflection or pure Essence: it is the fact of the identity of these two.[52]

Thus, for Hegel, absolute necessity is the form of the unity of pure Being and essence, *i.e.*, it is the actuality and possibilities that lie inherent in the Concept which form the necessity of the contingent. Contingency is then only the immediate form of necessity. Compare

these ideas of contingency, possibility, and necessity in the Concept to Marx' ideas concerning capital and the laws of capitalist accumulation and surplus exploitation.

> ... so that it involves changes in the average organic composition of the total capital of a certain society, then the gradual growth of constant capital in relation to variable capital *must necessarily* lead to a gradual fall of the general rate of profit, so long as the rate of surplus-value, or the rate of exploitation of labor by capital, remain the same.[53] (emphasis added)

The universal necessity of the rise in organic composition of capital and the fall of the rate of profit are contingent upon the sociological model that Marx creates to understand the class system of production, division of labor, the technization of industry, and market competition. He has abstracted from the historical occurrences by creating an abstract model in which there is no increase in the rate of surplus value when there is an increase in the organic composition of capital (technological development). There is an essential methodological assumption involved here. It is used in order for Marx to concentrate on both the effects of the increasing use of machinery, technology, and modern science in the production process and also to emphasize the possible countermeasures that could be taken to increase the rate of surplus value and avoid an economic crisis. He continues on the next page.

> The progressive tendency of the general rate of profit to fall is, therefore, just an expression peculiar to the capitalist mode of production of the progressive development of the social productivity of labor. This does not mean to say that the rate of profit may not fall temporarily for other reasons. But proceeding from the nature of the capitalist mode of production, it is *thereby proved a logical necessity* that in its development the general average rate of surplus-value must express itself in a falling general rate of profit.[54] (emphasis added)

Marx' law of the tendential fall in the rate of profit, the law upon which the famous "breakdown thesis" has depended is in fact a law of "logical necessity" and not historical necessity. The critical method produces an iron law of the Concept; it is expressed in history, but not necessarily in any direct manner. It is a law that has developed out of the inner structure of the logic and categories of capitalism itself. Its historical realization and objectification must await the actual economic crisis and the self-conscious revolutionary subject which brings it about. The distinction between crisis and contradiction mirrors that be-

tween history and logic. Crises are the historical manifestation (objectification) of the logic of capital. The two different methods used to understand crises and contradictions have different meta-theoretical assumptions about method, time, and reality (Chapters One, Two and Three, respectively).

Therefore, the contradiction between *Realisierungsschwierigkeiten* (problems of capital realization) and *Verwertungsschwierigkeiten* (problems of accumulation of surplus value)[55], upon which the ultimate breakdown of the capitalist system rests and which are ultimately linked to the initial contradictions of the commodity (the beginning therefore is both commodity and capital), are investigated by Marx from the perspective of the movement of the Concept and not from the perspective of the movement of history. "Marx himself pointed out that the abstract scheme of capital development was not enough to provide any predictions about the actual world. All crises in capitalism must be explained out of the given, empirical conditions. ..."[56] The actual economic downturns, recessions, and depressions must be examined and explained only after rigorous historical analysis of the interrelationships between the various social substructures. The fact that there are contradictions which cannot be historically transcended can, however, be examined through the logic of the system itself.

As Mattick writes, the laws of capital - the falling rate of profit and the increasing difficulty for the realization of surplus value out of unpaid labor - are laws of the Concept. Though the specifics of the laws themselves will be examined in the next sections of this chapter, what is important here is their ontological status as laws. They represent the inner workings and the development of the categories of commodity, money, and capital; they are universal and necessary for capitalist societies. They do not necessarily represent the actual conflicts at work in society, because they are "logical conclusions drawn from a model ... which do not exhaust the concrete capitalist world."[57] These must be balanced by the counteracting historical tendencies which the system uses to restabilize itself over time through increased exploitations, state interventionism, technological and scientific advancement, overseas investment and imperialism, *etc.*[58] The ability to readjust to crises and stabilize itself through various macro-economic countermeasures is more closely examined in the third volume of *Capital.*

VI. FROM SIMPLE COMMODITY PRODUCTION TO CAPITALIST PRODUCTION

If the analysis of Marx' theory of the beginning is not difficult enough,

the actual beginning of an analysis of *Capital* certainly is. Marx begins by recognizing that the wealth of nations lies in their accumulated commodities. Thus the analysis of the single commodity, its basic unit, is the beginning point for Marx. However, one must also recognize that the true beginning is also the end or at least contains the end implicit within its own potentiality or dialectical logic. The commodity we are told is a useful object existing outside of us, which satisfies human wants and may be viewed from the perspective of both quantity and quality. Marx now begins to unpack his analysis of the simple commodity in terms of both its quantitative and qualitative aspects. A commodity has both a specific use-value that is completed in the process of consumption and a value in the process of exchange. It can be bought and sold for a determinate quantity of another commodity.[59] While Marx begins the analysis of the commodity in terms of consumption and exchange and the quantitative side of these processes, what truly interests him is the qualitative side of the social relations of production. Having an exchange-value on the market, the commodity is an abstraction from its specific characteristics and specific use-value intended to satisfy human wants. It then becomes a quantitative measure for the possibility of an equal exchange. "If we make abstraction from its use-value, we make abstraction at the same time from the material elements and shapes that make the product a use-value. Its existence as a material thing is put out of sight."[60] This is a quite complex sentence for it contains a statement about the methodological character of the dialectic. Though he begins to use a specific quantitative object having utilitarian value in a capitalist society, the object itself is only an abstraction - a methodological abstraction and a sociological abstraction. The product is abstracted from its utility, from the character of labor that made the object, from the social relations of production that underlay the whole productive process that result in the creation of exchange-value, and finally, from the method that dialectically proceeds from the abstract to the concrete determinations of the Concept.[61]

While political economy begins with the population of a particular country and then proceeds to analyze the classes, town and country, sea, the different branches of production, consumption, and prices, Marx claims that these are only abstractions for they fail to capture the underlying social determinations that lie in the process of production and the production of abstract labor.[62] These are broad universal categories in which all societies take part, but they are abstract because the sociological foundations upon which they are built are left unanalyzed - the whole theory of value and the social relations of production of abstract labor. Abstraction is a sociological phenomenon characteristic of the labor process in capitalist societies. Exchange-

value is the crystalization of the social substance of capitalist social relations of production, *i.e.*, those processes which create "homogenous human labor".

> In a commodity-producing society, then, and in a commodity-producing society alone, the social character of each producer's labour manifests itself in the fact that this labour "ranks on an equality with that of all others" - *i.e.*, is reduced to abstract labour. And "the social character that this particular labour has of being equal to all other particular kinds of labour, takes the form that all the physically different articles that are products of labour, have one common quality, *viz.*, that of having value." [63]

This abstract labor, resulting from the leveling of talents and skills by the mechanization and the division of labor within the capitalist mode of production, ends in the creation of a uniform, homogeneous labor. It is the latter which creates value and only within the capitalist mode of production does this type of social relations of production come to dominate. The domination of the character of production by this social form will also affect the character of its distribution, exchange, and consumption.

For the next 140 pages Marx examines the various forms that the process of abstraction and fetishism take. It is the surface play within the "Free-trader Vulgaris" and in it lies the foundation of the bourgeois theory of the innate rights of man. In this study of simple exchange between two commodity owners Marx finds the basis for the principles of freedom, equality, and property. That is, the uncoerced freedom of exchange in the market by two owners of commodities interested only in the satisfaction of their individual interests is the foundation of liberalism. For Marx this vulgar system must give way to the analysis of the process of the production of commodities. As he moves from the process of exchange to the process of production, Marx will enter the world of the capitalist. "We shall at last force the secret of profit making."[64] And it is this world which is the world of alienation and economic exploitation. Marx will also now move from his general theory of labor to his theory of surplus-value and the heart of his theory of profit making.

The section on the fetishism of the commodity is also a crucial methodological section in *Capital*. Marx' argument is that there is a relationship between the process of abstraction and leveling in the workplace (production) and the leveling in interpersonal relations in the marketplace (distribution and exchange). When individuals are turned into commodities and become simply means to a profitable end in the market, interpersonal relationships become an interaction between the

commodities or things themselves. "The relations connecting the labour of one individual with that of the rest appear, not as direct social relations between individuals at work, but as what they really are, material relations between persons and social relations between things."[65] It is a process arrived at by abstracting from the quality and distinctiveness of the labor and reducing everything to "their common denominator, *viz*, expenditure of human labour-power or human labour in the abstract".[66] This is the result of the Industrial Revolution, the process of mechanization, and the new technology of the workplace. However, it is really the result of the revolution in the nature of private property, ownership, and ultimately in the social relations of production flowing from the new class structure of industrial capitalism. Thus the process of abstraction is an actual historical process which has important social psychological, meta-theoretical, and ethical implications.

From within the context of German Idealism, the section dealing with the fetishism of the commodities in *Capital* may be viewed as a moral critique of a society which treats individuals as means rather than as ends in themselves (Kant's moral imperative) and a critique of the forms of rationality and self-consciousness possible within this social interaction (Hegel). However, while representing these elements, it is also a key methodological statement regarding the nature of the categories used in political economy. The latter can only study and analyze the surface appearances of the social system, for it is portrayed as a mechanical, mathematical, and lawlike relationship between things - supply and demand, prices and the market, wages and merit, success and competition, social mobility and effort, and business cycle and competition (the innate structure of the system). Marx recognizes that these appearances do not represent the reality of the social system, but are, in effect, theological and metaphysical constructs.

> In order, therefore to find an analogy, we must have recourse to the mist-enveloped regions of the religious world. In that world the production of the human brain appear as independent beings endowed with life, and entering into relation both with one another and the human race.[67]

In fact, these become the world of ideology, of appearances and relationships which do not reach to the heart of the underlying class system and power relations of capitalism. The market is viewed as real and having a life of its own without the realization that it is an historical product and thus a creation of human hands. The resulting inequality, decisions, values, and class structure are also seen to result from the impartial rationality of the market mechanism itself. Theories are generated to rationalize this process and give it cultural significance.

But it was Marx who saw that underneath the appearances lay economic exploitation, the alienating workplace, class structure, and the power of the private ownership of the means of production. From this perspective the section on fetishism becomes an analysis of the historical and sociological foundations of the method of the critique of political economy. That is, the nature of labor abstraction, social interaction in a capitalist society, and the methodological problems created by them, force Marx to develop a dialectical critique which captures the essential structures of the system and not its mere appearances. Modern British political economy does not capture these hidden relationships and essential relations. This has been a main theme of Marx' since the *Paris Manuscripts*, when he writes:

> Political economy begins with the fact of private property; it does not explain it. It conceives the *material* process of private property, as this occurs in reality, in general and abstract formulas which then serves as laws. It does not *comprehend* these laws; that is, it does not show how they arise out of the nature of private property. Political economy provides no explanation of the basis for the distinction of labour from capital, of capital from land.[68]

Even at this early stage in his methodological development he recognized that political economy could only deal with the immediate facts abstracted into universal laws without comprehending the social relations of the workplace which ground the contractual relations of private ownership. Distribution is only the expression of exchange resulting from the prior divisions in production.[69] These structural developments necessitate an alteration in the method of gaining insight into the essential sociological structures of the appearances reflected in private property relations. Thus the critique of fetishism is also a critique of positivism with its emphasis on the "factual" and on the "immediately given" social world. Bourgeois science merely encourages the "myth of the given". At the end of the first chapter Marx makes a very interesting notation that the main reason for the failure of classical political economy was its inability to examine the historical and structural forms under which exchange-value is produced - wage-labor and exchange in its capital-form. As we have already seen Marx in a footnote at the end of the first chapter of *Capital* clearly indicates that his dialectical method is itself historical and only applicable to capitalist societies where the economic and material interests and structures of the law of value predominate. This is not true of the medieval and classical societies.[70]

The second part of Marx' methodological discussion lies at the end of Part Two in the first volume of *Capital.* Here he outlines the values

and ideology of a simple market exchange between equal owners of commodities. In this model of the simple market and exchange mechanism, the traditional liberal values of the market are stated.[71] Freedom to purchase or sell, equality of participants in the exchange, property as saleable commodities, and the system based on self-interest and utilitarian values are the structural and cultural limits of this new system. These are the values Marx will use in his analysis and critique of the capitalist social system itself. They are the values used to justify the moral foundation of the political economy and will be the values used as the normative standards by which to measure that system. Therefore, in these two methodological sections of *Capital*, Marx has given strong indications, no matter how obscure, that his approach would involve the following: a critique of fetishized objectivity (methodological objectivity) and traditional science (positivism), an analysis of the underlying essential productive/social relations, and an immanent critique of liberal economics, political philosophy, and liberal institutions using as his critical standard, not externally imposed norms, but the values of utilitarian liberalism itself. As Marx said at the end of Part II, the capitalist and his defense of the free exchange "has nothing to hide but - a hiding"[72], that is, has nothing to hide except the actual social relations of production which form the real basis for the exchange process. Marx has established the methodological justification and importance of his dialectical critique based on his critique of false objectivity and false consciousness (ideology) of the liberal system. The framework has been established for the development of his theory of surplus value and it is upon this theory that his distinction between paid and unpaid labor, constant and variable capital, the rate of surplus value and the rate of profit will be based. The logical context for the economic crises has been theoretically structured.

In his *Studies in the Labor Theory of Value* Ronald Meeks states that there are three major themes running throughout *Capital*: to show how the relations of production determine the consumption, distribution, and exchange of the social system; to compare and analyze the development of society from simple commodity production to capitalist commodity production; and, finally, to examine how the law of value operates in these two types of systems.[73] The first two themes are developed within the first volume of *Capital*, but the third is the most difficult, since it involves the clarification of the relationship, within the general theory of value, between surplus value and the rate of surplus value, on the one hand, and the price of production and the rate of profit, on the other. It involves the description of "the concrete forms which grow out of the movements of capital as a whole" and with the forms as they appear in "their actual movements".[74] That is, it is the comparison of the abstract law from Volume One with its imple-

mentation in a competitive capitalist society.

> But capitalism, having once found a foothold, soon proceeds to modify the way in which the law of value operates. The extension and intensification of capitalist competition leads to the formation of an average rate of profit, which means that equilibrium exchange ratios begin to diverge from embodied labour ratios in all cases where the organic composition of the capitals concerned is different. Commodities tend now to sell in proportion to their "prices of production" instead of in proportion to their "values".[75]

The distinction and derivation of profits from surplus value, resulting from the change from a society based on simple commodity production to one based on capital production, begins the process whereby logic and history are reconnected. At this point it is accomplished in theory only. The abstract theory of value of Volume One is connected to the economic crises of a competitive market economy in Volume Three. This structural and value distinction between surplus value and profits, which involve a closer look at the mechanism of the capitalist market, *e.g.,* the changes in the nature of the process of rationalization, technology used, and the relationships between labor and capital (technical composition and the organic composition of capital), lead to more complex distinctions between the rate of economic exploitation of labor (rate of surplus value) and the actual return on investments in the economy. This split between the appearances (profits) and their essence (surplus extraction), developing from the technological and social logic of competition, results, after a very complicated analysis by Marx, in the overproduction of capital and commodities, *i.e.*, an economic crisis of production and consumption traceable to a decline in the rate of profit. Profits are not synonymous with surplus, mainly because of other costs in the production process necessitated by the competitive rationality of the system. It is this disjuncture between surplus and profits which connects Volumes One and Three and the labor theory of value with the economic crisis theory. This is foundation of the famous and on-going transformation debate.

For Marx the contradictions within capitalism between material production and value production, use-value and exchange-value, physical demand and effective demand, are really contradictions between the underlying social abstract form of capital and the economic infrastructure and its technological achievements. He has shown that the market rationality is itself irrational for it relies on self-defeating imperatives and institutions - one rationalizing the system as a mechanism for class control and the other for the purposes of rationalizing production. The distinction and contradiction between the social rela-

tions of production and the productive forces will push the system toward its logical conclusions into economic crisis (Concept). How the crisis appears in history is a job for the historian. All possible criteria for economic development are reduced to the logic of capital and surplus extraction, that is, to the demands of class domination.

VII. MARX' THEORY OF VALUE AND ECONOMIC CRISIS THEORY

The relationship between Marx' theory of value (socially necessary abstract labor) and economic crisis revolves around the the distinction between the rate of surplus value and the rate of profit. The rate of surplus value is characterized by the relation between S/V = surplus value (unpaid labor)/cost of variable capital (living labor), while the rate of profit is characterized by S/C = surplus value/Capital.[76] According to Marx, the rate of profit is just another way of measuring surplus value, but in terms of the total social capital (both constant and variable capital). Capital is understood as composing both variable (living labor) and constant capital (means of production). It should be noted here that the term "capital" is one of Marx' most difficult categories. Depending on where in his works the term appears and the particular substance of the discussion, capital generally refers to one of two ideas, which are intimately interconnected. They may be analytically separated in the text for purposes of analysis and intellectual high-lighting. Capital is defined as the means of production and its component parts, *i.e.*, control over labor, land, machinery, raw materials, *etc.*, and the struc- tural transformations in the production process which have permited their use in the creation of surplus value and profit.

The key idea which holds these relationships together, for Marx, is the notion of the "organic composition of capital". This notion contains the two elements of the technical relations of labor power (labor as a commodity) to the means of production and the value composition or price of these components of the means of production (wages and costs of the means of production). Thus the organic composition of capital as C/V entails both the technical and value composition of capital. The technical composition of labor is that relationship between labor power (variable capital) and the means of production (constant capital), which is necessary to produce a definite quantity of products in a specific amount of time. The value composition of capital is this same relationship between variable and constant capital viewed from the perspective of their relative costs (value composition). The technical and value composition of capital reflects the relationships between the same two components of the production process, but from different interests

- one of immediate production and the other of the value of the component parts. What fascinates Marx is that, with a constant rate of economic exploitation (rate of surplus value is kept constant), a change in the nature of the organic composition of capital, *i.e.*, a change in the relationship between labor and the technological foundations of material production, there will be a change in the rate of profit. Since surplus value, which is the invisible and hidden essence of profits[77], is calculated on the basis of a different set of criteria than the rate of profit, a change in the organic composition of capital over time in response to particular historical demands of the competitive market economy, will result in different rates for both.

> Capitals of the same magnitude operating for the same working-time and with the same degree of exploitation may produce very much different amounts of profit, because of surplus-value, for the reason that a difference in the organic composition of capital in different spheres of production implies a difference in their variable part, thus a difference in the quantities of living labour set in motion by them, and therefore also a difference in the quantities of surplus-labour appropriated by them.[78]

There are organic differences in the values of capital resulting from the different industries, the different levels of national industrial development, and the different developments over time within the same industry. Changes in the relationships between variable capital (labor) and constant capital (means of production) will affect differently the rates of surplus value and the rates of profit. Marx argues that it is a law of development within capitalism that competition will force competitors to increase the amount of technology relative to the amount of labor in the organic composition of capital in order to produce more efficiently and productively and thus gain a competitive advantage. There is thus a progressive tendency, caused by the logic of capital and the market, to lead to a "gradual fall of the general rate of profit".[79] Though there will be a greater production of commodities, there will also be an historically proportionate decrease in labor necessary to produce an increased amount of use-value; this also results in a cheapening of the commodities and the socially necessary labor time to produce each. This is what Marx calls the "rising organic composition of capital". At the beginning of the section on 'The Law of the Tendency of the Rate of Profit to Fall' Marx examines the rate of profit in which the rate of surplus value remains constant at 100%, while the costs of the means of production increase mathematically from 50 all the way up to 400. Calculating the rate of profit as S/C , we see a gradual decline in the rate of profit from 66 2/3% to 20%.[80]

There is a relative decline in the amount of surplus value (unpaid labor) extracted when compared to the increased amount of technology. The increased technology, which sets in motion the living labor, results in a relative decline in the surplus labor (unpaid labor) appropriated and a relative decline in the rate of profit. Since the rate of surplus value is calculated on the basis of the relation between surplus labor and the costs for labor power, it will be different from the production of the rate of profit. The latter is calculated on the basis of the total social capital, *i.e.*, the relation between surplus labor and the costs for both variable and constant capital. A rising organic composition of capital would result in an increase in the absolute mass of surplus-labor, but a decrease in the rate of profit. This occurs at the same time as an increase in the mass of labor employed, surplus value produced, and the absolute mass of profits gained. This is Marx' notion of the tendential law of the diminishing returns of capital - as more labor and technology are thrown into production, the absolute amount of labor, surplus, and profits increases, while the rate of return on investment (profits) decreases. More labor and more machinery must be employed in order to remain competitive, but also to get more out of the system than was put in. It gets harder and harder for the owners of capital to justify their risks and investments, since their rate of return decreases even though their actual profits increase.

Schroyer analyzes this process as the contradiction between material production and value production; the former adding to the economic and productive infrastructure and the latter adding only to the production of value (surplus).[81] The rationality (or limits of rationality) of the system is expressed in terms of the latter, which, for Marx, was also a limit on the former. "The real barrier of capitalist production is capital itself."[82] The purpose of material production becomes reduced to value production and production becomes the goal of itself. With this, however, rationality and production are based only on their ability to reproduce themselves in capital and not to realize any trans-economic purposes. "Production is only for capital and not vice versa."[83] A decline in the rate of profit will result, for Marx, in the increasing difficulty of access to production from the outside (entry into the market becomes more difficult), increasing concentration of capital, and, ultimately, in the over-production of capital itself, resulting in further concentration. Profits are accumulated faster with a large concentration of capital and small rate of profit than a small amount of capital and a large rate of profit. This also tends to cause a further fall in the rate of profit. There is an over-production of capital and commodities, that is, it is an over-production in both production and consumption. They are two sides of the same coin. Marx was developing both an over-production and underconsumption theory by stressing the role of capital

in the process.

> Over-production of capital is never anything more than over-production of means of production - of means of labour and necessities of life - which may serve as capital, *i.e.*, may serve to exploit labour at a given degree of exploitation; a fall in the intensity of exploitation below a certain point, however, calls forth disturbances, and stoppages in the capitalist production process, crises, and destruction of capital.[84]

This over-production of the means of production also leads to an over-production of commodities. With the "functional stagnation" and the value depreciation of capital, paralysis of money exchange, collapse of the credit system, unemployment, there is also a crisis between consumption and production. The fatal flaw in the capitalist system is this contradiction which exists between two different sets of objective structural and economic imperatives within the same system. On one hand, the system is pushed by its own technological and market rationality to develop and rationalize its means of production, while at the same time structuring its production process according to the law of value. Within the capitalist mode of production there is a contradiction between the technological forces of production and "the specific conditions of production in which capital moves".[85] Marx is quite clear in arguing that the problem in over-production is not that there is too much technology in relation to the wants of the people, but rather, too little. This restriction on the use of technological rationality of the West lies in the barriers created from within capital itself. The system based on the law of value is irrational and contradictory.

These laws were "not formulated with reference to immediate social-economic reality but as structural tendencies of the totality of capitalist production".[86] They are the logical outgrowth of contradictions between the structural tendencies for technological rationality and the rationality of the law of value. These logical contradictions and possibilities, however, have already worked themselves out in history in different ways and different historical crises. This distinction between logical contradiction and historical crisis is Marx' way of developing Hegel's distinctions between consciousness and reality, concept and reality. This internal contradiction within the capitalist social relations of production is only an expression and dialectical development from the initial contradictions between use-value and exchange-value, concrete labor and abstract labor. Thus, the logical end of the system was already contained within its social totality - that is, within its initial contradictions found in the first chapter of Volume One of *Capital*, in the social nature of the commodity itself.

Against these logical tendencies which work themselves out in the historical world, there are real counteracting influences which affect the actual working of the tendential laws. The counterbalancing features of the economy which stabilize the market are: increasing intensity of exploitation, depression of wages below the value of labor-power, relative over-population, foreign trade, and an increase in stock capital.[87] The model Marx created for his analysis of the economic effects of his law of value assumed a constant rate of surplus value or exploitation in order to understand the workings of the system under the conditions of equilibrium. Throughout *Capital* Marx jumps out of his study of the logic of capital to examine the implications of his analysis for history or to give historical examples in order to clarify some point of the logic. The dialectic is constantly present. When one moves from logic to history the possibilities of intensifying the exploitation and expropriation of surplus from the workers increases through a variety of political and economic mechanisms, such as increasing the work time and work output, increasing the sophistication of the technology, introduction of child and female labor, lowering wages, consciously fostering and maintaining unemployment, creating a reserve army of unemployed, getting higher rates of profit overseas, and putting excess profits into interest-bearing stock. The concluding idea Marx wishes to leave the reader of *Capital* is that, in fact, all these mechanisms, including the market mechanism itself, are political arrangements created by class power and sustained by theoretical distortions and mystifications, which, while structurally and ideologically maintaining class hegemony, will never negate or transcend class logic.

CHAPTER FIVE

Against Epistemology and Foundationalism: From the Theory of Political Economy to Social Practice

I. INTRODUCTION

The central focus of this book has been on the meta-theoretical foundation of Marx' political economy as it develops from an analysis of epistemology to that of methodology and from method to the issue of scientific validation and social practice. Each part is a crucial link in the overall chain of issues as the crisis of science and epistemology pushes the argument from questions about the foundations of social science to those about 'theory and practice'. It is in this light that the relationship between 19th-century German Idealism and contemporary post-empiricist philosophy of science becomes very useful, for the latter too has gone through its own evaluation of the crisis of science. This chapter will continue the analysis of *Capital,* but not deal with the mechanics or internal logic of the work. Rather, it will examine the reasons behind the development of a social theory based on a dialectical critique of political economy and the epistemological and methodological necessity of building the idea of social practice into its own meta-theory. It has generally been assumed that the dialectical method was used simply because it conceptually captured best the internal conflicts and class divisions within capitalism. Though this is certainly true and thus part of the answer, the dialectical method and the methodological emphasis on both theory and practice are also responses to other internal, logical, epistemological, and methodological problems faced by Marx as a result of the critiques of science and epistemology generated by Hume and Hegel. In the following sections we will examine the development and implications of those critiques of epistemology and foundationalism. The crisis of epistemology and foundationalism occurs because science is incapable of justifying itself philosophically, since each attempt at justification requires its own new justification *ad infinitum.* This inability of social science to justify itself and its relationship to the social world are made even more difficult for Marx, since between the social world and social categories lie power relations, political domination, economic exploitation, and social repression. We are back to the 'dilemma of objective validity' as it occurs in the study of society. As a result of these problems the whole enterprise of both epistemology and foundationalism (foundation of the social sciences) will be seen as problematic, as will the view that we can have objective science from the traditional perspective (positivism).

Of special interest will be the examination of David Hume's critiques of science and the traditional justifications of deductive and inductive logic. These critiques of the philosophical foundations of science were the starting point for Hegel's formation of his dialectical logic and phenomenology. While Marx develops and expands this approach, his underlying philosophy of science and meta-theory of political economy will also presuppose similar critiques. In contemporary philosophy and sociology of science there is a similar return to Hume and the critiques of traditional epistemology and theories of foundationalism. The debates over the philosophical foundation and justification of the social sciences have had, in Europe especially, a profound impact on the development of social theories, which seek to analyze and evaluate the contemporary structures of political economy. As we have already seen a key theme which holds the 19th- and 20th-century intellectual traditions together is their common understanding of the difficulties of demarcation, *i.e.*, dealing with the relationships between concepts and reality. The ontological and logical status of the reference points of social categories and the difficulties associated with validation lie just below the surface in Marx' works. Since he did not develop an articulated meta-theory for his critique of epistemology or for his methodological justification of political economy, he will be examined in the context not only of Hume and Hegel, but also in relation to the modern tradition. Contemporary philosophy of science has developed the autonomous beginnings of a critique of epistemology and science - the post-empiricist philosophy of science of Quine, Kuhn, Feyerabend, Rorty, and Habermas.

The central methodological issue for both the 19th-century German tradition and the modern philosophical tradition has been 'the dilemma of objective validity' and the development of a consensus theory of truth.

> The problem which Hume raises here is simply that concerning the objective validity of the conceptual order of the mind. If one desires to defend a claim to certainty in knowledge pertaining to "matters of fact," it is incumbent upon him to show how the mind can impose its concepts upon the "matter of fact," upon the given of experience in such a manner as to guarantee that conceptual necessity will govern the given.[1]

It is the Humean problem refiltered through the works of Hegel, Marx, Popper, Adorno, Horkheimer, Sellars, and Quine. It is the critique of epistemology and foundationalism, the meta-theoretical difficulty of validating the categories of social consensus (social practice), which could potentially create a common bond between these seemingly

diverse intellectual traditions. This comparison of both traditions will supplement those dimensions missing from each, which could offer us surprising insights into the nature of the contemporary problems relating to epistemology, ethics, and political economy. Since many of Hegel's and Marx' critiques of science are similar to the modern tradition, the addition of the post-empiricist philosophy of science could supply missing elements in Marx' critique of traditional epistemology, his ideas on a critical and dialectical science, truth, and objectivity, and his notion that theory is always related to social practice. If not directly related to and clarifying Marx' position, they could very well point in the proper direction. On the other hand, Marx' political economy, his theory of false consciousness and ideology, and his theory of the good society could offer contemporary philosophy of science a way of articulating the historical and social context, within which modern science (and technology) is produced. It could put real substance in the *social* of 'social practice'. Both traditions argue that it is ultimately within a community consensus or social praxis that truth claims can be made and validated. This would represent the reconnecting of the links between philosophy and sociology (political economy), between concept and reality.

Both Marx and Habermas have argued that philosophical questions of morality and truth must ultimately become questions of social theory; both represent the strengths of the German traditions which stressed that the categorial content (*i.e.*, the structure of the categories of human knowledge and the structures of the options for moral choice) were determined or framed within the context of social interaction and the institutions of political economy. Traditional issues, such as those concerning moral choices, must become transformed into issues of social ethics (*Moralität* to *Sittlichkeit*), while those of epistemology must develop into a sociology of knowledge and social theory. Both morality and epistemology will be viewed by Marx as subareas of social theory. As Marx had said in the *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* - "it is not the consciousness of men which determines their existence, but social existence that determines their consciousness."[2] The question for each one of them becomes that of the justification of the relations between the conceptual order (morals and truth) and the real world.

In the First Thesis on Feuerbach, Marx undertook a critique of both materialism and idealism with an implicit critique of the epistemologies of empiricism and rationalism. That is, his critique centered around the nature of the objective world which is experienced in perception. However, it is in the second thesis that the epistemological question is clearly stated.

> The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory, but is a practical question. In practice man must prove the truth, that is, the reality and power the this-sidedness of his thinking. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question.[3]

A great deal has been written about Marx' concept of 'theory and practice', but little has been actually said. Much is simply the liturgical and ceremonial repetition of the notion that theory influences action and action theory. More sophisticated analyses delve into the sociology of knowledge, critique of ideology, and the meta-theory of the social sciences (Parekh).[4] Others attempt to differentiate between Marx' notion of praxis and pragmatism (Avineri, Kołakowski, Livergood, Hoffman and Goff)[5] and the different epistemological and anthropological assumptions in each. I would like to argue in this chapter that praxis involves not only the social structuring of the categories of experience and knowledge, but it also forms the principle for the criterion of knowledge itself. One could say that this is the most radical way of studying the issue. The 'Theses on Feuerbach' is too short and sometimes too enigmatic to sustain the weight of Marx' whole epistemology, especially when considering his later writings on political economy.

It is Habermas who correctly recognizes the 'dilemma of objective validity' and develops the first philosophical critique that incorporates strong Humean and Kantian elements. He correctly sees that Hegel's phenomenological critique (especially the 'Introduction' to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*) represents the first critique of epistemology and foundationalism from which the dialectical method develops.[6] It is his inability to extend this line of reasoning to Marx which undermines Habermas' own understanding and radicalization of the critical method. The direction he takes is a turn to a philosophy of language and away from political economy, away from the heart of a critical theory. However, it is this analysis of Hegel's critique of epistemology and foundationalism that sets the stage for a different understanding of the relations between thought and reality, consciousness and being. Habermas, following closely Hegel's analysis, presents as his central idea that the dialectic represents a radicalization of the Kantian method of critique and, even more importantly, an adequate response to the inability of philosophy to justify any epistemological reasoning whatsoever.

Hume had philosophically undermined both *a posteriori* reasoning and *a priori* reasoning, induction and deduction at the foundation of modern science. But it is Hegel who argues that epistemology is

logically impossible since every epistemological claim itself must be grounded in a further epistemological argument *ad infinitum*. Particular claims to universality and truth can no longer be justified in the traditional philosophical manner. Therefore, with the analysis of the dissolution of epistemology Hegel attempts to recover the abandoned stages of intellectual and cultural reflection, which Habermas contends had been repressed by analytic and instrumental reason, the process of rationalization of modern society, and even the inability of German social philosophy to realize its own radical potential.

II. DAVID HUME AND THE CRISIS OF MODERN SCIENCE

It is extremely difficult to overestimate the importance David Hume has had for modern philosophy and modern philosophy of science in particular. His penetrating analysis of the possible philosophical justifications for modern science left a real dilemma for later philosophers to handle the best way they could. In many instances the best way was simply to ignore those inconvenient portions of his analysis that would lead to a deep skepticism about the validity of modern science. His critiques of inductive and deductive reasoning had a crucial effect on the later developments in the German philosophy of Kant, Hegel, and Marx, and in the later philosophy of science. Though generally regarded as the most articulate defender of both empiricism and positivism by many contemporary philosophers, it can be argued that this is a very selective reading and interpretation of the thinker. Certainly someone like Karl Popper has used Hume to critique the legitimacy of inductive logic as the basis of science, while at the same time failing to see the real radical implications of his works.[7] A distinction should be made between the empirical and inductive foundation of scientific knowledge, the acquisition of the empirical "matters of fact" and the inductive foundation for the justification of that knowledge and validity of the conceptual order. How does one guarantee the conceptual necessity of the relationship between the empirical and the conceptual? It is this 'dilemma of objective validity' which will later frame Hegel's critique of epistemology and his dialectical method, Marx' critique of traditional epistemologies, his notion of 'theory and practice', and finally, the later arguments representing a critique of method (Feyerabend), a critique of privileged representations (Rorty), and the development of a consensus theory of truth (Apel and Habermas).

In 1748 Hume published *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* which began as a critique of the follies of metaphysics and popular superstitions and pushed toward the discovery of the "proper province of the mind" and the enquiry "into the nature of human

understanding".[8]

> It becomes, therefore, no inconsiderable part of science barely to know the different operations of the mind, to separate them from each other, to class them under their proper heads, and to correct all that seeming disorder, in which they lie involved, when made the object of reflection and inquiry.[9]

Just as philosophers had discovered the laws and principles of the planets, Hume undertook the discovery of those same relationships and principles in the mind and the connections between its various powers and faculties. It is in the second section of his work on the origins of ideas that Hume begins the process of reflecting on the structure of the human mind and its relation to the external world. He makes a distinction in the mind, based on the force and vivacity of all perceptions, between impressions of the senses and ideas. This distinction in Section Two will lead in Section Five to the distinction between objects of human reason as "matters of fact" and "relations of ideas".[10] Propositions of the latter kind are produced by the reflection of the mind and result in universal connections. Statements of geometry and algebra fall under this category and are produced by intuition or demonstrative logical certainty. That is, any statement of its opposite produces its own contradiction. Neither the method of acquisition of the objects of the mind nor the certainty of their truths are the same for "matter of fact" propositions. They, on the contrary, are not based on the logical integrity of the proposition and can entail their own opposites without contradiction. Therefore, the statement "without contradiction the sun will not rise tomorrow" does not contradict the statement "without contradiction the sun will rise tomorrow". This is quite different from saying two plus two equals five. In the former, the statement of one does not involve the logical contradiction of the other. It is here that Hume raises the crucial question for his study. "It may, therefore, be a subject worthy of curiosity, to inquire what is the nature of that evidence that assures us of any real existence and matter of fact beyond the present testimony of our senses, or the records of our memory."[11] If our knowledge of the external, physical world is to be scientific and involve universal and necessary laws, what will the connection be between the impressions of our experience and the conceptual theories of science? Since science does not deal with logical tautologies or analytic propositions, but the physical world, what is the connection between concepts and reality? What are the connections between the "matters of fact" and the philosophical justifications of those connections?

The division of the mind between impressions and reflections, the

divisions between the different types of objects of the mind, types of evidence for truth-claims, and also between different methods of acquisition ultimately lead to the 'dilemma of objective validity'.[12] Hume begins to answer the question he raises by recognizing that the essential condition for science rests with the relation between cause and effect, the relation between a perceived fact and its antecedent cause, *i.e.*, with the idea of necessity. He gives the example of the individual, who finding a watch on a desert island, concludes that there were once other men on the island. For Hume, the experience of a billiard game, the explosion of gunpowder, or the attraction of a magnet could never become the basis for a knowledge of causality. Deductive logic or *a priori* reasoning could not be the basis of scientific rationality.

> No object ever discovers, by the qualities which appear to the senses, either the causes which produced it, or the effects which will arise from it; nor can our reason, unassisted by experience, ever draw any inference concerning real existence and matter of fact.[13]

The cause of any event or "matter of fact" is impervious to scrutiny by an examination of the impressions of that fact. Thus, the ultimate principles of physics are impervious to the human mind. Having demonstrated that *a priori* reason is incapable of being the philosophical foundation of science, Hume re-asks the original question of his "dangerous dilemma" - "what is the nature of all our reasonings concerning matters of fact?"[14] He now turns his attention to the justification of causality through experience and induction. Although no one but a fool or madman would doubt the importance and authority of experience, Hume again begins to critique this justification of the basis of science. Although it first appears that experience is the basis of our knowledge of cause and effect, here, too, Hume argues that it cannot be philosophically justified, because "the proof of this last proposition by probable arguments, or arguments regarding existence, must be evidently going in a circle, and taking that for granted, which is the very point in question".[15] Philosophical proofs for inductive logic presuppose the validity of induction in the very proofs themselves; without these presuppositions, the validity of inductive reasoning could never be justified. That which is to be proved is assumed to be true from the start. With this line of reasoning, Hume undermines the validity of empiricism as he had previously the validity of rationalism. Finally, Hume concludes that all inferences and perceptions of causal relationships, which go beyond impressions and reflection, are grounded, not in reason, but custom or habit; that is, they are grounded in the nature of man or the natural propensity of man to perceive experience in this

manner. The foundation of science lies in human psychology and with it lies the crisis of science and Hume's skepticism. Science is incapable of grounding itself scientifically, but must rest upon an understanding of human nature. The stage is set for Hegel's critique of traditional science (positivism) and also his critique of the whole area of justifying science, *i.e.*, epistemology and foundationalism.

III. HEGEL AND MARX: FROM THE NEGATION OF SCIENCE TO THE NEGATION OF EPISTEMOLOGY

Some of the ideas just succinctly mentioned in Chapter One will now be expanded in order to show their implications for Marx' meta-theory and for his theory of truth and social praxis. The notion of 'critique' as the philosophical investigation into the limits of the categories of pure and practical reason, the meta-theoretical study of the natural sciences, and the conditions for the possibility of natural science, becomes transformed by Hegel into a critique of epistemology itself. Hegel develops his analysis by examining the sociological and historical foundations of epistemology and its claims to scientific validity by radicalizing the critical method. Habermas has said that epistemology cannot justify itself or its claims to knowledge, because epistemology is caught in a "bad contradiction". It assumes the validity of that which is necessary to prove first and ultimately, any attempt to justify epistemology must assume the validity of a prior epistemology *ad infinitum.* Therefore critique must become a critique of the whole of human experience and the self-conscious reflection on the historical conditions of objectification.[16] It must become a phenomenological reconstruction of the history of human experience.

> Epistemology presumes to take nothing for granted except its pure project of radically doubting. In truth it bases itself on a critical consciousness that is the result of an entire process of self-formation. Thus it is the beneficiary of a stage of reflection that it does not admit and therefore also cannot legitimate.[17]

Habermas holds that Hegel traced this self-formative process of consciousness through the complete stages of the evolutionary cultural history of mankind. He analytically demarcates the process into the history of mankind, the socialization of the individual, and the formation of the absolute mind in religion, art, and science. "By reconstructing the self-formative process of consciousness, the critique of knowledge observes how at every stage the standards of the preceding one disintegrate and new ones arise."[18] Schroyer calls this the phe-

nomenological reconstructive method of Hegel, which seeks through the critique of positivism and reification (false objectivity) historically to reconstruct the objectification of human knowledge and experience as the interaction of the Subject and Object.[19] Therefore, science becomes grounded in a reflection on its own self-formative process within the context of the social totality. Hegel extends the notion of 'critique' to the social and historical totality of everyday life.

This becomes the central methodological structure and meaning of science for Marx, who extends this method to the analysis of the ultimate contradictions inherent in the capitalist system. He examines the categories and structures (logic and history) of political economy. Dialectical concepts and critical science deal with the immanent critique of logical contradictions, the transformative method, and the contradiction between ideology and social reality. Marx, thus, has a radically different view of the nature of science, its range of applicability, and its ultimate cognitive goals. It also reveals he has a completely different conceptualization of the future in terms of how it relates to scientific investigation. The concepts and theories of critical science were not designed to inquire into the future; they were designed to reflect upon the internal logical-historical order of the capitalist system. From the transcendental categories of Kant and the dialectical categories of Hegel to the political economy of Marx there developed a perspective of truth such that "truth is a characteristic of Being and not knowledge since the objects are true only when they are what they should be, "wenn ihre Realität ihrem Begriff entspricht".[20]

As Hegel had examined the genesis and origins of knowledge and objectivity through a phenomenological reconstruction of human experience, Marx develops his 'critique' as both the categorial and phenomenological reconstruction of the formation of capital and the historical structures of capitalism.[21] Hegel had recognized the 'dilemma of epistemology', which in order to establish the conditions for the possibility of knowledge first had to establish its own First Philosophy; without the latter there could be no justification of epistemology, which would also have required another epistemology for its own justification. Habermas states:

> ... Hegel perceives that Kant's critique of consciousness commences with a consciousness that is not transparent to itself. The observing consciousness of phenomenology knows that it itself is incorporated in the experience of reflection as one of its elements.[22]

Hegel, therefore, found it necessary to replace epistemology with phenomenological reflection of self-consciousness. The *Phenomenology* is the story of the genesis of modern self-consciousness as it

evolves through its natural, cultural, and political environment. Hegel had thus negated the whole philosophical enterprise of Kantian epistemology and had moved the issue of the formation of consciousness, knowledge, and truth-claims into the arena of social interaction. The way out of the dilemma is for consciousness to make epistemology itself an object of critical reflection. Transcendental consciousness and the objects of experience become moments in the formation of self-consciousness, but, unfortunately for Hegel, this occurs within the framework of the Absolute, which immunizes the whole process from critique itself. This is the reason the dialectic was created; it was used as an epistemological and methodological response to the 'dilemma of objective validity' and the 'dilemma of epistemology'. If there was no true beginning (for every beginning presupposes a philosophically unjustifiable beginning), then the transformation and development of consciousness itself became the only justifiable method. The *Phenomenology* began with the simplest form of experience, while *Capital* began with the simplest form of capitalist relationships as commodity production. The 'dilemma of objective validity' is preceded by the dilemma of the beginning.

The analysis of the critique of epistemology along with Hegel's theory of reflection and objectivity will give us a better insight into the potentials of Marx' political economy. They represent methodological implications for the dialectical method used in political economy, since without them the reasoning behind the critique and its application become confused. Marx applied both Hegel's theory of objectivity and critique of epistemology to the examination of capital . He held that in order to understand capital adequately it was necessary to reconstruct the origins and development of the logical/historical preconditions of capital in terms of commodity exchange and a money economy. Hegel's critique of epistemology undermined any possibility, for Marx, of analyzing capitalism from the perspective of the traditional social sciences with their epistemologically unacceptable presuppositions. Only by the necessary unfolding of the logic of the categories necessary for capital, as they develop from one level to another, is the structural whole of capital really understood. The dialectic is an integrative aspect of Marx' study of capitalism and not a metaphysical hold-over from his earlier Hegelian infatuation; it also resulted from Hegel's devastating critique of epistemology and the necessity of constructing a new science of political economy with this in mind.

IV. MARX' THEORY OF TRUTH

There are nine component parts to Marx' theory of truth, all of which

have been analyzed by other theorists before. However, the secret to an understanding of Marx' method lies in the answer to how they all fit together and why they are necessary in the first place. Marx did not mechanically take over a metaphysical system from Hegel or his critics in order to make it relevant for an examination of political economy. Rather the logic of both his and Hegel's critique of the traditional theories of truth and science forced Marx to construct a 'science' of political economy which could transcend the weaknesses of traditional meta-theory (positivism); they were the response to real problems inherited from the 18th century. The components of Marx' theory of truth are as follows: (1) a critique of traditional epistemology and notions of objective validity, and a *critique of foundationalism*; (2) the analysis of the development of consciousness and political economy of capitalism in *history*; (3) an analysis of the cultural and social context of this development - *sociology*; (4) a critique of traditional theories of political economy by an examination of the breakdown of their false claims to universality and truth (*ideology*) through an *immanent critique* of their theories; (5) analysis of capitalism within the broadest possible framework of social structures - *social totality*; (6) analysis of the dialectical unfolding of consciousness and the structures of political economy and their ramifications for self-consciousness in terms of the *contradictions* of the social formation; (7) creation of the context and categories of reflection and also the possibilities for social change - *praxis*; (8) given our understanding of the first element of a theory of truth as a critique of epistemology and foundationalism, the ultimate validity and purpose of social theory is political action and political wisdom (*phronesis* of Aristotle); (9) an implicit development of a theory of the good life based on the concepts of species-being and alienation - *teleology*.

This analytic breakdown of the components of Marx' notion of truth can be further interpreted as specific responses to the 'dilemma of objective validity', the critique of epistemology, and the dangers of political ideology. The first component with its analysis of the critique of epistemology and foundationalism is a response to the initial critique of science developed by Hume (number 1). The historical, sociological, and ideology critique (numbers 2, 3, and 4) are the responses Marx saw necessary to deal adequately with the ahistorical and asocial weaknesses inherent in classical political economy; the dialectical method, the use of immanent critique through the analysis of society's own internal contradictions, and the methodological application of social totality were the methodological responses to the problems created in defining and justifying truth after the Hegelian critique of epistemology (numbers 4, 5, and 6); and finally the concept of praxis, as an epistemological and methodological category in his later writings, is Marx' response to the problems created by the universalism in Hegel's Absolute Spirit and the

difficulties of making valid truth-claims, given the historical relativity resulting from his above critiques of Hegel and science (numbers 7, 8, and 9).

The interesting thing about this analysis is that each category from one to nine represents a specific methodological response to the theories and problems created by the preceding category. Thus, they are not randomly thrown together, nor is Marx' method an interesting meta-physical construct within a complex philosophical system, but rather, his method is necessitated by the contradictions and dilemmas within traditional philosophy and social science. The importance of history, society, immanent critique of ideology, totality, the dialectic, emphasis on contradictions and conflict, teleology, and praxis as social change are fundamentally necessary due to the false consciousness and distortions of classical economics and science and the critiques of Hume and Hegel. Since Marx does not deal specifically with an articulated theory of truth, our analysis must piece it together from a variety of dispersed fragments, his ideas in the *Grundrisse* and *Capital*, and a good deal of studied speculation. His theory of truth is extremely complex for it lies at the intersection of his critique of traditional theories of epistemology, his notion of 'theory and practice', his dialectical critique of political economy, and finally, his theory of the good society; the last component is a synthesis of his notion of species-life from the *Paris Manuscripts*, his ideas of human emancipation from both the 'On the Jewish Question' and 'Critique of the Gotha Program', and the historical goal of self-realization in the *Grundrisse*. Thus Marx' theory of truth is closely tied to his critique of political economy and his theory of the good society; his theory of truth, as we will see, is tied to a consensus theory of truth within the framework of a social theory of the good society. There is, thus, agreement with Habermas' view that Marx moves from epistemology to social theory, but there is major disagreement over the nature of social theory. Habermas stresses the early Marx, while the argument in this chapter connects the early Marx to the Marx of the *Grundrisse* and *Capital*.

Colletti's examination of the German Idealist tradition reveals a distinctive theory of objectivity, which argues that objectivity "cannot be what is immediately apprehended by sensation, but something which, in order to be established and recognized must make use of rational criteria - *i.e.*, of mediation and therefore, beyond any doubt, of deduction itself."[23] Marx further developed Hegel's theory of objectivity with the development of his ideas on fetishism. The notion of fetishism may be understood as an extension of Marx' concerns about alienation in his early manuscripts to a meta-critique of social science in his later ones; coming at the end of the first chapter of *Capital* the statement on fetishism was a critique of reified categories and

positivism in economics.[24] It represents a critique of the ahistorical and asocial categories used in bourgeois social theory, especially in the natural rights tradition. From the questions of rights, freedom, social interaction, and capital-labor relations Marx was aware that the perception and experience of society was already pre-formed by the social structures and relations from within a particular historical mode of production. This had to be taken into consideration when building a new political economy.

From one perspective fetishism is Marx' expression of his insight into a sociology of knowledge and its methodological implications, which he first began to development in his analysis of social praxis in the *Paris Manuscripts*.[25] There the social reality is ideally created in the process whereby nature is humanized and man naturalized in the process by which human needs are satisfied through social labor. The world is thus pre-structured and pre-formed by the objectifications of a specific set of social relations of production, the restrictions and limits of the legal system, and the ideological forms of this social reality. Any science which simply reflects this set of complex historical relationships itself, emphasizing the appearance of the rationality of the market or the equality of exchange between the buyer and seller of labor, becomes an ideology, because it does not understand the structuring process of the underlying social relations of domination and class by which the empirical reality is created and then repressed. Marx, like Hegel, is interested in the development of the Concept and not simply the analysis of the historical development of society.

The method he uses is a self-conscious reflective critique of sociological reification (in the fields of ethics, logic, science, method and history). The truth of science lies in mediated self-consciousness or the recognition of the internal limitations of the categorial structures of political economy. Science, therefore, for both Hegel and Marx, is the self-movement of the Concept from reality to actuality, immediacy to mediacy, from "having beenness" of posited Being to the unfolding of its own laws of development in the present. Science can, therefore, only be reflective rather than projective. Marx does not have a categorial structure capable of predicting the future development of capitalism, only its logical (essential) limits. It might be objected that he does have an analysis in the third volume of *Capital* on the development of the natural laws of capitalism that entails the growing immiseration of the working class, the law of the concentration and centralization of capital, the law of the increasing severity of cyclical crises, the law of the rising organic composition of capital, and the tendential fall in the rate of profit.[26] However, as we have seen in the previous chapter, it is important to distinguish between a contradiction and an actual historical crisis (examples of the latter would involve the development of the

reserve army of unemployed, under-consumption, over-production, falling profits, *etc.*). The former involves a logical conflict inherent in the categories of political economy which can never be transcended, while the latter is a contingent crisis which can be historically overcome. Contradictions manifest themselves in historical crises and will always be inherent in the capitalist system. When one combines Marx' analysis of the methodology of political economy and his examination of the tendential laws of capitalism we can begin to see that Marx' notion of science remains tied to the *Begriff*.

V. MARX' DILEMMA OF OBJECTIVE VALIDITY AND TRUTH AS SOCIAL PRAXIS

We have examined the meta-theoretical assumptions implicit in the dialectical method and his theory of truth, especially those assumptions relating to a theory of objectivity and a critique of epistemology. There have been many attempts to clarify Marx' notion of praxis and its relation to truth and science. Some have argued that Marx held a utilitarian, pragmatic, positivistic, correspondence, modified correspondence, and even an idealist view of truth.[27] There seems to be more agreement over the role praxis plays in a philosophical anthropology or a sociology of knowledge than in epistemology. Parekh argues that Marx' notion of praxis is crucial for an understanding of a variety of aspects of Marx' social theory, except the criterion of truth.

> In such cases the theory creates its own truth, or rather makes itself true by bringing the world into harmony with itself. A theory does not helplessly attend upon reality and passively await its judgement; it enters and shapes the world, and participates in the determination of its own truth and falsity.[28]

However, further on he writes:"Praxis creates new reality but can never be the criterion of truth. Only the reality is the criterion of truth."[29] The question is what is reality and how do you conceptually get to it? Kołakowski argues that there evolved in the nineteenth century two conflicting views of truth; one is the positivistic Marxism proposed by Engels, while the other is the pragmatism of William James.[30] While the first definition of truth is compatible with the classical definition, in which the correctness of a theory is measured by its ability to correspond to a pre-existing reality; the second definition is a biological definition based on the principle of organic adaptation, which assumes that success is its own criterion of truth. There seems to be a subtle and sensitive treatment of the notion of praxis in the early manuscripts of

Marx, but the later works are generally treated within the framework of a scientific positivism. However, neither position is in any way compatible with our present discussion of Marx' methodology/epistemology in the *Grundrisse* and *Capital*. All the Hegelian elements and their implications in each of the subsections of this book would have to be explained in a different way or simply explained away. Even as astute an observer as Richard Bernstein in analyzing the notion of praxis writes on one page in his *Praxis and Action* that the criterion of the correctness of a particular theory is its ability to bring human problems to self-consciousness, while on the next page he argues that it is the correctness of the analysis which will bring about revolutionary consciousness.[31] Does the truth lie in the subjective moment of self-consciousness or the objective moment of a correspondence to social reality? Is the key to an unlocking of Marx' ideas philosophical reflection, scientism, or practical action? A response to the above is that all these different theories generally presuppose the traditional epistemological antinomy between subjectivity and objectivity, the differences being only a one-sided emphasis on a single aspect of the dichotomy.

Those authors who argue that praxis does become a criterion of truth generally refer to the 'Theses on Feuerbach' and Marx' comment that "the question whether objective truth is an attribute of human thinking is not a theoretical question, but a *practical* question".[32] There are a couple of problems with letting such a short piece carry so much weight in Marx' epistemology. Its location in the chronology of Marx' writings have led many to argue that it represents a product of his early philosophical speculation, which had been transcended by his later positivistic writings. Second, this passage could refer to the creation of the subjective and objective elements within the process of knowledge formation, but not to the ultimate criterion of that process; praxis determines the particular components or objects in the creation of truth, but not truth itself. The social reality and the categories of self-consciousness are formed through an historical praxis, but praxis does not become epistemology and certainly not social theory. Both of these arguments contain valid critiques. This is why any argument defining praxis as the epistemological justification of social knowledge must come from within the logic and meta-theory of Marx' critique of political economy in *Capital*. From the analysis of Marx' methodology in his later works, the assumptions underlying the dialectical method, and the necessity for the application of that particular method as opposed to traditional approaches to the social sciences, there are clear indications that praxis had to be a crucial part of the criterion of truth. Once the traditional framework of epistemology and the relation between knowledge and reality had been undermined by Marx' analysis of the social constitution of reality, his meta-theory of fetishism and its

critique of appearances, and his view of science, as both 'critique' and the dialectical self-movement of the Concept, praxis and the actual methodology of *Capital* had to take on a different meaning.

For Hegel phenomenological self-reflection was an attempt to transcend the limitations and contradictions of Kant's transcendental self and the epistemology and metaphysics of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. All the assumptions of this critique were to be examined within the context of the development of self-consciousness itself. Kant's key ideas were to become simple moments in the development of Hegel's Absolute Spirit. Marx transformed this imperative of the phenomenological critique in order to analyze and undermine the assumptions of bourgeois economics which were then taken as givens. The reality of the market, the freedom and liberty of exchange, the ontological priority of possessive individualism, and the myth of the given were to become negated categories and moments in the self-development of class consciousness. The social relations and power relations of a class dominated society would now be seen to make up the essential structure of capitalist society. Elements of Marx' notion of truth rest on the internal critique of bourgeois political economy, which entails revealing the inconsistencies and contradictions within the stated theory itself and also a comparison of theory to historical and anthropological reality.

But the major issue is - by what means is the objectivity of the historical reality and its essential structural components validated? What and where is the meta-theory which would justify this analysis and critique? Following the logic of the above analysis one is forced to conclude that the social reality is created and understood within the dialectical process between man and nature mediated by the historical social formations and modes of production. The subjective and objective components of knowledge are formed in this process of objectification and externalization (sociology of knowledge), but so too is the actual criterion of truth itself. This is the truly radical nature of Marx' notion of 'theory and praxis' and entails the development of an epistemology within the broader context of the structures of political economy, that is, it entails a developed theory of human emancipation and workers' democracy. Epistemology necessarily leads to social critique and political economy. This could well be the most important implication of Marx' methodology and his contribution to social theory. The fixation on one side of the subject/object dialectic or the return to an already disputed and problematic epistemology can not clarify the issue. Enlightenment as social praxis becomes the criterion of knowledge; the creation of a free society in which there are no restraints on the search and acquisition of knowledge, becomes the basis for truth. This is not a problem of a transcendental theory of communicative rationality or

analytic language theory, but an epistemological problem based in political economy.

One could respond that though this might take us one step further in our analysis, the question still remains - "Yes, but what is the criterion of this enlightenment?" We are back in the 'dilemma of the objective validity' of the categories of our experience. The answer is that this criticism itself falls back into the traditional epistemological framework. Knowledge is not a fetishized object to be owned, but the process of freeing the social individual to reach his/her potential; any restraint on this process leads to a false consciousness. Therefore, Marx' critique of political economy was an opening up of the limited ranges and scope of bourgeois categories and the penetration of the phenomenal experiences which would limit our cognitive and practical potential. This interpretation and approach to meta-critique and social praxis not only traces the continuity between the epistemological assumptions of Hegel and Marx, but also the continuity in the concept of praxis from the early to the later works. The continuity concerning the methodological implication of social practice is there, though some authors have become confused because of the relationship between praxis and labor. That to some extent is another level of analysis and another issue and should not be confused with this methodological question.

At this point in the analysis praxis has moved from an epistemological category to an ethical category of social theory. If praxis is the criterion of truth then the real question becomes: what are the political-economic institutions which would permit unrestrained social practice to take place - a society unrestrained by liberalism and its alienation, exploitation, fetishism, and ideological distortions. Epistemology leads to the realm of social ethics and deals with the economic and political structures of modern society, which destroy the species-being and the possibilities for both political and human emancipation. Ethics will be turned into a political economic critique (past and present) and the social praxis toward future social possibilities. It will also deal with the normative foundations of an analysis of society, its institutions and projected values (sociology of knowledge) and the social critique which arises from it (critique of ideology); it will form the heart of the normative understanding of all aspects of social relations from alienation and false consciousness to fetishism and ideology. As epistemology develops into social theory, ethics becomes the foundation for the analysis of the real potentials for social change through praxis.

Epistemology, because of its internal dynamic, was pushed beyond its own former limits as a theory of knowledge to a social theory, which had at its core a political economy and moral philosophy. Moral philosophy becomes the critique of political economy and the development of a theory of the good society within which democratic consensus and

free social practice is reached. Ethics, thus, is the completion of the change from epistemology to social theory; it is necessary to clarify the heart of the nature and structure of the historical institutions which make up social practice and, therefore, the possibility of truth. Truth and morality are joined with political economy in Marx' social theory. They become the basis for truly autonomous moral action.[33] This compatibility and synthesis of epistemology and ethics leads to a more comprehensive and fuller picture of Marx' intentions and actual methods. Ethics and epistemology are restored and united in Marx' political economy in *Capital*. Marx, like Hegel before him, had retained the Aristotelian distinctions between praxis and *techne*, *episteme* and *phronesis*, and science and ethics. With the critique of traditional epistemologies, theories of objectivity and science, Marx ties the truth of science not to theory, but to praxis. But the nature and form of praxis, along with its critieria of validation and justification are never analysed, even though the underlying theory of praxis accompanies Marx' every step.

> Aristotle emphasizes that politics, and practical philosophy in general, cannot be compared in its claims to knowledge with a rigorous science, with the apodictic *episteme*. For its subject matter, the Just and the Excellent, in its context of a variable and contingent praxis, lacks ontological constancy as well as logical necessity. The capacity of practical philosophy is *phronesis* a prudent understanding of the situation, and on this the tradition of classical politics has continued to base itself. ...[34]

This is similar to some of the ideas found in Marx' 'On the Jewish Question', 'Theses on Feuerbach', and 'Critique of the Gotha Program'. The critique of epistemology and positivism, the development of the dialectical critique, and the use of the idea of 'theory and practice' coupled with the demand for political and human emancipation and democratic equality lead to the conclusion that Marx' theory of knowledge runs parallel to the Aristotelian concept of *phronesis* (practical political wisdom). It is here that Marx can be seen as synthesizing the past and present, the classical and modern traditions. That is, because of the crisis of science and the developments in the 19th-century German response, Marx can best be understood as returning to Aristotle and his critique of ethics as a positive science.

Marx never really wrote on the issues of meta-critique and it is quite possible that what has been written here is taking too much liberty with his own ideas and their implications. However, I believe that they are very much implicit in his writings and are not incompatible with them. Perhaps turning to others who did explicitly deal with these issues,

even if the schools of thought are radically different with their different politics, methods, and goals, will still help us clarify the epistemological and sociological meaning of social practice as used by Marx. His critique of positivism and epistemology, the politics underlying the search for truth, his notion of 'theory and praxis' (truth as democratic consensus), while recapturing some of the classical wisdom of ancient Greece, also anticipates some of the later contemporary debates within the history and philosophy of science over the problematic nature of science and truth. Their debates will be helpful in further clarifying some of the other philosophical issues that lie beneath the critiques of epistemology and science. They may offer us insight into the nature of praxis that Marx himself never developed, but which might not be incompatible with his own perspective. Thus Marx' political-economic interpretation of social praxis will be contrasted to post-empiricist concepts about social practice in order to strengthen and possibly synthesize the theories of both traditions. They are both grounded in a return to Kant. A side-effect of this is the recognition of the continuing importance of the German tradition in these areas of investigation.

VI. SCIENCE AS SOCIAL PRACTICE AND THE CRITIQUE OF PRIVILEGED REPRESENTATIONS

In recent years there has been a lively debate between the analytic tradition of the philosophy of science (Carnap, Hempel, Nagel, Braitwaite, and Popper) and the post-empiricist tradition of the philosophy of science (Burtt, Koyré, Duhem, Kuhn, Feyerabend, Rorty, Habermas, and Quine).[35] The former school of thought stresses the definition and logic of scientific enquiry, analysis of its methodological presuppositions, the verification, falsification, or validation of scientific theories, and implicit metaphysical claims as to the empirical reality which underlies the conceptual and scientific framework (correspondence theory of truth).[36] The latter school stresses the historical, cultural, and relative social context of the theories, the *Weltanschauung* underlying the structures and problems to be solved, the political and ideological claims of modern science, and the irrationality (trans-scientific foundations) that grounds its methodological approach.[37] The debate has called into question the rationality, objectivity, and progressiveness of modern science (and indirectly modern technology and society) as well. In turn, it has also led to a re-evaluation of the epistemology and meta-theory of science itself; it has made problematic the ocular metaphor which has, since the 17th century, dominated epistemological and theoretical thinking - the notion that the human mind acted as the "mirror of nature"[38], reflecting its intricacies,

complexities, and laws.

With the rethinking of the question of the nature of science many other questions were raised: what is rationality, what is science; what is the relation between scientific knowledge and its empirical referent; does science investigate the real world or only the conventional components of that world; and, finally, if science is one cultural or symbolic representational system among others what is its objective status and claim to universal knowledge?

Though these are important questions traditional philosophy of science has been hampered by its inability to incorporate material from both the sociology of knowledge and social theory into its framework, thereby resulting in what Laudan has described as the increasing insularity of academic philosophers from the social sciences. The same claim could easily be made against traditional social scientists. Though both Kuhn and Feyerabend recognize that the creation of paradigms does not necessarily make use of rational, progressive, and scientific criteria, the sociological reasons for these shifts have only vaguely been analyzed. Why and how does science develop and progress if its development has consisted of shifts in conceptual frameworks, in belief systems, and in cultural configurations of the world? The answers to these problems have been conceived of in terms of the methodological quest for instrumental progress (Mary Hesse)[39], science's problem-solving effectiveness (Larry Laudan)[40], science's technical interests and instrumental control (Jürgen Habermas)[41], and finally, its manageability and pragmatism (Willard Quine).[42] It is the social practice which underlies the methodological and scientific imperatives which must be more clearly analyzed.

VII. THE DUHEM-QUINE THESIS AND THE BEGINNINGS OF SCIENTIFIC CONVENTIONALISM

Both the physicist and historian Pierre Duhem and the epistemologist Willard Quine have developed a neo-Kantian analysis of modern science which transforms the metaphysical categories of Kant's transcendental analytic into a logical-conceptual system - a symbolic form. This translation of Kantian categories from the realm of metaphysics to logic maintains, however, the fundamental Kantian structure of *a priori* synthetic judgments, the distinction between the phenomena and noumena, and the inability to know reality as it is in-itself, distinct from our conceptual framework of that understanding. Neo-Kantian philosophy of science is, as Veatch has recognized, a critique of the principles of the verifiability and falsification theories, and of the inductive and deductive models of scientific methodology.[43] It is this same

Kantianism radicalized by Feyerabend which leads to methodological and theoretical anarchism, the breakdown of a philosophy of science, and the call for the democratization of science itself.[44] The latter is the beginning of the recognition of the sociological and political components which ground scientific rationalism.

It is this Kantian foundation, running throughout the non-analytic tradition of the philosophy of science, which continues to recognize our inability to confront the reality of the physical world, independent of our conceptual and theoretical (linguistic and logical) frameworks, which we bring to an interpretation of the natural world. Our inability to know nature in itself and to know only our relation to it has resulted in a renewed interest in the methodology, principles, and procedures of the natural sciences; it represents a rebirth of epistemology in the form of conventionalism. What we know then is our own conceptual structures created and overlaid in a synthetic unity upon nature. What are these conceptual grids; where do they come from; what are the assumptions that ground them; and what is their relationship to nature and to social interrelationships?

Duhem views science as a logical, symbolic representation, which is neither true nor false, but a system of mathematical propositions.

> The observation of physical phenomena does not put us into relation with the hidden reality under the sensible appearances, but enables us to apprehend the sensible appearances themselves in a particular and concrete form. Besides, experimental laws do not have the material reality for their object, but deal with these sensible appearances, taken, it is true, in an abstract and general form. Removing or tearing away the veil from these sensible appearances, theory proceeds into and underneath them, and seeks what is really in bodies.[45]

The mathematical symbols, hypotheses, and experimental laws are, for Duhem, arbitrary in that they do not depend on the real state of the physical bodies they represent; the only criteria for being scientific are adherence to the laws of non-contradiction, valid syllogism, and accurate calculation. The scientific theories represent not hidden realities, but rules and procedures of mathematical analysis. "Thus, a true theory is not a theory which gives an explanation of physical appearances in conformity with reality; it is a theory which represents in a satisfactory manner a group of experimental laws."[46] The categories of the experimental laws organize the appearances so they may be systematized, classified, and organized to permit "intellectual economy". It aids in the process of recollection and communication to have reduced the complexity of the sensible world to a manageable

proportion of deductive laws. What makes for a good theory? Duhem holds that it is a question of usefulness, convenience, and beauty, but also predictability. His philosophy of science reflects his Kantian preoccupation with the separation of science and metaphysics, appearances and reality; it also represents his break with the copy theory of truth ('the mirror of nature') in order to develop a symbolic theory of truth.

Cassirer believes that Duhem's thought is the final product of a symbolic theory of science which goes back to Hertz and Poincaré.[47] It was Duhem's critique of the modern positivist tradition and the separation of fact and theory which so excited Cassirer. Because the physical fact is so intimately connected with the theoretical orientation of the scientific investigation, no physical fact could be used as the basis for the verification or falsification of any particular theory. According to Cassirer, only another theory could perform such a function. "A physical fact implies a whole set of theoretical statements and is significant only in relation to this whole."[48] The traditional positivistic objectivity of method and theory rested ultimately on the objectivity of the physical world. However, now that objectivity is viewed as a synthesis of experimental calculation and symbolic representation, objectivity and subjectivity no longer are distinct ontological realms.

Willard Quine takes up similar ideas when he critiques the notion that science could be a 'mirror of nature'; rather, he asks the question about the relation between reality and the language by which we grasp that reality. However, that reality is already pre-formed by the conceptual and linguistic structures and we can never get to the thing-in-itself.

> The fundamental-seeming philosophical question, How much of our science is merely contributed by language and how much is a genuine reflection of reality is perhaps a spurious question which itself arises from a certain particular type of language. Certainly we are in a predicament if we try to answer the question; for to answer the question we must talk about the world as well as about language, and to talk about the world we must already impose upon the world some conceptual scheme particular to our own language.[49]

Since we cannot get outside our conceptual scheme in order to compare it to objective reality, we cannot answer the question of the correctness of the conceptual system. According to Quine it is "the efficiency of communication and prediction" plus elegance and conceptual economy which become the measurements for the adequacy of the conceptual framework. Therefore, the mirroring of nature, the correspondence of theory to fact, of concept to reality is undermined by

Quine, who accepts the fundamental Kantian restrictions on metaphysical knowledge. Recognizing his debt to Duhem, Quine likewise is critical of radical reductionism which holds that every meaningful statement must be translatable into statements about the immediate physical world.

> As an empiricist I continue to think of the conceptual scheme of science as a tool, ultimately, for predicting future experience in the light of past experience. Physical objects are conceptually imported into the situation as convenient intermediaries - not by definition in terms of experience, but simply as irreducible posits - comparable, epistemologically, to the gods of Homer. ... But in point of epistemological footing the physical objects and the gods differ only in degree and not in kind. Both sorts of entities enter our conception only as cultural posits. The myth of physical objects is epistemologically superior to most in that it has proved more efficacious than other myths as a device for working a manageable structure into the flux of experience.[50]

The objectivity, which is a "conceptually imported" tool for the management of the complexity of the external world, is bounded by the symbolic forms and structures and the cultural values of manageability. As in the Kantian tradition, objects are posited, but now no longer on the basis of the transcendental subjectivity with its static and universal categories of the understanding and intuition. They are now mythological posits which are neither true nor false, but better or worse in explanation and prediction. Neither Duhem nor Quine was able to make the transition to a broader conceptualization of the underlying sociological foundations of these myths of physical objects, other than vague and abstract reference to the technical uses that could be made of modern science. These orientations were viewed within the context of the cultural significance and meaning attached to the physical world on the basis of their technical interests. No wider connections were made to link the philosophy of science and epistemology to social theory - no examination of the relations among technical interests, rationalization, industrialization, modern technology, and the fundamental changes in the structures of work organization and social subsystems.

For Quine, the conceptual form "underdetermined by experience" impinges on experience "only at the boundaries". Like Duhem, he believes that at the interior of any theory there are no direct links between empirical experience and statements of fact. This point thus has two important implications: the first, is the idea that there are no factual statements which are immediately verifiable through experience, since it is only the total science which can be measured against experience and a

conflict at any interior point in the scheme would involve a re-examination of the logical connections that exist within the system. The second point is that there is always the possibility that more than one conceptual representation could apply in any particular case, because there is an underdetermination by experience. It is for these reasons that Quine is led to make the argument that the traditional Kantian distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements no longer holds. The distinctions between logical and experimental additions to our knowledge, between logically and empirically true statements are no longer tenable due to the integrated system of logical laws that make up the total science and the empirical underdetermination of nature in science.

> The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs from the most casual matters of geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure mathematics or logic, is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges ... . Furthermore it becomes folly to seek a boundary between synthetic statements, which hold contingently on experience, and analytic statements, which hold come what may. Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system.[51]

A recalcitrant experience can be incorporated into the total language form by the proper adjustments and re-evaluations in other parts of the system through *ad hoc* theories. Therefore, it would be problematic whether we could discover the empirical content of any individual statement; thus scientific theories can be viewed as theoretical dogmas. Scientists are capable of rescuing any theory from falsification by creating additional assumptions and hypotheses that maintain the equilibrium and consistency of the original theory. At the level of mathematical abstraction characteristic of modern science it is logic and consistency which determines the survivability of the theory. The "myth of physical objects" is, for Quine, a useful and practical myth for obtaining the type of information necessary for the prediction and management of information. The basis for such shifts and adjustments in the symbolic code or the possibility of a total re-evaluation of the adequacy of the conceptual representation are not dealt with by Quine. This would involve an historical and sociological view of science and the transition from a theory of knowledge to a theory of society (sociological epistemology). The various components of Quine's thesis in the 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', written in the early Fifties, are important contributions to the critique of positivism and the anticipation of later developments in alternative, non-analytic philosophy of science:

(1) the distinctions between core and periphery and language and reality (appearances and the thing-in-itself); (2) the breakdown of the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements; (3) the formation of *ad hoc* theories; (4) the myth of objectivity in science; (5) and the critique of both verification and falsification theories of science.

VIII. SOCIAL PRAXIS AND THE POST-EMPIRICIST PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE: RORTY AND FEYERABEND

In his *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, Rorty has recognized that Quine's holistic approach to science represents a critique of the epistemological foundations of modern science and the visual metaphor that lies at the basis of the notions of objective certitude and rationality in science. Knowledge and science can no longer be based on the adequacy of the correspondence between the scientist's theory and the empirical reality to which the theory is supposed to correspond. Rorty argues that it is not the fit between ideas and their corresponding objects which is the hallmark of scientific justification, but rather, the justification which arises out of social practice or conversation.[52] When correspondence is replaced by communication and intersubjective practice, "privileged representations" - either in terms of epistemological and methodological structures (subjective consciousness) or in terms of the structures of the corresponding physical world (external objectivity) - are no longer relevant; thus, the traditional privileged access to truth, either through intuition, sense certainty, innate ideas or concepts (subjectivity) or through the objectivity of the external real world, is called into question. The theory of representations (intuition and concepts) and objective reference (ontology) are rejected.

The subjective and objective components of the traditional theories of knowledge are both seen as conventional creations. Rorty contends that this is the legacy of the Kantian spirit of German Idealism against which positivists have spent the past century inveighing and which, parenthetically, is coming back to haunt them.[53] Thus, the quest for accurate representation, certitude, correct method, and truth, as the mirroring of nature, is reconceptualized by him into a theory of meta-practice.[54] It is at this point that philosophy has reached its own under-determined boundaries of analysis. The analysis of social practice and conversation lies in the historical and social contexts in which they take place. If knowledge is not grounded in nature or in the transcendental conditions of subjectivity, but in the forms and structures of social interaction, then the latter becomes the real conditions which ground scientific development and the real basis for a philosophy of

science.

Rorty's work is also a direct critique of Hume's purpose in his *Enquiry*, since the former begins his analysis with a critique of foundationalism, *i.e.*, a critique of all attempts to uncover the hidden structure of the mind and, thus, to uncover the secrets of knowing itself. Foundationalism is that subarea of philosophy which deals with a theory of representation and the process by which representations of the objective world are mirrored or constructed by the mind.

> We owe the notion of a "theory of knowledge" based on an understanding of "mental processes" to the seventeenth century, and especially to Locke. We owe the notion of "the mind" as a separate entity in which "processes" occur to the same period, and especially to Descartes. We owe the notion of philosophy as a tribunal of pure reason, upholding or denying the claims of the rest of culture, to the eighteenth century and especially to Kant, but this Kantian notion presupposed general assent to the Lockean notions of mental processes and Cartesian notions of mental processes.[55]

Rorty, coming out of a tradition framed by Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Dewey, along with some of the contemporary critics of empiricist philosophy of science (Quine, Davidson, Hanson, Kuhn, and Feyerabend), begins to undertake in his work a critique of the emphasis on "mental processes", "epistemic privilege", "the search for objective knowledge", and "accurate representations", and, like Hegel and Marx before him, epistemology and metaphysics themselves. Rorty's approach involves the serious questioning of the idea that the purpose or even ability of philosophy is to discover the foundations of knowledge in either its objective and subjective moments; this type of question misses the whole dynamic, content, and goal of knowledge. It involves a more radical doubt that there is absolute knowledge and also a doubt about knowing the conditions for the possibility of knowledge in the traditional sense. This form of conventionalism calls into question the notion that there are 'facts' and explanation of 'facts'; that there is an ontological reference point for those facts; that abstract and extremely complex and mathematical theories even deal with the empirical at their center; and that there really is a 'method' to discover and systematize these social fabrications. The distinctions made by Hume between "matters of fact" and "relations of ideas", between the empirically discrete and the necessary universal are themselves social conventions without ontological foundations.

Rorty develops briefly and inadequately the idea of "epistemological behaviorism" or pragmatism, when referring to his theory that rationality and epistemic authority now rest with society.

> Once conversation replaces confrontation the notion of the mind as the Mirror of Nature can be discarded. Then the notion of philosophy as the discipline which looks for privileged representations among those constituting the Mirror becomes unintelligible ... If we see knowledge as a matter of conversation and social practice, rather than as an attempt to mirror nature we will not be likely to envisage a metapractice which will be the critique of all possible forms of social practice.[56]

Under the heading of social practice Rorty includes all facets of social interaction and the language game (community rules governing the use of concepts, logic, inference, *etc.*, within the practice of language), including the history of language, neurophysiology, physical and cultural anthropology, and the political and cultural context of the language game itself.[57]

The rationality of science lies not in its foundation, but in the rationality of scientific interaction and exchange of information; the intersubjective verifiability of problems, research methods, and conclusions make science scientific. He even clarifies his rejection of epistemology and the notion that knowledge has foundations by mentioning an analogous relationship in moral philosophy. He contends that moral philosophy in pragmatism has no foundations in an ontological or transcendental view of human nature. The authority and justification for morality lies not in a privileged moral position, but in the traditions and customs of society.[58] A danger implicit in this type of reasoning has been recognized by others[59]; there is really no clarification in Rorty concerning the nature of social practice - its origins, development and structure. In fact, it is this question of the structure of consensus which is central to Rorty's argument, but which is not investigated. What is the general structure of rationality by which we are to distinguish "a rational from an irrational consensus"?[60] Bernstein in his critique of Rorty argues that Rorty has reintroduced the "myth of the given" through the back door in terms of the givenness of the unquestioned social practices of the scientists.[61] But how are these social practices (social institutions and social interactions) to be the object of critical reflection? By what set of principles and standards are they to be evaluated and judged? Ferrara has argued against Habermas' *Diskursethik* and consensus theory of truth in the same vein.

> The Diskursethik allows the philosopher no privileged access to the operation of his or her own conceptual machinery. All substantive pronouncements on the validity of single norms must originate in *real discourse* or, alternatively, in discourses undertaken

in an advocacy way. The outcome of these real discourses cannot be anticipated by philosophers.[62]

There is for Ferrara no objective standard or vision of the good which could be used to evaluate whether the consensus is a valid one or not. This is the problem with Habermas' ethics. Though it deals with ethics from within the neo-Aristotelian perspective, it does not include a theory of the good society which is another of the key components in the latter's notion of *phronesis*. If Rorty has replaced the contemplative understanding of theory with the practical wisdom of *phronesis*, then scientific investigation becomes just one form among many of discursive rationality. The goal now is to begin the process of the clarification and formulation of a theory of ethical consensus or a theory of the good life (democracy), which would incorporate science and technology as components in the broadest issues that influence society.

Paul Feyerabend is another contemporary, non-empiricist philosopher of science, who has developed in his analyses an emphasis more on the political implications of the method and application of the principles of empiricism. Positivism is seen as having become tied to "dogmatic principles" and immunizing the scientific method and its metaphysical implications from all forms of critical scrutiny. "Far from eliminating dogma and metaphysics and thereby encouraging progress, modern empiricism has found a new way of making dogma and metaphysics respectable."[63] He explicitly describes this process of the dogmatization of empiricism in political terms. Since the underlying principles and method of science are no longer open to serious investigation, this has created an anti-democratic and totalitarian mood. Feyerabend seems to be applying the principles and goals of John Stuart Mill's *On Liberty* to the scientific enterprise. He is more aware than Rorty of the political implications of the process and the necessity to argue for more tolerance in scientific matters. Feyerabend's theory of science has forced him in *Science in a Free Society* to develop an analysis of epistemological relativism in the context of a pluralist theory of democracy. He has recognized that the arena for the discussion of theories of knowledge has moved to the arena of discourse about political freedoms and rights in a theory of democracy. Science and truth have become questions for him of political theory; the logical step here would be to analyze science and its truth claims within the social context of Marx and not Mill.

Objectivity lies not in a privileged access to truth, but in theoretical pluralism. His political critique of the dogmatism of science lies in his understanding of the nature of science and, especially, in the nature of the relationship between theory and facts.

> Facts and theories are much more intimately connected than is admitted by the autonomy principle. Not only is the description of every single fact dependent on some theory. There exist also facts which cannot be unearthed except with the help of alternatives to the theory to be tested, and which become unavailable as soon as such alternatives are excluded.[64]

The autonomy principle , according to Feyerabend, argues that "the discovery and description of facts is independent of all theorizing".[65] It is also asserted that facts exist whether they are perceived or explained by any theory. Furthermore, facts are given and are the basic building blocks of any theory. Feyerabend critiques these notions in a fashion similar to Kuhn in the latter's *Structure of Scientific Revolutions.* Facts are not independent of theory, but are constituted in the process of theory formation itself; it is the theory which creates its own facts and then later becomes verified by those same facts. Facts are highly theory-laden and are pre-structured by the theoretical context within which they are created; they do not lie outside of scientific theories, but are part of the process of their creation.[66]

The major problem with Feyerabend is basically the same as for Rorty - the tying of science to political liberalism results in the same difficulties faced by Rorty in that there is is no coherent theory of objective consensus - a theory of true consensus as opposed to a distorted consensus. As Spragens has written, there are "no grounds for principled opposition to tyrannical and oppressive political practices", given the nihilism inherent in the values and relativism of modern pluralism.[67] This is a problem to be dealt with in another work. The purpose of this chapter has been to show that in both the German traditions of the 18th and 19th centuries and in contemporary post-empiricist philosophy of science, there has emerged a critique of positivism and foundationalism, along with the formation of a consensus theory of truth whose basis is in the notion of social practice. Feyerabend, Kuhn, Quine, and Habermas all have raised serious doubts about the empiricist tradition and the latter's claims to objectivity and truth. It was Marx, however, who placed it squarely in the social practice of capitalism with his sociology of knowledge, critique of false consciousness and ideology, and his sociological epistemology (objectivity formed by social practice); he saw knowledge in the context of alienation and fetishism, economic distortion of social relationships, and political power. Both traditions are helpful in clarifying the same phenomenon. However, Marx extended the analysis of social practice into the political economy, while modern philosophy of science extends it into the meta-theory and history of science. Both are very useful. With their common intellectual traditions in British empiricism and

German Idealism, their common critiques of traditional theory of knowledge and science, and the recognition of the politics of science (in particular Feyerabend and Habermas), they supplement each other's limitations. Modern philosophy of science extends some of the Hegelian-Marxian critiques of science, while the latter adds a new political dimension to the modern critiques of epistemology, science, and "privileged representations". The understanding of social practice is decidedly expanded by the joint consideration of these two traditions.

It would not be inappropriate to raise the issue whether the political economy which lies at the heart of Marx' concept of practice could not be of help in clarifying the whole issue of a theory of social consensus. That is, a possible response to the problem of social practice and social consensus lies in the clarification of the political-economic structures of the 'good society' within which the consensus takes place. Thus there are four crucial moments to a more fully developed theory of knowledge beyond Marx: (1) a critique of epistemology and foundationalism; (2) a consensus theory of truth (social ethics); (3) a theory of the good society (political philosophy); (4) and a critique of the power relations of modern society (political economy).

PART III

META-CRITIQUE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY: MARX' LEGACY

CHAPTER SIX

Epistemology and Political Economy: From Philosophy to Social Theory

I. INTRODUCTION

With the growing rationalization and fragmentation of the academy in the past years, with the separation of the humanities from the social sciences, philosophy from sociology, there has been a corresponding separation between 19th- and 20th-century social theory. Getting back to the classical period is getting correspondingly more difficult with the passage of time, resulting in a loss for everyone. The previous chapters on the relationships between the social theory of Karl Marx, 19th-century German epistemology, and modern philosophy of science have revealed the need to rethink the relationships between areas and disciplines and ultimately, the nature of the liberal arts education itself. The contemporary divisions within the academy are no longer tenable, if they ever were. Questions about subjectivity and objectivity, concepts and reality, science and truth, freedom and self-realization, and class inequality and social justice have shown us that they are all fundamentally questions about the nature of social interaction and social structures with central emphasis on political economy. That is, the central concepts of Western philosophy from the time of the Greeks to the present cannot be viewed as separate from the more historical and sociological questions about the nature and structure of society.

The traditional problems raised in epistemology and methodology are ultimately questions that can be more adequately responded to in the context of the power and class relationships within an examination of social institutions. For it is the latter which structure the social framework within which the categories of science and morality and thus, consciousness itself, are developed. The structures of objectivity and rationality in scientific activity are social in nature. There are real questions that the traditional epistemological categories claiming a privileged access to truth are any longer relevant to answer the problems raised by philosophy. Philosophy is no longer an adequate response to the important issues raised by philosophy itself. Epistemology raised the crucial philosophical issues of our times concerning the nature of knowledge, the status of its categories, and their possible justification (foundationalism), but the proof of their applicability and truth lies in an understanding of the social framework, which structures and frames the issues in the first place and offers us the possibility of resolving them.

II. IDEOLOGY, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

Marx' sociology of knowledge and his critique of ideology offers us a perspective by which the relationship between philosophy and sociology can be best comprehended. In the interrelationships among knowledge, consciousness, and society the relationship between traditional philosophy and social science becomes more prominent. Though begun by Hegel, it is Marx who articulates this insight best. Central to the development of his thoughts about the categories of the understanding and the formation of consciousness are his ideas concerning private property, alienation, and false consciousness. It will be through the examination of these ideas that the connection between epistemology and social structures will be seen. For this we must return to the early works of the *Paris Manuscripts* and analyze the concept of alienated labor and its relation to the alienated consciousness of classical political economy. Marx develops the idea that the traditional relationship between subjectivity and objectivity is mediated by a theory of political economy, that is, the relationship between consciousness and nature is mediated by our understanding of the nature of social structures and relations of production. Consciousness comes in contact with the external world only through the social structures and categories which it has created. Science, technology, and industrial social relations mediate the manner and form through which consciousness creates and is formed by nature. The essential power relationships, as they are manifested in the social relations of production, help form the categories of everyday perception and the categories at the self-conscious level: science. These relationships form the basis for the transcendental subjectivity.

The traditional debates about the nature and origin of knowledge with reference to the moments of subjectivity or objectivity within the schools of rationalism, empiricism or the idealism of Hegelian metaphysics are replaced by the transformation of epistemology into political economy. The essential being of man is partially manifested and realized in the process of the transformation of nature within a particular social formation. What we are is the product of the self-creativity of man through social production, through the recreation and redirection of nature and the reorganization of the social relations around the production process, along with the political process that protects and maintains the public and private spheres. This, according to Marx, is what distinguishes man from the animals, this is what establishes his universality and distinctiveness.

> The universality of man appears in practice in the universality which makes the whole of nature into his inorganic body: (1) as a direct means of life; and equally (2) as the material object and instrument of his life activity. Nature is the inorganic body of man.[1]

Man is universal to the extent that his intellectual and manual labor freely creates the conditions out of which he self-consciously develops. The productive life activity of the individual as a species-being is the free, conscious life activity of man. Creation, as we have already seen in Part One, is not the result of a synthesis of the categories of the understanding and the manifold of representation within the transcendental subject, but rather the real creation of the subject in the very moment when the natural and social conditions of its existence are made through labor. Individuality, life, and consciousness are all the result of this self-formative process in the real world. It is no longer the result of transcendental or dialectical categories, *i.e.*, an aspect of Kantian or Hegelian logic, but the creation of the existential self in the actual process of the production of the physical and spiritual goods of society.

Marx' analysis of the objectification of labor is both a critique of economic domination and the loss of power over one's creations and an important comment on an analysis of an epistemology whose central theme has shifted from philosophy to sociology.

> The immediate *task of philosophy*, which is at the service of history, once the *saintly form* of human self-alienation has been unmasked, is to unmask self-alienation in its *unholy form*. Thus the criticism of heaven turns into the criticism of the earth, *the criticism of religion* turns into the *criticism of right*, and the *criticism of theology* into the *criticism of politics* ...[2] (italics in original)

Objectification is the productive process by which the natural world and the categories, through which this world is manifested, are created. Thus the *Paris Manuscripts* represent a further development of the epistemological dilemma of Hume and Hegel's critique of epistemology and First Philosophies. Marx' analysis of praxis and species-being can now be viewed as a sociological theory of knowledge. Marx believed that they do not presuppose the validity of any kind of truth, but it does recognize that social constraints and determinations are crucial for the formation of a particular form of knowledge. Capitalism produces the seemingly *a priori* structures of the mind and the false universality of a consciousness that cannot look beyond the surface to enquire into the essential social relations of the productive process or the potentials

inherent in the economic infrastructure and its own political ideals. This is what Marx attacks as ideology.

Productivity, then, is not simply a means for the furtherance of physical existence, but is also a means to self-creativity and self-realization. What is formed in this process are nature, social relations, and the universal self. The formation of both the reality of nature and the categories of human consciousness are mediated by the structures of political economy; they are mediated by the form and content of the power and class relationships within society, that ultimately give shape to all aspects of our everyday life world and our awareness of it. While traditional philosophers were concerned with the nature of sense experience, intuition, self-evident ideas, or the nature of the objective world, Marx began to concentrate on the nature of the creativity of the species-being and the intervening relations of production, through which reality was created in the historical world. Thus sociology, with its central emphasis on political economy, became the focal point through which traditional epistemological questions became filtered. The social reality became the mechanism through which questions of truth and falsity and false consciousness and ideology were asked. This also explains the reasons for the centrality of Marx' critical analysis of private property and alienated labor for an understanding of alienated consciousness. Alienated labor and its external manifestation in the private ownership of the means of production takes away man's "species-life, his real objectivity as a species-being, and changes his advantage over animals into a disadvantage."[3]

The powerlessness of a productive process in which the social contours of production are outside the control of the workers results in alienated labor and in a world in which the objects of sense experience and our relation to them, the facts it creates, and forms of consciousness that result from it are also alien. The alienation of perception, knowledge, aesthetics, and wisdom characterizes this process. What was to be a creation of the species-life and the community turns into an undermining of community relations and self-creativity. The consciousness that is formed in this productive process, in turn, creates similarly alienated forms of consciousness in which the social process is replaced or hidden under the appearances of a reified natural order. This natural order is then legitimated by bourgeois political theory and political economy. It is the job of the natural rights and positivist traditions to create the universal standards and immutable forms of moral and conceptual objectivity, either in the myth of the state of nature or the immediacy of experience. The objectivity created as perceivable cultural objects, norms, or social institutions has its own built-in metaphysics negated by Hegel's critique of the traditional epistemological categories in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. It is an

objectivity divorced from subjectivity; not subjectivity interpreted as particular individual standards and biases, but a subjectivity which incorporates the idea of the social construction of reality, *i.e.*, knowledge and objectivity. Thus, the categories of economics as a science analyze the immediately given data without inquiring into the domination and control revealed in the analysis of the social aspects of production. Throughout this analysis of workplace alienation the implications for a social epistemology are clear. Clear also is the epistemological critique implicit in this analysis of the metaphysics of sense experience and positivism.

> Conditioned and "contained" by the rationality of the established system, sense experience tends to "immunize" man against the very unfamiliar experience of the possibilities of human freedom.[4]

In fact, the reified objectivity of positivist science is only the objectivity of the capitalistically pre-structured world, in which private property is perceived as an "objective fact". The supersession of private property is clearly understood by Marx as both a social and an epistemological revolution in the way reality is understood and the essence of man appropriated. In this interrelationship between political economy and epistemology, concern for the analysis of the structures of the workplace organization, the social relations of production, and private property, also represents a concern for the objects of experience which color and distort the actual formation of our physical, social, and personal worlds. The sensuous appropriation of the world is determined by the type of economic appropriation of that world. In the various forms of human appropriation of the world - hearing, touching, seeing, feeling, perceiving, thinking, *etc.*, that is, through the five senses, the spiritual and practical senses - the political economy frames the way in which experience is created and also the way in which human sensuousness responds to and acts upon the world. Political economy (praxis) and epistemology (human sensibility) are thus two sides of the same issue of objectivity.

> The supersession of private property is, therefore, the complete *emancipation* of all the human qualities and senses. It is such an emancipation because these qualities and senses have become human, from the subjective as well as the objective point of view. The eye has become a *human* eye when its *object* has become a *human*, social object, created by man and destined for him. The senses have, therefore, become directly theoreticians in practice.[5]

> Only when the social reality becomes human, when alienated labor

and private property are eliminated, will sensuousness humanly create and appropriate the world. Only then will the socially created objects become manifestations of humanity, only then will "the objects then confirm and realize his individuality, they are his own objects, *i.e.*, man himself becomes the object".[6] When man himself becomes the direct object of the senses, rather than reified social relations, then there will be the possibility of self-realization. Nature, in turn, will no longer be turned into capital or an element in the private appropriation of nature; man's relation to nature will no longer be based on ownership or other utilitarian characteristics. Possession through consumption does not constitute nature's existence for us, but the very alienation of both human and physical nature. This is Marx' critique of the appropriation of nature under capitalism and its emancipation under socialism; it is only in the latter that nature becomes a human object or "objective humanity", since humanity has become a social object - a product of the social praxis and objectification of human nature into the social objects of experience. The emancipation of nature is tied to the emancipation of human sensibility, consciousness, and society. There is a reciprocal process involved here with the naturalization of humanity along with the humanization of nature. "Man is the direct object of natural science."[7] The self-realization of humanity through its species-being and social objectivity is accomplished in the natural sciences, for nature is itself the expression of the social object.

The emphasis, for Marx, naturally turned to political economy and the examination in his early writings of the process of alienation. If the social relations at the workplace were the micro-reflections of the broader class structure, then that avenue, through which the self was to be created, was blocked by a complex set of social institutions, which led to a weakening and possible destruction of a true, rational self-consciousness. Self-consciousness was no longer a philosophical category whose structural foundations were to be transcendentally or logically unfolded. Now it became the manifestation of distorted power relationships in a class society. This is his central critique of traditional philosophy. "As in the old materialism criticized by Marx, reality is perceived only in the form of an object, not as human sensuous activity, or practice."[8]

By transforming the philosophy of Hegel into a radical materialism, Marx has not changed the fundamental issues central to the history of German Idealism. On the contrary, he has simply broadened them to include the missing element between subjectivity and objectivity - the structure of political economy. If this structure in any way undermines or hinders the free creation of the self as species-being, then consciousness becomes malformed. Truth, therefore, seems to lie not in the structures of a static consciousness, the ontologically prior natural

world, or in the search for the hidden dimensions of subjectivity and objectivity, but in the possibilities realized or suffocated by the society itself. This is not to say that society defines or determines the truth, but it certainly can permit and nurture an approach to self-creativity which permits man the fullest realization of his/her potential given the historical limitations of the moment. While not defining or delimiting those potentials, it is still a positive critique in that certain institutions can be shown to be antithetical to creativity and freedom, *e.g.*, the market economy. We now can begin to see that what originally appeared as simply an epistemological question, which later turned into a political economic question, now begins to take the form of an ethical question about the nature of social justice. This has been the logic of this work throughout - to show the underlying integration among epistemology, political economy, and ethics. Though they are separated for analytic clarity, these three areas represent different aspects of the same problem.

III. HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AS SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY

From the analysis of objectivity and the methodological problems related to false objectivity, that is, the inability of distinguishing between appearances and essence, surface phenomena and social relations, Marx begins to develop his theory of historical materialism in his *The German Ideology*. As we have seen Marx' early writings on alienation have multifaceted implications, one being a critique of positivistic science and the underlying epistemological premises of its theory of objectivity (and thus consciousness). The critique of traditional rationalistic methodology is widened in the *The German Ideology* to include an historical theory of society, social interaction, and a critique of historical false consciousness - ideology. From alienation in the workplace Marx expands the framework of his analysis to include the alienation from self-creativity in history as it is expressed in various cultural forms. The critique of ideology flows out of Marx' understanding of the Feuerbachian critique of Hegelian abstractionism and metaphysics. Marx argues that the process of objectification, alienation, and the return to self in Hegel's *Phenomenology* occurs within the philosophical realm of contemplation and self-consciousness only; in turn, Feuerbach's materialism, rejects idealism and stresses the belief that the abstractions of religion are man-made products and not the result of the self-movement of the Absolute Spirit. However, it too is caught up in its own ideology, because it too does not distinguish between essence and reality and has an abstract and contemplative understanding of the nature of man separated from "real, historical

men". It is the senuous reality within the historical mode of production which creates ideas and not the the other way around. The analysis and critique of both Hegel and Feuerbach in *The German Ideology* and *Holy Family* are a further articulation of Marx' earlier ideas on epistemology within the context of the historical development of social formations and cultural forms. This is certainly one of the important aspects of his early and middle period works - the philosophical formulation of epistemology in terms of work structures, property relations, and his theory of historical materialism. It is a clarification of the relationships between history, social development, and the development of the various forms of cultural consciousness.

Throughout this period in Marx' writings there is, however, a noticeable element of positivism and mechanical economic determinism, especially when he deals with such issues as his philosophy of history, social change precipitated by the contradictions between the productive forces and relations of production, historical necessity, the relationship between base and superstructure, his theory of needs, and his materialist concept of man. However, within the context of his overall writings with its epistemological and philosophical continuity this appears as an experimental period in his life heavily influenced by Engels. With his new theory of historical materialism there is a further development of his earlier social epistemology, which stresses the relationship between consciousness and the social reality.

> The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear at this stage as the direct efflux of their material behavior. The same applies to mental production as expressed in the language of the politics, law, morality, religion, metaphysics of a people. Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, *etc.*, real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms.[9]

A central theme of his historical materialism revolves around the production of the cultural realm, its institutional and ideational components and their ability to conceal the actual underlying forms of the alienated social life of capitalism. Ideas and consciousness are the product of the material forms of social existence as they develop within particular historical modes of production. They are shaped and determined by the social reality and do not exist as independent universals to be philosophically examined or justified. Consciousness is not autonomous of society, but is formed within its context. In fact,

the ideas seen as abstract universals, are, for Marx, the ideas of the ruling class and are presented in a way that breaks any connection between thought and the social reality or thought and social critique. The ideals, values, and theories about morality and political philosophy are the expressions of a bourgeois culture and consciousness. Because of their claims to absolute universality and necessity these ideas also hide from critical view alternative forms of consciousness, which may undermine the class position and hegemony of the ruling class. The claims to universality by natural law theory and classical political economy, as well as the universalism implicit in Hegelian and Feuerbachian abstract philosophy, hold out the independence of thought and its unconnectedness to the real social world, thereby protecting it from serious critical objections and possible change.

> What appears to be the triumph of subjective rationality, the subjection of all reality to logical formalism, is paid for by the obedient subjection of reason to what is directly given. What is abandoned is the whole claim and approach to knowledge: to comprehend the given as such.[10]

This mechanism is used to justify culturally the existing social relations as being the most rational forms of social production, exchange, and distribution. Critiquing Hegel and the Left Hegelians he writes that "the products of consciousness cannot be dissolved by mental criticism or by resolution into 'self-consciousness'".[11]

Ideas do not have an independent existence outside of the material world and, therefore, should be viewed as conceptual expressions of historically specific times. To change ideas the underlying social relations must be changed. Marx believes that there is a dialectic between the various elements of consciousness and the political economy that cannot be resolved into a simple one-dimensionality of economic determinism; he stresses that we make history ourselves "but under very definite assumptions and conditions".[12] The epistemological component of historical materialism is contained in the notion that the sensuous world is not directly given, but it too is a product of the way the productive process is historically organized. The way we look at the world is the result of the structuring of human experience by that same social world. The ideology of positivism rests on a theory of "objectivity" which assumes the ontological distinction between subject and object and the complete independence of the objects of experience from any constitutive structuring of the mind. For this reason the positivist can act upon the world without any thought of his own assumptions and effects upon the subject/object dialectics. Marx' historical materialism makes fundamental changes in that theory of objectivity for

the objects themselves are pre-structured by history. The world of appearance hides a complex dialectic between consciousness and society; the senses are pre-structured by the class institutions of capitalism and the contradictions within society between the economic infrastructure and the social relations of production. The Hegelian idea that the truth of objectivity is subjectivity is still valid from Marx' perspective.

Another of his intentions in *The German Ideology* is to critique the claims of the German socialists who argued that the institutions of politics and religion were the real basis upon which society was built; for them there is no analysis of the productive relations, the economic and technological foundations of society, or the developmental stages through which societies have evolved. For Marx, the Left Hegelians and the socialists were simply following too closely the logic of Hegel's analysis with his emphasis on the products of human consciousness and not material reality. This social epistemology forms a continuum with the earlier manuscripts and is part of the overall development of Marx' method of 'critique'. Coming out of the dogmatic slumber of Humean skepticism, the development of the transcendental and phenomenological critiques in German Idealism transferred the organizing and systematizing principle of human experience from tradition, perception, the logical subject, to the phenomenological subject, and finally, to the historical subject.[13] The constant pruning and clarification of the mechanism by which the objects of perception are formed, the formal manner in which experience becomes meaningful, and how knowledge of the world is created, were part of the process in which the critique of the positivist theory of truth evolved into a sociological constitution theory of truth. As the transcendental and phenomenological components of epistemology became incorporated into a social theory, the internal dynamic of history, as analyzed in Marx' theory of historical materialism, became the framework within which experience, objects of perception, and truth-claims were constituted. Ideas and consciousness are the result of an historical and constitutive process, unlike the possibility of experience in empiricism. They are not simply one-dimensional creatures of the economic foundations.

Ideas have a dynamic and life of their own and though the values of justice and freedom in liberalism attempt to validate the structural mechanics of capitalism, they are used in *Capital* as the basis for the undermining of the whole of its justification for political economy. Ideas are not merely epiphenomena of alienated consciousness, but double-edged swords. Consciousness, in acting back upon the system which produced it, can demand social change in the name of the unrealized values of liberal freedoms, but also in the name of the values

of man's species-being, the potentials of human emancipation, the hopes of worker control as in the Paris Commune, and the possibilities implicit in a radicalization of liberalism - "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs". That is, from the unrealized natural rights of liberalism, to the equal rights of socialism, to the human rights of communism, the ideas which grew out of modern society became the same ideas which will actively change it. However, as Marx has said in the *Holy Family*:

> Ideas never lead beyond the established situation, they only lead beyond the ideas of the established situation. In fact, ideas cannot realize anything. The realization of ideas requires men who apply a practical force.[14]

Truth, for Marx, is thus praxis, since only practical activity can deal adequately with the future. The whole meta-theoretical foundation of his critique of political economy rests upon a reflective analysis of the logic of an historical social system and its immanent ethical critique. History within Marx' social theory is bounded by Hegel's and Schelling's notions of temporality and the development of the past as "posited having beenness" of the Concept, *i.e.*, the future is the development of the immanent principle of the inner logic of capital. Since the theory does not generate abstract *a priori* logic or general laws of societal motion into the future, praxis and subjective consciousness are crucial to the realization of the Concept. The future as historically open (the emancipatory future), however, is limited conceptually and institutionally only by the general historical conditions of the times and not by the simple logic of the system. Truth lies not in the abstract theory, but in the self-conscious actor emancipated by theoretical insights and the constitutive behavior of the social actor himself. "The demand to renounce illusions about one's situation is a demand to renounce a situation that requires illusion."[15] Praxis, then, is an integrated intellectual and manual activity, which is a further stage in the development of classical moral thought and its critique of all social institutions, which distort the development of social creativity and solidarity and the moral consciousness and character of the individual. It is also the further radicalization of the critiques of epistemology and knowledge of Kant and Hegel by the continuous vigilance against all forms of false universality (religious consciousness, Left Hegelian idealism, natural rights theory, classical political economy, *etc.*) and false objectivity (liberal state and free-market economy).

Truth, then, is not a having, but a becoming[16]; it is the dual constitution of the self and society in a non-alienated structural situation. Truth is thus the process in which the 'critique' of false consciousness

and ideology, the self-conscious creation of a democratic community, the institutional structures of its political economy, and the creations of its own subjectivity become the basis of social praxis. But does this necessitate some social theory to act as a guide during the process, to give a signal when the social praxis is going off course or is not adhering to is own criteria of truth as becoming?

> The difficulty here, however, is that these principles, as we will discover, are open to a wide range of interpretations. In the absence of a broader criterion relating to the purpose of democracy, how can an intelligent dialogue on the conflicting interpretations of these principles be possible? Moreover, without such a criterion, is not the theorist likely to interpret these principles exclusively by the realistic standard which measures the soundness of an interpretation according to the degree to which it mirrors the demonstrable facts relating to the political system at given times.[17]

This I believe is implicitly answered by Marx in his theories of the species-being and the good society. The early manuscripts return not only to supply the philosophical basis for Marx' critique of positivism and his method as 'dialectical critique', but they also return to provide further clarification for the justification of social praxis itself. It is this theory of a non-alienated society, which is crying out in every page of Marx' works and is presupposed in all his critiques of capitalism, which becomes the ultimate foundation of epistemology. But, it is also grounded in political economy and in the critiques of epistemology and foundationalism. Though much of this is implicit in Marx, it does not mean that it is not there or not a crucial component of his analysis. It means that much more analysis must take place in order archaeologically to uncover and reconstruct these deep structures and to further these seminal insights.

IV. MARX, HABERMAS, AND THE REFLECTIVE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE SPECIES

Habermas would probably object to this interpretation of Marx, since, for him, the self-constitution of the individual through labor reduces self-constitution of the community and the process of reflection to an instrumental or productive activity. Reflective knowledge (*Reflexionswissen*) is replaced by productive knowledge (*Produktionswissen*). Marx had reduced, according to Habermas, social practice to labor and in the process had unreflectively combined both interaction and work, communicative (symbolic) interaction and instrumental activity.[18] The

self-constitution of the species is reduced to a consideration of class antagonisms and the analysis of the forms of social labor. The alternative, for Habermas, lies in a consideration of the transcendental conditions of various forms of knowledge as found in his early works or the dialectical unfolding of the very cognitive and communicative competencies that make possible the self-constitution of the species in modernity found in his later ones. That is, Habermas' thoughts center either on an analysis of the normative assumptions of human interests in knowledge (technical, communicative, and emancipatory interests) or the reflective reconstruction of the cultural conditions for self-consciousness as expressed in the psychological, symbolic, moral, and structural foundations of the self-formative process itself.

Isaac Balbus in his *Marxism and Domination* makes a similar argument with his critique of Marx.[19] He argues that Marx by reducing social interaction and self-consciousness to labor and class consciousness had lost the crucial elements of the Hegelian symbolic interchange and mutual recognition along with the self-consciousness which arises out of the communicative process. This critique by Habermas, Balbus, and others of Marx' philosophical anthropology rooted in the political economy of the 17th and 18th centuries has important implications for the continued dialogue within the German intellectual tradition. However, this critique of Marx and his reduction of the self-formative process to productive knowledge is also accompanied, for Habermas, by the reduction of Marx' materialism and science to positivism.

> In order to prove the scientific character of his analysis, Marx repeatedly made use of its analogy to the natural sciences. He never gives evidence of having revised his early intentions, according to which the science of man was to form a unity with the natural sciences ... . Science in the rigorous sense lacks precisely this element of reflection that characterizes investigating the natural-historical process of the self-generation of the social subject and also making the subject conscious of this process.[20]

Because this natural-historical element and the concomitant ability to develop a self-consciousness are absent, Habermas has rejected the positivism underlying Marx' notion of science. For him critical science must include two main components - the hermeneutic understanding of the self-constitutive process in history and the critical reflection on the form of knowledge of that hermeneutics, which, for him, means an "epistemological critique". Science is defined by Habermas as a critique and "an analysis of a constitutive process" or self-formative process of the species.[21]

In his *Mirror of Production*, Jean Baudrillard criticizes Marx for failing to realize that the development of self-consciousness took place within the framework of the productive apparatus, modern science, technology, and the capitalist social relations of production.[22] Consciousness itself is formed through a series of mirrors. The first is the 'mirror of production', through which man objectifies and externalizes himself in nature and the second is the 'mirror of nature', which involves the technical apparatus and social structure within which the first occurs. The objectivity of social institutions, which is the basis for everyday interaction, consciousness, and scientific consciousness, is created as a result of work. For Baudrillard, this represents only the more humanistic underside of political economy, with its stress on concrete and abstract labor, use-value and exchange-value, and the labor theory of value. Balbus is also sympathetic to this critique of Marx, for he says:

> To put this another way, the only type of recognition that can be achieved *vis-à-vis* a thoroughly subjugated, "annihilated" nature is the recognition of the self that we have imposed on it. As Marx would have it, "through ... production (objectification) nature appears as his world and his reality ... he contemplates himself in a world that he has created." What Marx takes to be the authentic form of recognition, then, is in Hegel's eyes but a narcissistic form of self-contemplation that lacks the reciprocity that genuine recognition demands. Objectification fails to effect any real identification between humans and nature but only establishes the identification of humans with the mirror image.[23]

Baudrillard considers the metaphysical overdetermination of human nature by the symbolic code of the Enlightenment to be uncritically accepted by Marx. The emphasis on work, political economy, economic exploitation, alienation, and the labor theory of value by Marx meant that he was captured by the metaphysics of political economy, which was the very thing he attempted to escape. Thus many of the concepts and theories rejected at the conscious level are reintroduced at the unconscious level. These critiques of Marx as having reduced the self-constitutive process of the formation of the species-being to instrumental activity (work), objectification (production), or to the metaphysics of Enlightenment political economy clearly miss the major points about the expanded framework of Marx' epistemology and method of political economy. An inclusion of the latter results in a very different interpretation of praxis and the communicative ethic. The notion of praxis, as an epistemological, meta-theoretical, and political category, transforms the one-dimensional understanding of it as simply

work, that is, as a category of political economy only. His whole insight is opposed to both the "mirror of nature" and the "mirror of production" paradigms. The above chapters have analysed in detail the meta-theory underlying this critical perspective which includes:

1. the crisis of science
2. the crisis of inductive/deductive logic
3. the 'dilemma of objective validity'
4. the constitution theory of truth
5. the critique of reason
6. the phenomenological radicalization of truth-claims
7. the critique of epistemology
8. the ontological and logical split between thought and reality
9. method as dialectical critique (method, time, and materialism)
10. Marx' critique of epistemology and foundationalism
11. the law of value and critique of political economy
12. the theory of social practice

These all lead to a vastly different understanding of social action, social knowledge, and the self-formative process of the species-being. The meta-critique of political economy in the end leaves us with a position going in a similar direction to some of the very same authors critical of Marx. The difference, however, is that Marx includes the critique of political economy and the structural analysis of capitalist society through the law of value. This interpretation of Marx and his importance for the 21st century lies in a reincorporation of sociology and philosophy - the critique of political economy, hermeneutics, and critical theory. It understands knowledge as a political process in the self-enlightenment of the species and the social consciousness of the individual.

We have analyzed the "epistemological critique" in Chapter Five through the examination of the manner in which German Idealism and materialism appropriated the epistemological problem and 'dilemma of objective validity' of David Hume. Marx' self-consciousness and social critique are not simply the aggregate of his disenchantment and alienation from the social system, but the product of a successive incorporation of the classical German tradition's epistemological self-understanding into a critical synthesis whose central focus is the political economy. To reduce this form of knowledge simply to instrumental rationality without recognizing how it too is "a reconstruction of the history of the species"[24], a reconstruction of the greatness of the Western intellectual traditions, is to misunderstand and under-estimate Marx' accomplishments. This is not an attempt to justify Marx at all cost, but rather to understand his contributions to contemporary

epistemological analysis and the social critique of capitalism. The traditional views of social philosophy, morality, and epistemology central to the self-formation of the species-being of Western man are subtly and humanistically synthesized into a comprehensive critique (science) of the modern loss of this self-formative process and the potential of mankind. By overlooking this and centering his analysis of Marx' epistemology on the latter's early anthropology, Habermas has lost the truly critical edge of the synthesis of the traditions with modernity, philosophy with political economy. This critique of Habermas is not an attempt to undermine the immense progress he has made in social theory; its purpose is to reconstruct critically the value of Marx' thought to contemporary theorists. Mainly, however, it is an attempt to view Marx from the perspective of the broadest possible panorama of the intellectual traditions which he integrated. It is a modest attempt to overcome the modern philosophical disease of social amnesia[25], by the return to political economy and classical German metaphysics.

V. SOCIAL ETHICS AND THE META-THEORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

From Hume's critique of science, its philosophical foundations and justification, and the principle of objective validity, to Hegel's critique of Kant's transcendental theory of reflection, objectivity, science, and rationality, to the Schelling-Feuerbach critique of Hegel's theory of objectivity and identity theory, to Marx' critique of epistemology and traditional science, his theory of science as 'critique', and the dialectic of the Concept, questions of truth- and validity-claims became questions about social practice. That is, they became issues about the nature and structure of a society, which could permit free and unrestrained social interaction, unhampered by false universality or objectivity in the political economy and the cultural realm, *i.e.*, alienated consciousness, fetishized social relationships, an economic science of reified appearances, ideological distortions of consciousness, *etc.*

> Only in a community has each individual the means of cultivating his gifts in all directions; only in community, therefore, is personal freedom possible. By 'community' Marx has in mind a sincere and multi-faceted relationship binding each individual to everyone else in his society. Such a bond can only come into existence after all artificial barriers to the mutual involvement of people have been torn down. Its first prerequisite is the abolition of classes. Only then can all man's social functions register as free activity; only

then, in Marx' words, 'is personal freedom possible'.[26]

Marx' meta-critique leads us to further questions about the nature of social practice with its critique and change of political economy and all institutions which distort and inhibit the development of rational self-consciousness. Implicit within this is a theory of the good society. This line of approach also causes us to raise the same old epistemological questions about truth- and validity-claims, but now in the context of his 'theory and praxtice'.

There are a variety of methods used by Marx throughout his works but the four important ones for appreciating his analysis of capitalist social formation in his later writings include an immanent critique, the use of his labor theory of value, his critique of fetishism and false objectivity, and his theory of economic exploitation. In all four instances, the above considered epistemological considerations and Marx' self-conscious integration of the classical self-reflective moments of the development of man's species-being are crucial for an understanding of the intentions and goals of Marx' critiques. The argument developed above also indicates that, since Marx was critical of traditional epistemologies and science, his view of 'science' contained strong normative or ethical components. Ethics could not be divorced from science nor could it be divorced from the analysis of the structures of capitalist society. Today with the writings of Rawls, Nozick, Nielsen, Novak, and Benne this seems to be a more and more common interpretation of the relation between ethics and social science in the academy.[27] Taylor recognizes this about Hegel when he writes "for Hegel, in contrast, morality can only achieve a concrete context in politics, in the design of the society we have to further and sustain".[28]

Seventeenth-century ethics has not fared well and has either been reduced to positivism and social engineering of the proper social order (Hobbes to Comte), has been eliminated as another form of meaningless metaphysics by logical positivism, or has been reduced to a meta-morality or consideration of the logical foundations of moral choices (contemporary analytic philosophy). With the meta-theoretical changes introduced by Marx in his later writings, he has rescued both ethics and political economy from 19th-century positivism and has rethought the relationship between ethics and society in a fashion not unlike attempts in the classical traditions of Jerusalem and Athens. Where epistemology is transformed into political economy, the nature of the social structure becomes a crucial ethical question. When knowledge becomes a social product again, the classical traditions become, in turn, more important. Since the 'dilemma of objective validity' had forced Hegel and Marx to social theory to explain the development of modern consciousness, now ethics must be re-introduced to explain and evaluate

the nature of the institutions that form the content of that social practice. Ethics will thus deal with the following:

1. the examination of the values and assumptions underlying the method of Marx' social critique of political economy - *epistemology.*
2. analysis of species-being, alienation, and the beginnings of a theory of the good society, which will also form the normative basis for his critiques - *social philosophy.*
3. establishing the guidelines for the analysis of the critique itself and the institutions which would undermine the developmental potential of the species-being, self-consciousness, and freedom - *political economy.*
4. tentative acceptance of liberalism and its political values for the purposes of an immanent critique of capitalism - *methodology.*
5. integration of the classical ethical traditions with their emphasis on human creativity (critique of idolatry), self-realization and human potentiality (Greek ethics), and political consensus (phronesis and praxis) - *classical ethics.*
6. the development of Marx' theory of political and human emancipation and his labor theory of value with its implicit demand for equality and social justice - *theory of human rights.*
7. analysis of the contradictions of use-value and exchange-value, material production and value production (theory of labor abstraction and value production), and the economic crisis theory as both the economic and moral breakdown of capitalist society - *social ethics.*

Within each of these elements there are strong humanistic values and assumptions that reflect the same interests and concerns as Marx' earlier writings from Paris. The one theme which holds all his methodological approaches and theoretical perspectives together is his critique of alienation and false objectivity. Anything which impinges on the prospects for a free, rational human development within society is ruthlessly condemned, whether it is the specific social institutions which rob us of our ability to act and choose freely (religion, state, market economy, fragmented workplace as examined in his early writings), the cultural abstractions of false consciousness (his critique of Hegel, Feuerbach, and the Left Hegelians in his middle period), or the abstractions and fetishism of modern political economy, science and the creation of autonomous economic laws that overwhelm and destroy human intervention (later writings). Anything which interferes with the process of self-realization and human creativity (subjectivity) destroys the possibilities inherent in being human. The false objectivity of alienated labor, cultural abstractions, fetishized social relations, and objectified trans-historical laws undermines the power of rationality and

social praxis (human intervention).

The analysis of the social process and sociological foundations of economic laws in *Capital* was simply the furtherance of Marx' initial anthropological, ethical, and epistemological premises as found in his earlier ethical writings. Their alienation was viewed as the result of the social relations of production and the private ownership of the means of production. At the end of his life this same notion of alienation encompassed an understanding of the totality of the social processes and relationships underneath the appearances of the economic laws of a competitive market economy. No longer concerned with the simple anthropological questions and the relation between capital and species-being, he now had the method capable of revealing the inner logic of capitalism. It was this analysis which revealed the ethical breakdown of the system's ability to realize its own moral claims. These claims could free us from the ideology of materialism and modernity and give us the awareness and possibility of reclaiming our rights and future in social praxis, no longer tied to the contradictions of the market economy. This is the hidden secret of *Capital* - that there was a breakdown thesis running throughout, but not an historical, economic breakdown, but an ethical one. Marx' analysis showed how the liberal tradition and its ethical values only ideologically shielded and distorted the actual logical and historical structures and development of this system.

Marx has shown us that the appearances of social justice and equality within the wage-labor system are unreal and an illusion. So too with economic laws. The business cycle and the laws of overproduction, as part of the rationality of the market, are only part of a society whose social relations are capitalistic and whose production is based on abstract labor, exchange-value, and economic exploitation of unpaid labor. Unemployment and poverty, the physical and psychological suffering of the mass of people are not the result of a transcendent law of economics, but a law inherent in the value system of capitalism, and the social structures resulting from the law of value. The liberty and freedom of utilitarian liberalism produced by such a system reduce us to our least common denominator as passive consumers and crude materialists. The ideals of liberalism continue to immunize us from critical thought and social action. Rationality is reduced to a technical reason concerned with success in the marketplace and material consumption.

Marx has rescued the concept of rationality from this fetishism and materialist reductionism by reincorporating some of the key insights of the classical tradition into his political economy. This has not been generally understood simply because Marx' early writings are separated off from his later ones and the latter were, in turn written off as deterministic and scientistic. This was done because of their apparent

positivism, or because of their failure correctly to reproduce and historically predict the breakdown of the system, or because of their failure to anticipate the alterations and structural transformations of later capitalism. The epistemological and methodological assumptions of his critical method in *Capital* lead us to a consideration of the normative basis of science. The analysis of the ethical imperatives inherent in the critique of the 19th-century German thirst for subjectivity, self-consciousness, and freedom takes on, in turn, a more intense and profound meaning. *Capital* is Marx' categorical imperative to take control over our own lives and the society we have failed self-consciously to construct. Buchanan expresses this in his remarks on Marx' concept of alienation and positive freedom in his latest work.

> Similarly, the worker in capitalism periodically produces more goods than can be purchased, with the result that the system suffers "underconsumption crises." Capitalists in turn react by cutting back production - and they do this by laying off workers. In a sense, then, the worker's own creation, over which he exercises no control, dominates and harms him. More generally, Marx charges that worker and capitalist alike help to create a system of social institutions and social relations over which no one can exercise effective control and that in this broader sense the creation dominates the creator in the market system.[29]

Marx simply raised the classical philosophical traditions out of their abstract theorizing and made them real driving forces for an analysis and understanding of the nature of man and society and the potentials of each. The critique of the loss of potentiality and self-realization as a result of the alienating productive relations and technological forces of the workplace in the early works is supplemented with the critique of the loss of control over the structure of the whole social system and the immutable laws of capitalist development. The reputed split between the early philosophical works and the later positivistic works is the result of the failure to analyze properly Marx' theory of science and the continuity between his early and later writings over the issue of his theories of knowledge and objectivity. Once the positivism of his later works crumbles, so too do the myths of the separation of philosophy and science, humanism and naturalism, early and later writings.

Throughout *Capital* Marx' social ethics are implicit within the normative assumptions of his methodological approaches mentioned above. The philosophical and ethical assumptions of his critique of fetishism, his critique of the liberal values of free exchange and equality in the market (production and consumption), and the underlying historical and exploitative social relations of a society dichotomized by

value- and material-rationalization, alienated labor and private property, form the ethical framework for his analysis of capitalism. Gould has argued that underlying Marx' labor theory of value and his provisional acceptance of the liberal values of a simple commodity exchange at the end of Part II in the first volume of *Capital*, there is an implicit theory of property rights and abstract justice. In his analysis of the labor process itself and its actual structures, Marx concludes that capitalism undermines its own explicitly stated value system. These rights are "violated in the processes of alienation and exploitation in production."[30]

> [B]y a peculiar logic, the right of property undergoes a dialectical inversion, so that on the side of capital it becomes the right to an alien product, or the right of property over alien labor, the right to appropriate alien labor without equivalent, and, on the side of labor capacity, it becomes the duty to relate to one's own labor or to one's own product as to alien property.[31]

Gould completes her analysis of the *Grundrisse* by explicating Marx' underlying theory of abstract justice as the conditions for self-realization through social mutuality. This would entail four fundamental principles of justice: *one*, equal access to the means of production; *two*, equal right to determine the forms of social organization; *three*, equal rights to the conditions of positive freedom or self-realization; and *four*, social mutuality and respect (Kant's kingdom of ends). For Marx a theory of social justice or social ethics entails an understanding of the social relations of political economy, which also forms the framework within which social practice and truth can be established (epistemology). It is a thread which connects the early to the later Marx and also the classical Jewish and Greek traditions to Marxist political economy. In these traditions it is the recognition of and respect for the personhood of man that are central. It represents the importance of the inviolability of the dignity of the individual and the dialectical relationship between the individual and the social. In the Jewish tradition the critique of idolatry and false objectivity is picked up by Marx in his critique of false universalism and ideology. The Greek tradition has added to this by clarifying the nature of the social individual and moral self-realization within the social context. Aristotle's ethical theory, its later meta-theoretical implications for Marx' notion of critical science, and his idea of praxis as practical wisdom expands further the issue of social mutuality and human dignity.[32] Ethics and social knowledge are to extend these values of social critique and not establish theories which distort the relationships between subjectivity and objectivity and turn self-creativity into epistemological and historical passivity.

Since in neither philosophy, science, nor morality is there a privileged access to truth, it will be social praxis which must form the framework for the continued search for truth in all three. They require an understanding of the behavior, institutions, and historical changes within society that have occurred with the development of modernity, *i.e.* an understanding of political economy. Thus, there is a great deal of internal consistency in both Marx' ethics and epistemology. Both of these determining components of his meta-theory of political economy contain in them implicit normative assumptions about the nature of the individual and the structures of society. It is the concept of the individual freedom of the species-being which guides both Marx' ethics and his epistemology - guides his critique of all political economic institutions, theoretical laws, economic methodologies, and theories of objectivity which undercut the self-creative possibilities of man. This is the legacy of Marx and the legacy of the Western tradition upon which he draws deeply; it is also the profoundest hopes and aspirations of the Jewish, Greek, and German traditions. And Marx' true importance in this tradition is having kept these ideals alive at a time when human rationality, freedom, and individuality were being (and continue to be) reduced to simple market categories. The emphasis in the above work has been on exposing the inadequate interpretations of Marx' view of knowledge and his critiques of both traditional science and positivism. A further clarification of his substantive historical critique of capital, its ethical foundations in the classical traditions, and his unusual use of 'theory and practice' requires another volume. This book has examined what Marx was not doing in *Capital*; that is, positivism; the next step is to examine what he was, in fact, doing - social ethics.

NOTES

CHAPTER ONE

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